2011-10-25:  NIST’s Recommendations on the 9-11 WTC Building Collapses … GROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity – Recommendations 1, 2 & 3 (out of 30)

2011-11-18:  NIST WTC Recommendations 4-7 > Structural Fire Endurance … GROUP 2.  Enhanced Fire Endurance of Structures – Recommendations 4, 5, 6 & 7

2011-11-24:  NIST WTC Recommendations 8-11 > New Design of Structures … GROUP 3.  New Methods for Fire Resisting Design of Structures – Recommendations 8, 9, 10 & 11

2011-11-25:  NIST WTC Recommendations 12-15 > Improved Active Protection … GROUP 4.  Improved Active Fire Protection – Recommendations 12, 13, 14 & 15

2011-11-30:  NIST Recommendations 16-20 > Improved People Evacuation … GROUP 5.  Improved Building Evacuation – Recommendations 16, 17, 18, 19 & 20

2011-12-04:  NIST WTC Recommendations 21-24 > Improved Firefighting … GROUP 6.  Improved Emergency Response – Recommendations 21, 22, 23 & 24

2011-12-07:  NIST WTC Recommendations 25-28 > Improved Practices … GROUP 7.  Improved Procedures and Practices – Recommendations 25, 26, 27 & 28

2011-12-08:  NIST WTC Recommendations 29-30 > Improved Fire Education … GROUP 8.  Education and Training – Recommendations 29 & 30 (out of 30)

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Colour image showing 'The Cloud' Residential Tower Project, in Seoul (South Korea) ... which will be completed in 2015. Design by MVRDV Architects, The Netherlands. Click to enlarge.

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2011-12-15:  You know what is coming soon … so Merry Christmas & Happy New Year to One and All !!

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  1.     There were 2 Important Reasons for undertaking this Series of Posts …

(a)       The General Public, and particularly Client Organizations, should be facilitated in directly accessing the core content of the 2005 NIST WTC Recommendations.  Up to now, many people have found this to be a daunting task.  More importantly, I also wanted to clearly show that implementation of the Recommendations is still proceeding far too slowly … and that today, many significant aspects of these Recommendations remain unimplemented.  Furthermore, in the case of some recent key national standards, e.g. British Standard BS 9999, which was published in 2008 … the NIST Recommendations were entirely ignored.

As a golden rule … National Building Codes/Regulations and National Standards … cannot, should not, and must not … be applied without informed thought and many questions, on the part of a building designer !

(b)       With the benefit of hindsight, and our practical experience in FireOx International … I also wanted to add a necessary 2011 Technical Commentary to the NIST Recommendations … highlighting some of the radical implications, and some of the limitations, of these Recommendations … in the hope of initiating a much-needed and long overdue international discussion on the subject.

Colour photograph showing the Taipei 101 Tower, in Taiwan ... which was completed in 2004. Designed by C.Y. Lee & Partners Architects/Planners, Taiwan. Click to enlarge.

” Architecture is the language of a culture.”

” A living building is the information space where life can be found.  Life exists within the space.  The information of space is then the information of life.  Space is the body of the building.  The building is therefore the space, the information, and the life.”

C.Y. Lee & Partners Architects/Planners, Taiwan

[ This is a local dialect of familiar Architectural Language.  However, the new multi-aspect language of Sustainable Design is fast evolving.  In order to perform as an effective and creative member of a Trans-Disciplinary Design & Construction Team ... can Fire Engineers quickly learn to communicate on these wavelengths ??   Evidence to date suggests not ! ]

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  2.     ‘Climate Change’ & ‘Energy Stability’ – Relentless Driving Forces for Sustainable Design !

Not only is Sustainable Fire Engineering inevitable … it must be !   And not at some distant point in the future … but now … yesterday !!   There is such a build-up of pressure on Spatial Planners and Building Designers to respond quickly, creatively, intuitively and appropriately to the relentless driving forces of Climate Change (including climate change mitigation, adaptation, and severe weather resilience) and Energy Stability (including energy efficiency and conservation) … that there is no other option for the International Fire Science and Engineering Community but to adapt.  Adapt and evolve … or become irrelevant !!

And one more interesting thought to digest … ‘Green’ is not the answer.  ’Green’ looks at only one aspect of Sustainable Human & Social Development … the Environment.  This is a blinkered, short-sighted, simplistic and ill-conceived approach to realizing the complex goal of a Safe and Sustainable Built Environment.  ‘Green’ is ‘Sustainability’ for innocent children !!

Colour image showing the Shanghai Tower Project, in China ... which will be completed in 2014. Design by Gensler Architects & Planners, USA. Click to enlarge.

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  (a)      Organization for Economic Co-Operation & Development (OECD) – 2012′s Environmental Outlook to 2050

Extract from Pre-Release Climate Change Chapter, November 2011 …

‘ Climate change presents a global systemic risk to society.  It threatens the basic elements of life for all people: access to water, food production, health, use of land, and physical and natural capital.  Inadequate attention to climate change could have significant social consequences for human wellbeing, hamper economic growth and heighten the risk of abrupt and large-scale changes to our climatic and ecological systems.  The significant economic damage could equate to a permanent loss in average per capita world consumption of more than 14% (Stern, 2006).  Some poor countries would be likely to suffer particularly severely.  This chapter demonstrates how avoiding these economic, social and environmental costs will require effective policies to shift economies onto low-carbon and climate-resilient growth paths.’

  (b)      U.N. World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Greenhouse Gas Bulletin No.7, November 2011

Executive Summary …

The latest analysis of observations from the WMO Global Atmosphere Watch (GAW) Programme shows that the globally averaged mixing ratios of Carbon Dioxide (CO₂), Methane (CH₄) and Nitrous Oxide (N₂O) reached new highs in 2010, with CO₂ at 389.0 parts per million (ppm), CH₄ at 1808 parts per billion (ppb) and N₂O at 323.2 ppb.  These values are greater than those in pre-industrial times (before 1750) by 39%, 158% and 20%, respectively.  Atmospheric increases of CO₂ and N₂O from 2009 to 2010 are consistent with recent years, but they are higher than both those observed from 2008 to 2009 and those averaged over the past 10 years.  Atmospheric CH₄ continues to increase, consistent with the past three years.  The U.S. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Annual Greenhouse Gas Index shows that from 1990 to 2010 radiative forcing by long-lived Greenhouse Gases (GHG’s) increased by 29%, with CO₂ accounting for nearly 80% of this increase.  Radiative forcing of N₂O exceeded that of CFC-12, making N₂O the third most important long-lived Greenhouse Gas.

  (c)      International Energy Agency (IEA) – World Energy Outlook, November 2011

Extract from Executive Summary …

‘ There are few signs that the urgently needed change in direction in global energy trends is underway.  Although the recovery in the world economy since 2009 has been uneven, and future economic prospects remain uncertain, global primary energy demand rebounded by a remarkable 5% in 2010, pushing CO₂ emissions to a new high.  Subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption of fossil fuels jumped to over $400 billion.  The number of people without access to electricity remained unacceptably high at 1.3 Billion, around 20% of the world’s population.  Despite the priority in many countries to increase energy efficiency, global energy intensity worsened for the second straight year.  Against this unpromising background, events such as those at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and the turmoil in parts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have cast doubts on the reliability of energy supply, while concerns about sovereign financial integrity have shifted the focus of government attention away from energy policy and limited their means of policy intervention, boding ill for agreed global climate change objectives.’

Colour image showing the One World Trade Center Project, in New York City (USA) ... which will be completed in 2013. Design by Skidmore Owings & Merrill, Architects/Planners, USA. Click to enlarge.

[ Not just in the case of Tall, Super-Tall and Mega-Tall Buildings ... but the many, many Other Building Types in the Built Environment ... are Building Designers implementing the 2005 & 2008 NIST WTC Recommendations ... without waiting for Building and Fire Codes/Regulations and Standards to be properly revised and updated ??   Evidence to date suggests not ! ]

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  3.     Separate Dilemmas for Client Organizations and Building Designers …

As discussed earlier in this Series … the Fire Safety Objectives of Building and Fire Codes/Regulations are limited to:

• The protection of building users/occupants ;   and
• The protection of property … BUT only insofar as that is relevant to the protection of the users/occupants ;

… because the function of Building and Fire Codes is to protect Society.  Well, that is supposed to be true !   Unfortunately, not all Codes/Regulations are adequate or up-to-date … as we have been observing here in these posts.

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Just taking the Taipei 101 Tower as an example, I have very recently sent out three genuine, bona fide e-mail messages from our practice …

2011-12-08

Toshiba Elevator & Building Systems Corporation (TELC), Japan.

To Whom It May Concern …

Knowing that your organization was involved in the Taipei 101 Project … we have been examining your WebSite very carefully.  However, some important information was missing from there.

For our International Work … we would like to receive technical information on the Use of Elevators for Fire Evacuation in Buildings … which we understand is actually happening in the Taipei Tower, since it was completed in 2004.

The Universal Design approach must also be integrated into any New Elevators.

Can you help us ?

C.J. Walsh

[2012-01-10 ... No reply yet !]

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2011-12-12

Mr. Thomas Z. Scarangello P.E. – Chairman & CEO, Thornton Tomasetti Structural Engineers, New York.

Dear Thomas,

Knowing that your organization was involved in the structural design of the Taipei 101 Tower, which was completed in 2004 … and in the on-going design of many other iconic tall, super-tall and mega-tall buildings around the world … we have been examining your Company Brochures and WebSite very carefully.  However, some essential information is missing.

As you are certainly aware … implementation of the 2005 & 2008 National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) Recommendations on the Collapse of WTC Buildings 1, 2 & 7, in New York, on 11 September 2001 … is still proceeding at a snail’s pace, i.e. very slowly.  Today, many significant aspects of NIST’s Recommendations remain unimplemented.

For our International Work … we would like to understand how you have responded directly to the NIST Recommendations … and incorporated the necessary additional modifications into your current structural fire engineering designs.

Many thanks for your kind attention.  In anticipation of your prompt and detailed response …

C.J. Walsh

[2012-01-10 ... No reply yet !]

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2011-12-14

Mr. C.Y. Lee & Mr. C.P. Wang, Principal Architects – C.Y. Lee & Partners Architects/Planners, Taiwan.

Dear Sirs,

Knowing that your architectural practice designed the Taipei 101 Tower, which was completed in 2004 … and, later, was also involved in the design of other tall and super-tall buildings in Taiwan and China … we have been examining your Company WebSite very carefully.  However, some essential information is missing.

As you are probably aware … implementation of the 2005 & 2008 U.S. National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) Recommendations on the Collapse of WTC Buildings 1, 2 & 7, in New York City, on 11 September 2001 … is still proceeding at a snail’s pace, i.e. very slowly.  Today, many significant aspects of NIST’s Recommendations remain unimplemented.

For our International Work … we would like to understand how you have responded directly to the NIST Recommendations … and incorporated the necessary additional modifications into your current architectural designs.

Many thanks for your kind attention.  In anticipation of your prompt and detailed response …

C.J. Walsh

[2012-01-10 ... No reply yet !]

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So … how many Clients, or Client Organizations, are aware that to properly protect their interests … even, a significant part of their interests … it is vitally necessary that Project-Specific Fire Engineering Design Objectives be developed which will have a much wider scope ?   The answer is … not many !

How many Architects, Structural Engineers, and Fire Engineers fully explain this to their Clients or Client Organizations ?

And how many Clients/Client Organizations either know that they should ask, or have the balls to ask … their Architect, Structural Engineer and Fire Engineer for this explanation … and furthermore, in the case of any High-Rise Building, Iconic Building, or Building having an Important Function or an Innovative Design … ask the same individuals for some solid reassurance that they have responded directly to the 2005 & 2008 NIST WTC Recommendations … and incorporated the necessary additional modifications into your current designs … whatever current Building and Fire Codes/Regulations do or do not say ??   A big dilemma !

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A common and very risky dilemma for Building Designers, however, arises in the situation where the Project Developer, i.e. the Client/Client Organization … is the same as the Construction Organization.  The Project Design & Construction Team - as a whole - now has very little power or authority if a conflict arises over technical aspects of the design … or over construction costs.  An even bigger dilemma !!

Colour image showing the Kingdom Tower Project, in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) ... which will be completed in 2018. Design by Adrian Smith & Gordon Gill Architecture, USA. Click to enlarge.

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  4.     The Next Series of Posts – 2008 NIST WTC Recommendations

In the new year of 2012 … I will examine the later NIST Recommendations which were a response to the Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse of World Trade Center Building No.7.

Colour image showing the Signature Tower Project, in Jakarta (Indonesia) ... which will be completed in 2016. Design by Smallwood Reynolds Stewart Stewart Architects & Planners, USA. Click to enlarge.

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  5.     Please … Your Comments, Views & Opinions ?!?

The future of  Conventional Fire Engineering ended on the morning of Tuesday, 11 September 2001, in New York City … an engineering discipline constrained by a long heritage deeply embedded in, and manacled to, an outdated and inflexible prescriptive approach to Codes/Regulations and Standards … an approach which is irrational, ignores the ‘real’ needs of the ‘real’ people who use and/or occupy ‘real’ buildings … and, quite frankly, no longer makes any scientific sense !!

On the other hand … having confronted the harsh realities of 9/11 and the Mumbai ‘Hive’ Attacks, and digested the 2005 & 2008 NIST WTC Recommendations … Sustainable Fire Engineering … having a robust empirical basis, being ‘person-centred’, and positively promoting creativity … offers the International Fire Science and Engineering Community a confident journey forward into the future … on many diverse routes !

This IS the only appropriate response to the exciting architectural innovations and fire safety challenges of today’s Built Environment.

BUT … what do you think ?

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END

ILO – EU CEDEFOP

‘Skills for Green Jobs – A Global View’  (a synthesis report based on 21 country reports)

Click the Link Above to read and/or download PDF File (5.3 Mb)

The vision is positive … its advice is practical … and the writers actually sound as if they know what they are talking about.  And it is evident that the word ‘green’ is used, in this Report, as a simple means of communicating the far more complex concept of ‘sustainable human and social development’, with all of its many different aspects.  Judge for yourself by reading the extract from the Executive Summary below.

This Report’s contents also complement, very neatly, what has been said here in many posts … concerning the institutional infrastructure necessary, in societies, to properly implement an effective response to policies of energy conservation and security, climate change and sustainable development.

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WAYS FORWARD  [ Pages xxiv to xxvi, Executive Summary, ILO - EU CEDEFOP Report: 'Skills for Green Jobs - A Global View' ]

It is important to remember that skills are not a poor servant of the economy, expected merely to react and adjust to any change.  The availability of a suitably trained workforce capable of further learning inspires confidence that in turn encourages investment, technical innovation, economic diversification and job creation.

Policies Need to be Informed, Coherent and Co-Ordinated

When policies to green the economy and policies to develop skills are not well connected, skill bottlenecks will slow the green transformation, and potential new jobs will be lost.  Strategic, leadership and management skills that enable policy-makers in governments, employers’ associations and trade unions to set the right incentives and create enabling conditions for cleaner production and services are an absolute priority.

Environmental awareness as an integral part of education and training at all levels, introduced as a core skill from early childhood education onwards, will eventually push consumer behaviour and preferences and the market itself.

Labour market information for anticipating and monitoring skill needs for green jobs is the critical starting point for effective policy cycles.  This enables governments and businesses to anticipate changes in the labour market, identify the impact on skill requirements, incorporate changes into the system by revising training programmes and introducing new ones, and monitor the impact of training on the labour market.

The country studies that told the most successful stories prove the value of effective co-ordination among line ministries and social partners, achieved by creating task forces for human resource development for a greening economy, or by incorporating training and skills issues into a council for environmental development.  It is important that the platform for this dialogue has decision-making authority, can establish clear commitments among all those partners involved and allocate human and financial resources to them, and has agreed responsibilities not only for planning but for implementation.  A win–win situation can only be achieved if environment, jobs and skills are discussed, planned and implemented in conjunction with each other.

Decentralized approaches can actually promote policy co-ordination and coherence at sectoral and local levels.  Direct dialogue between national and regional governments and social partners can be translated into action when commitments and resource allocation occur at a smaller scale and where immediate dividends are obvious for all partners involved.  A good combination of top-down co-ordinated policy-making with bottom-up sectoral or local initiatives can support effective training-intensive green transitions.

Policies Need to be Targeted

The transformation to greener economies provides an opportunity to reduce social inequalities.  Social justice dictates that training initiatives target those who lose jobs during the transition, especially those who are typically at a disadvantage in the labour market and may require special assistance.  The growth dividend from greening the economy will be attained only if access to new training provided as part of green measures is made accessible to disadvantaged youth, persons with disabilities, rural communities and other vulnerable groups.  Incentives to increase women’s participation in technical training programmes will not only increase their participation in technology-driven occupations but also help solve the skill shortage problem in this segment of the labour market.

Green Transitions Affect the Entire Training System

Taking into account all three types of skills change – that resulting from employment shifts within and across sectors as the consequence of green restructuring, that associated with new and emerging occupations, and the massive change in the content of established occupations – it becomes clear that the whole training system must be mobilized.  Adjusting training programmes to green changes in the labour market is a transversal task across levels and types of education and training.

So far, compulsory level and tertiary education have been catching up rather well, whereas technical and vocational education and training has been lagging behind in adapting to the needs of the green economy.  Improving adjustment here can give new impetus to employment-centred and fair green transitions and requires the following key challenges to be met:

• Putting basic skills high on the policy agenda, as a foundation of flexibility and employability throughout the life cycle ;
• Matching classroom and practical training through apprenticeships, internships, job placements, projects on the job etc ;
• Adjusting the length and breadth of training provision according to different types of skills change ;
• Equipping teachers and trainers with up-to-date knowledge on environmental issues and on green technologies – education and training which deals with preparation of teachers and trainers should be one of the first priorities in skills response strategies ;
• Enabling active labour market policy measures (ALMP’s) to take into account green structural change and to provide access to relevant training and other employment activation measures ;    and
• Deploying public employment services (PES), as important players in job matching and training, to raise awareness about green business opportunities and related skill needs.

The linchpin of effective skills development for greening the economy is co-ordination.  The degree of co ordination between public and private stakeholders and the degree of involvement of social partners are decisive.  Concerted measures need to be undertaken by governments at different levels, including the community level, employers and workers, through institutional mechanisms of social dialogue, such as national or regional tripartite councils, sector or industry skills councils, public–private partnerships and the like.

Developing Countries Need Special Measures

Developing countries, and the workers and employers in them, have the least responsibility for climate change and environmental degradation but suffer their economic and social consequences disproportionately.  Special measures that can speed their employment-centred green transformations include:

-   capacity building for employers in the informal economy and micro- and small enterprises to enter green markets in localities where they are most needed ;

-   entrepreneurship training and business coaching for young people and adults to start up green businesses in conjunction with micro-finance projects ;

-   environmental awareness among decision-makers, business leaders and administrators as well as institutions of formal and non-formal training systems ;

-   capacity building of tripartite constituents to strengthen social dialogue mechanisms and to apply these to dialogue about accessibility of training for green jobs ;   and

-   increased capacity of formal education and training systems and institutions to provide basic skills for all and to raise the skills base of the national workforce ;  this includes improving apprenticeship systems and building synergies with NGO’s that provide education and training.

These measures can only be taken if resources are available.  It is therefore recommended that not only national governments but also international partnerships in developing countries take these recommendations into account both in environment programmes and in skills development programmes.

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‘GREENING’ IRELAND’s ECONOMY ?

Ireland was not one of the countries examined in the ILO / EU CEDEFOP Project.  That should tell us a lot !

BUT … just pause for a moment … and meditate on the many skill-related issues arising from the debacle at the Priory Hall Apartment Development, in Dublin.

AND NOW … read the following extracts from recent Irish National Reports … ‘high notions’ from goats in the Kerry Mountains …

The Overarching Vision – Forfás Report: ‘Future Skills Needs of Enterprise within the Green Economy in Ireland’ (November 2010) …

” For Ireland to be the benchmark ‘smart green’ economy for population centres under 20 million by 2015 – and to have the skills base and talent to drive innovative and high value products and services and maximise future business and employment growth potential.”

Final Paragraphs, #7 Conclusions – Review of National Climate Policy (November 2011) …

” In the wider-international context, there are also encouraging signs of a new ‘green growth’ paradigm which emphasises resource efficiency, the protection of natural resources and competitiveness along with the creation of new jobs.  A long-term view of how Ireland aligns its economic development with the demands of the growth engines of global commerce should be at the core of a low-carbon development vision.  In order to create enabling conditions for selling into these markets, many of which are already gearing up for the green economy, it will be necessary to ensure that the domestic conditions are right to encourage innovation.  This can be done by showing environmental ambition and using tools that allow the market to identify solutions.  That will require a combination of taking the best of what is working in other countries as well as devising domestically appropriate policies that will place Ireland in the vanguard of countries making the most of the opportunities presented by the green economy.

In terms of a long-term national vision of a carbon-constrained world, Ireland is faced with both the challenge of addressing a unique greenhouse gas emissions profile and the opportunity to position itself as an enlightened society with an environmentally sustainable and competitive, low-carbon economy.  Developing the policies to put Ireland on a clear and definite path to achieve that vision is the immediate priority.”

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Who Are These Moráns ?!?   Will Somebody Please Get Real !?!

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END

Some time ago … Irish Minister of State at the Department of Health & Children, Ms. Kathleen Lynch T.D., released to the public a report on the future policy of disability in Ireland.  The report was drawn up by an Expert Reference Group at the request of the Department.  Submissions were sought from the public and interested groups on this document, entitled ‘Report of Disability Policy Review’.

The Report, and other ‘supporting’ information, can be downloaded from the Department’s WebSite at … http://www.dohc.ie/consultations/

Submissions had to be received by the Department, at the latest, on Friday 4 November 2011.

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As you read through the SDI Submission below, please also note well that on the 2 Web Pages of the Department’s Site …

• Background to Report of Disability Policy Review ;   and
• Summary of Key Proposals from The Review of Disability Policy ;

… there is not one single mention of the word ‘rights’ !

In a post back on 17 February 2009 … concerning another disability matter, i.e. the complete lack of ‘accessible’ emergency services for people with a hearing impairment in our country, I wrote:

‘ Irish Politicians and Senior Civil Servants would all rather commit ritual suicide on Merrion Street (outside the Dáil and Government Buildings) than give people with disabilities their rights.’

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The following is the recent Submission made by Sustainable Design International … and submitted to the Department of Health & Children on 4 November 2011 …

Re: The Future of Disability Policy in Ireland – SDI Submission

Ms. Kathleen Lynch T.D., Minister of State,  c/o Office for Disability & Mental Health, Department of Health & Children, Hawkins House, Dublin 2.

Dear Minister,

It is reassuring to see that the following two documents, available for download from the Department’s WebSite, contain extensive references to Human Rights and, particularly, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities …

     -  Report of Disability Policy Review – Prepared by Ms. Fiona Keogh PhD, on behalf of the Expert Reference Group on Disability Policy (October 2011) ;

     -  Report on Public Consultation: Efficiency & Effectiveness of Disability Services in Ireland – Review of Disability Services under the Value for Money & Policy Review Initiative 2009-2011 (December 2010).

And yet … the following document, also available for download from the Department’s WebSite, does not make one single reference to Human Rights …

     -  Summary of Key Proposals from The Review of Disability Policy (October 2011).

It is a matter of deep concern how such a fundamental issue can suddenly, and with malign intent, be erased from view … and understanding !

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Whether or not Ireland has ratified the United Nations 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is no longer relevant.

The European Union (EU), having its own legal personality after the Lisbon Treaty, did ratify the UN Convention … back on 23 December 2010.

Therefore, Ireland is now bound by a Duty of Loyal Co-Operation, deriving from Article 4.3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

This Duty embraces two sets of obligations:  1) All EU Member States shall take appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the EU Treaties or resulting from action taken by the EU Institutions;  and 2) All EU Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the European Union’s tasks, and shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.

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In complete contrast to Ireland’s Current Disability Policy … Future Disability Policy must now be re-drafted, and implemented, in a manner where:

a)  Explicit reference is made, throughout, to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities … and to the fact that there is now a robust rights-based foundation to Ireland’s National Disability Policy ;

and

b)  There is a full, comprehensive and correct response to all of the contents of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

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I would specifically draw your attention to Articles 31 & 33 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities … which together mandate that implementation is taken seriously … that it is competent and effective … and, most importantly, that independent monitoring and verification is a fundamental part of the whole policy development and implementation process.

In closing, may I add that the treatment of ‘Accessibility’ in all of the documents is careless, and disgracefully inadequate !!

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Sustainable Design International  is a professional and multi-disciplinary design, engineering, research and consultancy practice – specializing in the theory and implementation of a Sustainable Human Environment (social - built - virtual - economic).

Our Organization possesses a unique level of expertise on all aspects of Human Environment Accessibility for People with Activity Limitations.

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Yours,

C. J. Walsh,  Consultant Architect, Fire Engineer & Technical Controller.

Managing Director, Sustainable Design International Ltd. – Ireland & Italy.  Sürdürülebilir Tasarım Tic.Ltd.Şti. – Turkey.

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END

BUT … is anybody out there asking the questions: “Are Our Buildings Safer ?” … and … “Are Our Firefighters Safer ?”   AND … if you do ask those questions … are you able to distinguish between solid, reliable information and ‘spin’ ?

So many Irish people, and people of Irish descent, were directly involved in this traumatic event … working inside the WTC offices, as stockbrokers … or outside, as maintenance personnel, or firefighters, policemen and women, or as members of the emergency medical services …

Colour photograph showing the thick cloud of toxic dust and debris spreading rapidly throughout lower Manhattan, and beyond, after the Second Tower Collapse (WTC 1/North Tower) just before 10.30 hrs (local time) on the morning of 11 September 2001. Earlier, seismic sensors located 160 Km away had recorded the time and intensity of the First Tower Collapse (WTC 2/South Tower) at 09.59 hrs (local time). Click to enlarge.

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REALPOLITIK

The previous post about the United Nations Gaza Flotilla Report, I hope, created an uncertainty in your mind … a worrying thought regarding political interference and the negative, and very often, destructive influence of vested interests … which is a necessary frame of mind to have, also, for an essential discussion – on the 10th Anniversary of the 9-11 WTC Incident – about the Safety of Our Buildings, particularly High-Rise Buildings, Iconic Buildings, and those Buildings having a Critical Function and/or an Innovative Design … and the Safety of Our Firefighters.

By ‘Our Buildings’ … I don’t just mean buildings in Ireland, or Europe … I mean buildings on every continent of our small planet.  And … such a discussion must be trans-disciplinary, involving the use of simple language only … because it is necessary for each discipline to clearly understand what the others are saying (this rarely happens !) … and the discussion must also be transparent to, and be easily assimilated by, the general population in all of our societies.  And by ‘Our Firefighters’ … I mean firefighters worldwide.

Concerning the Gaza Flotilla Report … we could ask …

• Would the Findings and Recommendations have been different … if there had been 4 independent and obviously impartial people on the Panel of Inquiry instead ?   The answer is … yes, of course !   And …
• Why did UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon nominate President Álvaro Uribe (Vice-Chair), an ‘ultra’ rightwing politician from Columbia … and Mr. Joseph Ciechanover Itzhar, an Israeli, to serve on the Panel ?   I will leave you to answer that for yourself …

The important point I wish to make is that the community of International Fire Science and Engineering – just like every other ‘human’ community – is not immune from these sorts of malevolent influences !

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Colour photograph showing advanced clean up operations at the World Trade Center Complex after 11 September 2001. Fires continued to smoulder for weeks after the Incident. Click to enlarge.

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LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF 9-11

Just five weeks after the 9-11 World Trade Center (WTC) Incident in New York … I found myself in Manhattan for the purpose of making an important presentation to a conference which was taking place not far from Madison Square Garden … while staying Down-Town in Battery Park City, at an apartment within the Security Zone.  Yes, I was worried and fearful before going … but …

Environmental Impact:  Any effect caused by a given activity on the environment, including human health, safety and welfare, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, climate, landscape and historical monuments or other physical structures, or the interactions among these factors; it also includes effects on accessibility, cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to those factors.

On first arriving in the city, by taxi from Kennedy Airport … I witnessed, at first hand, the racist hostility of a policeman towards our coloured Asian driver, who had simply asked about the procedure to pass through the Security Zone Boundary.  Later, walking near the WTC Site, I would encounter the ‘macho’ behaviour of many National Guardsmen on security duty.

At the conference, I met a person who was literally unable to speak – could not even bear to talk about – the 9-11 Incident.

Everywhere south of Canal Street was in a terrible, horrific condition.

The weather, fortunately, had remained generally very good … sunny, with a light breeze coming in from the sea.  Then, unexpectedly, one day towards the end of my stay … the sky was overcast and the air stood still … in lower Manhattan, it assaulted my eyes, nose and the back of my throat.  Many times, during that particular day, I retched … but could not vomit !   Yet, a representative of the U.S. EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) announced that there was no problem with air quality !   Meanwhile, in Mid-Town, everything ‘appeared’ normal.

10 Years Afterwards … people, communities and the country (USA) are all still suffering … physically, mentally and psychologically … from the 9-11 WTC Incident … unable to ask for help, or perhaps, too proud or ashamed to speak up.

September 2001 – World Health Organization

WHO: How to Address Psychosocial Reactions to Catastrophe

Click the Link Above to read and/or download PDF File (12.5 kb)

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10 YEARS AFTER 9-11 – ARE OUR BUILDINGS & FIREFIGHTERS SAFER ?

Or to put it in a more technical way … how are the Critical Recommendations contained in the 2005 & 2008 NIST(USA) Reports on the 9-11 WTC Buildings 1, 2 & 7 Collapses being implemented ?   And, what is the quality of that implementation ?

At this time, two years ago … I asked …

• Why are so many Key Institutions and Organizations in the International Building Sector still desperately trying to ignore and/or deny the Recommendations in those 2 NIST Reports ?
• Why have National Building and Fire Codes/Regulations and Standards not yet been revised to respond, properly and satisfactorily, to the NIST Recommendations ?
• Why can we not yet use All Lifts (Elevators) in a Building during a fire incident ?   Why are Lift (Elevator) Manufacturers still actively resisting this necessary change ?

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Colour image showing an Ostrich with its Head in the Sand ... an accurate description of the International 'Technical' Reaction to the 9-11 WTC Incident ... "it never happened" ... or "it was a unique event, and it will never happen again" ... or "this unusual event only has implications for very, very, very tall buildings" ... blah, blah, blah !!

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The answers to the questions are NO … and NO … minor revisions (tinkering at the edges) have been made to Codes/Regulations & Standards in some countries … and, generally, progress on implementing the NIST Recommendations is proving to be very slow … too slow !   Most surprisingly, no revisions have been made to Codes/Regulations & Standards in many countries.

To illustrate tinkering at the edges … refer to the USA’s International Building Code (2012 Edition) … which, despite its grandiose title, is really just another of the USA’s National Model Building Codes … and check out this very disappointing Article: ‘Evolution of Building Code Requirements in a Post 9/11 World’, by David Drengenberg and Gene Corley, in the recently published Special Issue III (2011) of the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat (CTBUH) Journal … which is available at  http://www.ctbuh.org/

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Progress at the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), in the USA, is a little more apparent … but still, far too little and far too slow.  Check out this recent Special 9-11 Report: ‘A Decade of Difference’, by Fred Durso Jr … on the NFPA WebSite … http://www.nfpa.org/publicJournalDetail.asp?categoryID=2248&itemID=53000&src=NFPAJournal …

And … released earlier this year, NFPA’s Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service has identified ‘areas of ongoing concern’ !!

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To Be Continued …

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END

Colour photograph showing the MV Mavi Marmara aid-carrying ship leaving the port of Antalya, in Southern Turkey ... on 22 May 2010 ... for Gaza, in Palestine.

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On 2 August 2010 … UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, established a Panel of Inquiry to report on the 31 May 2010 Gaza Flotilla Incident in the International Waters of the Mediterranean Sea.  The Panel Team consisted of 4 Members …

• Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Chair ;
• President Álvaro Uribe, Vice-Chair ;
• Mr. Joseph Ciechanover Itzhar ;   and
• Mr. Süleyman Özdem Sanberk.

The Panel’s Report was released by the United Nations last Friday, 2 September 2011 … and can be downloaded from the following address … http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf

The Findings and Recommendations contained in the Panel’s Report have been widely covered since then, at national and international levels, in the various news media.

Colour photograph showing the 2010 Gaza Flotilla Panel of Inquiry Team ... Mr. Süleyman Özdem Sanberk, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, President Álvaro Uribe and Mr. Joseph Ciechanover Itzhar ... with UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, in the centre. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

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For a More Balanced Presentation of the Recent UN Gaza Flotilla Report, however, the following short statement by Mr. Sanberk, a graduate of the Law Faculty at Istanbul University and former Turkish Ambassador, must be reproduced – in full – and widely circulated.

Mr. Sanberk’s Statement can be viewed on Page 105 (the last page !) of the Report …

” I hereby register my disagreement with the Chairmanship on the following issues contained in the report:

• The question of the legality of the blockade imposed on Gaza by Israel ;
• The actions of the flotilla ;
• Naval blockades in general ;
• Appendix: The applicable International legal principles.

This, for the following reasons:

-  On the legal aspect of the blockade, Turkey and Israel have submitted two opposing arguments.  International legal authorities are divided on the matter since it is unprecedented, highly complex and the legal framework lacks codification.  However, the Chairmanship and its report fully associated itself with Israel and categorically dismissed the views of the other, despite the fact that the legal arguments presented by Turkey have been supported by the vast majority of the International Community.  Common sense and conscience dictate that the blockade is unlawful.

-  Also the UN Human Rights Council concluded that the blockade was unlawful.  The Report of the Human Rights Council Fact Finding Mission received widespread approval from the member states.

-  Freedom and safety of navigation on the high seas is a universally accepted rule of international law.  There can be no exception from this long-standing principle unless there is a universal convergence of views.

-  The intentions of the participants in the International Humanitarian Convoy were humanitarian, reflecting the concerns of the vast majority of the International Community.  They came under attack in international waters.  They resisted for their own protection.  Nine civilians were killed and many others were injured by the Israeli soldiers.  One of the victims is still in a coma.  The evidence confirms that at least some of the victims had been killed deliberately.

-  The wording in the report is not satisfactory in describing the actual extent of the atrocities that the victims have been subjected to.  This includes the scope of the maltreatment suffered by the passengers in the hands of Israeli soldiers and officials.

In view of the above, I reject and dissociate myself from the relevant parts and paragraphs of the report, as reflected in paragraphs ii, iv, v, vii of the findings contained in the summary of the report and paragraphs ii, iv, v, vii, viii and ix of the recommendations contained in the same text.”

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END

Taken as a whole … this is also a reliable indicator with regard to what is not happening in a strongly related policy area … the implementation of EU Sustainability Policy.

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The next BIG United Nations International Climate Change Conference in 2011 – COP 17 – will take place from 28 November to 9 December, 2011 … in Durban, South Africa.  Let’s not get our hopes up for the long-awaited, very necessary and urgent Global, Legally Binding Consensus Agreement on Climate Change Mitigation to be finalized there … but let’s not be too negative either !

And how are the UNFCCC Annex I Countries doing so far ?   For an answer, please follow the link below to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) WebSite …

Official UNFCCC Map – All Annex I Countries

I wrote ‘an answer’ … as this is not ‘the answer’ … because the Climate Change Numbers produced by each country are not yet sufficiently accurate, precise and reliable.  In fact, there is so much massaging of numbers that it might be better just to imagine this whole process as the Climate Change Red Light District !

BUT … we do know enough to be able to identify the worst offenders:

• 34 – IRELAND !
• 35 – Iceland
• 36 – Greece
• 37 – Portugal
• 38 – New Zealand
• 39 – Spain
• 40 – Canada
• 41 – Australia
• 42 – Malta
• 43 – Turkey

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Looking back to when the Climate Change ‘Train’ began to come off the rails … the 2009 Copenhagen Accord was a political agreement between a small number of Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers, and Heads of Delegation from Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) and the USA … who attended the UNFCCC Climate Change Summit in December 2009.  Many countries have made voluntary submissions, i.e. not legally binding, to Appendices I and II of the Accord.

A general overview of the submissions made by the Developed Economies, however, reveals the following about the emissions targets being undertaken …

     -   they are highly conditional on the performance of other countries ;

     -   they are very disappointing … being far below what is required to cap the planetary temperature rise at 1.5 degrees Celsius ;   and

     -   there is no consistent emission base year … varying, for example, from 1990, 1992, 2000 to 2005.

This is very far from being a signal of serious intent from these countries … and is not … in any way, shape or manner … an acceptance of historical responsibilities.  It would be reasonable, therefore, to surmise that the process of achieving a global, legally binding, consensus agreement on greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets will be long and difficult.  The Climate Change Mitigation Agenda is fraught with difficulty … and is going absolutely nowhere at present !

Some Conclusions about Copenhagen and Since:

1. The Danish Organizers were entirely responsible for the 2009 Climate Change Train Wreck !   And … this incompetent bungling continues to contaminate events since then.
2. All Sectors of Europe’s Social Environment must now take seriously, i.e. pro-actively engage with, the Climate Change Adaptation Agenda … and prepare for a planetary temperature rise of at least 3-4 degrees Celsius before the end of this century !!

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Meanwhile, at national level in Ireland … and further to my post, dated 23 February 2011 … the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the following Press Release on 4 July 2011 …

‘ Kerdiffstown Landfill Remediation Project – Community Update Number No. 4

Gas flares at the Kerdiffstown Landfill are now installed and fully operational.  The flares burn off odorous gas that is collected by gas wells in two areas at the site – the lined landfill cell, and the North-West corner.

The lined landfill cell has now been fully covered with a heavy plastic membrane that will prevent gas escaping into the air.  This membrane will also stop rainwater getting into the waste and creating ‘leachate’ – the residual liquid that seeps through waste after rainfall.

These temporary gas control measures should result in a reduction in odour coming from the site.  Odour will continue to be encountered on occasion until the full remediation is completed and, in particular, there is a risk of odour during work phases where wastes will be disturbed.

The next major remedial works to occur on site will be the demolition of a number of unsafe buildings. The buildings are scheduled to be demolished in August, and the EPA will communicate the specific dates before the works commence.

On Friday, 1 July 2011, the EPA welcomed a number of TDs, councillors, council officials and members of the local community to the site for a briefing, and tour of the site works done to date.  The EPA would like to thank deputies Emmet Stagg, Anthony Lawlor, and Catherine Murphy, and Councillors Anne Breen, Emer McDaid, and Ger Dunne, for attending.

The EPA then met with members of the Local Community for the first Community Liaison Group meeting.  This group was formed to ensure that those people affected by the site can communicate directly with the people who will clean the site.  The Liaison Group includes EPA staff, Kildare County Council officials, members of CAN (Clean Air Naas), a representative from Kerdiffstown House, and local residents and business people.  The group took a tour of the site to review ongoing remedial works.

The EPA will continue to issue Community Updates as remedial works on the site take place.  For information about works at the site, go to … www.kerdiffstowncleanup.ie .’

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Please read, again, that first paragraph of the Press Release above … and pinch yourself !

Ireland’s EPA has an onerous legal responsibility with regard to the development and implementation of this country’s National Climate Change Policy.  Furthermore … the EPA, on its own WebSite ( http://www.epa.ie/ ) states the following …

‘ The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) aims to be a leader in the climate change debate in Ireland, and to be the first port of call for information on climate change.  We hope that the information we provide on these WebPages will keep you informed on the latest news, research and events in the climate change area, not only in Ireland but internationally.’

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I ask: “Why are those Landfill Gases at Kerdiffstown being burned off ???”

Because Ireland’s National Climate Change Policy is a ‘paper’ policy … an ‘Alice in Wonderland’ policy … a policy not intended for ‘real’ implementation.  Surely we have a right to expect that, within the same national organization … somebody, somewhere … is able to think laterally ?

Climate Change Time is running out … and there is an immediate and desperate need for simple, direct and honest talk, consultation, awareness raising, training and education … across all sectors of our Social Environment !

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At European level … an example, to follow below, of the continuing weak and feeble Climate Change Language still being used by EU Institutions and Official Organizations … where individual employees, of all ranks, are more fearful of offending national and/or EU politicians than they are in doing their jobs properly and protecting EU Citizens and the Environment …

A recently published European Environment Agency (EEA) Technical Report 7: ‘Safe Water & Healthy Water Services in a Changing Environment’ … summarises existing knowledge of Climate Change Impacts on water services and health; the nature and effectiveness of the policy responses; and the coverage and gaps in existing assessments of these themes.

To download the Full Technical Report, go to the EEA’s WebSite … http://www.eea.europa.eu/ .

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‘ Climate Change, Water & Health

• Millennium Development Goal 7 (MDG7) is to halve the proportion of the global population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015.  A World Health Organization (WHO) assessment in 2010 finds that access to improved water sources, sanitation and wastewater treatment has increased over the past two decades.  In many countries in the Eastern European Region, however, progress is slow.  More than 50% of the rural population in ten countries have no access to improved water, giving rise to important health inequalities.

• It is important to understand how Climate Change and Extreme Weather Events will affect the achievement of MDG7.  Drinking water supplies and sanitation systems will have to be made resilient to Climate Change, and drinking water and sanitation must be fully incorporated into integrated water resource management.

• Climate Change is projected to cause major changes in yearly and seasonal precipitation and water flow, flooding and coastal erosion risks, water quality, and the distribution of species and ecosystems.

• Climate Change will impact all areas of water services – the quality and availability of water sources, infrastructure, and the type of treatment needed to meet quality standards.  We will also see more frequent and severe droughts, flooding and weather events.

• Countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia face the greatest threats to safe water.  The infrastructure in many towns and rural areas is in poor condition, and water provision is erratic and of unsatisfactory quality.

• Heavy rainfall events may also lead to flooding, especially in urban areas, and this can have serious impacts on the performance and efficiency of water supply and wastewater treatment systems, which may potentially lead to health risks.  Waterborne diseases arise predominantly from contamination of water supplies after heavy rainfall and flooding.

• Low river flows and increased temperatures during droughts reduce dilution of wastewater effluent, and drinking water quality could be compromised, increasing the need for extra treatment of both effluent and water supplies.

Water Management Policies & Extreme Weather Events

• Water management policies at European and EU Levels are being made increasingly adaptable to Climate Change, which should help safeguard public health and ecosystem services in the future.

• There are numerous guidelines for the design of water and human health policies across Europe (e.g. WHO Guidelines on drinking water quality, Protocol on Water and Health, and draft guidance on water supply and sanitation in extreme weather).  Recently, such Guidance has focused on how policy design and implementation might be affected by and adapted to Climate Change Events.

• The WHO Vision 2030 Study assesses how and where Climate Change will affect drinking water and sanitation in the medium term, and what can be done to maximise the resilience of drinking water and sanitation systems.

• Several existing EU Policies address water management issues (the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, the Water Framework Directive, Floods Directive and the EU Water Scarcity and Droughts Strategy) and others deal more directly with potential water-related impacts on human health (e.g. the Drinking Water Directive, and Bathing Water Directive).

• There is a clear recognition that Climate Change creates a need for coherent, sustainable, cross-sectoral policy and regulation; sharing of available tools; facilitating mechanisms for partnerships and financing; and readiness to optimise across sectors during implementation.

• The water utility sector faces a unique set of challenges.  A primary challenge will be enhancing its capacity to cope with Climate Change Impacts and Other Human Pressures on water systems, while fostering greater resiliency to extreme hydrological events.

• With more frequent higher-intensity storms projected, utilities face the need to update infrastructure design practices.  This necessitates investments – not necessarily only in larger structures but also smarter (using better process control technologies) or local measures on storm water run-off.

Assessment Knowledge Base

• At international, national and local levels … much information is produced for assessments of the state of water and related health impacts.  Overall, both the current international and national water and health assessments have limited focus on extreme weather events and their effects on water services.

• In national assessments and programmes, countries appear to be aware of the adverse consequences of Climate Change on water and health.  However, sometimes assessments appear to be based on ‘expert knowledge’, largely qualitative in scope, and not going further than identifying likely scenarios.  The evidence‑base is lacking to make reliable estimates of the health effects of Climate Change resulting from impacts on water resources.

• Much effort is now focused on the impact of Climate Change on water and the environment, including health-related impacts.  Many international and European organisations have mapped out future Climate Change Impacts on water-related issues, identifying vulnerable groups and vulnerable sub-regions.

• The vast majority of the assessments of drought and water scarcity have focused on the impact of water scarcity, water use by sectors and strategies for meeting demand.  Very little consideration has been given to the health effects or consequences of future extreme weather events.

• The health effects of flooding do not feature significantly in national assessments.  The main focus is identifying regions most at risk of flooding and preparing plans for responding and mitigating the main consequences.

• Sufficient public health competences exist to cope with the health effects of Climate Change.  However, no (comprehensive) assessment has been undertaken to predict the severity or extent of future health risks related to the impact of Climate Change on water services.

• Irrespective of an assessment of the disease burden, actions being taken on the wider scale to respond to water scarcity, drought and flooding will help to reduce the health effects associated with Climate Change and water.’

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If you were a Key Decision-Maker … would this language spur you into action … or make you yawn, and put you to sleep ???

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END

     1.  Social & Economic Environments in Ireland ?

It has been a hectic few weeks here in Ireland … with successful visits to our country by Queen Elizabeth II of England and President Barack O’Bama(!) of the United States of America … not at the same time, of course … and, lest we ever forget, the Leinster Rugby Team winning the Heineken Cup in Cardiff … and the Munster Rugby Team then beating Leinster, a week later, to win the Magner’s League Final in Limerick.  It will take us a month of Sundays to recover !

It is slowly dawning on people in Ireland, however, that the Economic Environment is not the same as the Social Environment, which we are discovering is still resilient, robust, warm, vital and healthy.  As for our miserable Economic Environment … sin scéal eile (that’s another story) … please see #2 below.

Social Environment:  The complex network of real and virtual human interaction – at a communal or larger group level – which operates for reasons of tradition, culture, business, pleasure, information exchange, institutional organization, legal procedure, governance, human betterment, social progress and spiritual enlightenment, etc.

The Social Environment shapes, binds together, and directs the future development of the Built and Virtual Environments.

Built Environment:  Anywhere there is, or has been, a man-made or wrought (worked) intervention by humans in the Natural Environment, e.g. cities, towns, villages, rural settlements, service utilities, transport systems, roads, bridges, tunnels, and cultivated lands, lakes, rivers, coasts, seas, etc … including the Virtual Environment.

Economic Environment:  The intricate web of real and virtual human commercial activity – operating at micro and macro-economic levels – which facilitates, supports, but sometimes hampers or disrupts, human interaction in the Social Environment.

These are important distinctions !

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     2.  Ireland’s National Economic Governance ?

In Ireland, a big deal has been made of losing our National Economic Sovereignty.

BUT … on 19 April 2011 … the Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland was published … ‘Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland’.  This document was prepared by Mr. Peter Nyberg, a Finnish Economist … and sole member of the Commission.

Immediately, it should be pointed out that this is just one report … in a series of reports purporting to thoroughly examine separate aspects of the Economic Catastrophe which befell Ireland in the period leading up to and during 2008.  The intention of the Irish Government, at the time that these Investigations were established, was to obscure … as much as possible … the Big Picture of a Completely Corrupt & Dysfunctional System of Irish Economic Governance.  Nobody saw anything … nobody heard anything … nobody knew anything !!

In order to protect the Guilty, the Incompetent, and the Inept … individuals are typically not named in such Investigation Reports.   We - the Citizens of Ireland – are therefore not in a position to clearly identify these ‘mothers’ … as they engage in an elitist game of musical chairs around the boardrooms and senior management levels of our national institutions.

The following extract from the 2011 Nyberg Report … will give you a small, and very mild, flavour of what was happening during the Celtic Tiger Years.  Please forgive the length of the extract … but try to stick with it.  You must understand.

2011 Nyberg Report

‘Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland’

Chapter 5 – Findings & Final Considerations

5.1  Findings – General

5.1.1  The Report concentrates, as its Terms of Reference require, on explaining the reasons specifically for the Irish banking crisis.  However, it is useful to keep in mind that this crisis cannot be seen in isolation from what was happening elsewhere.  It appears, at least on the face of it, that many of the problems and failings in Irish banks and public institutions were quite similar to those in other countries.

5.1.2  For instance, Irish banks compared their policies and achievements with peer groups containing well regarded banks in the UK and the EU.  Risk management systems and remuneration practices were often adopted from abroad.  Judging from results, similar problems, as in Ireland, arose in implementing them in a manner consistent with prudent credit policies.  The relatively greater losses seen in Ireland may thus be seen as a consequence of somewhat greater abandon in accessing wholesale funding and in lending to domestic property than in other countries.  Thus, there is a difference in degree rather than in concept.

5.1.3  Similarly, central banks and regulators abroad generally were almost as unsuspecting of growing financial fragility as their Irish counterparts.  The method of regulation or the number of available macro-economists does not generally seem to have made a great deal of difference.  The same seems true of auditors, rating agencies, analysts and investors, most of whom remained calm and optimistic until the crisis actually broke.  Internal investigations in the IMF also indicate a widespread lack of understanding and clear communication of the accumulating risks by that organisation.  There were incentives to conform with prevailing views, even in cases where proper analysis would have identified growing risk.

5.1.4  The fact that Ireland was not special does not, of course, account for or diminish the failures in the performance of the people in private and public positions responsible for financial stability and prudent banking.  It does, however, put the many undoubted failings found by the Commission into perspective.  Regardless, it indicates that the problems experienced in Ireland in the 2000’s have a wider relevance, as do any suggestions on how to prevent similar things from easily happening again.

5.2  Findings – Banks

Business Models & Strategies

5.2.1  Responding to increased competition and pressure for increased earnings, banks set aggressive targets for profit growth.  In many cases, this drive for growth really implied a partial change in business model and strategy without the corresponding necessary strengthening of governance, procedures and practices.  This was accepted partly because future economic developments were trusted to remain benign in Ireland as they already had been for several years.  Comfort was also taken from peer bank practices and the lack of concern among authorities, market participants and observers.  The particular characteristics of the property and funding markets were not taken into account.

5.2.2  In practice, Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo) was a monoline bank providing rapid but not cheap financing to a number of long-standing customers mainly in the commercial property market; sales and customer retention were important drivers of activity.  Irish Nationwide Building Society’s (INBS) business model was unique and different to those of any of the other covered banks as it was concentrated primarily on speculative site finance, which proved initially to be very profitable in a rising property market.  The model was risky, however, and risk mitigation primarily involved selecting trusted and previously successful customers.  The business models of the other covered banks were more diversified, but during the Period most of them escalated their financing of commercial property in order to achieve profit growth.  While IL&P remained concentrated on mortgage lending, it was increasingly funded by the wholesale markets.

Governance & Procedures

5.2.3  The primary problem with governance in the majority of the covered banks was not that it was lacking or poorly structured but that, over time, it changed as controls gradually weakened to allow increased growth.  In some cases, management information systems were weak and did not give managers and the board meaningful or complete information.  In particular, inadequate consolidation and categorisation of lending sometimes resulted in an incomplete picture of total or type of property exposures.  In some of the bigger banks, the embedded internal divisional structures made group oversight difficult.  The INBS model was atypical; the Society lacked a number of formal functions usually considered necessary in banks and, in addition, documentation was substandard.

5.2.4  On boards, there appears to often have existed a collegiate and consensual style with little serious challenge or debate.  Among Non-Executive Directors (NED), it appears that the banking knowledge and expertise necessary to assess the lending and funding risks inherent in bank business models was insufficient.  They were therefore formally independent but, in practice, highly reliant on the knowledge, openness and ability of bank management.  In particular many NEDs, but also a number of senior management, seem to have believed that the existence of formal policies, structures and procedures were, on their own, sufficient for the prudent management of the business.  As they came to rely more on sophisticated models, partly in consequence of the introduction of Basle II, many of the basics were neglected.  It appears that senior management and boards did not appreciate how general growth targets affected operations lower down in the organisation.

5.2.5  In Anglo, some board members had significant shareholdings in the bank which indicates that they had particularly full trust in the operations and growth goals of the bank.

Remuneration

5.2.6  Financial incentives, while not the major cause of the crisis, likely contributed to the rapid expansion of bank lending since the incentives did not sufficiently stress modifiers for risk.  There are, however, also other important motivating factors which must be taken into account when assessing the behaviour of individuals.

Lending & Credit

5.2.7  Lending growth was substantial in all covered banks and was largely concentrated in the property sector.  In order to facilitate growth and make banks more competitive, credit and lending policies gradually became more relaxed and were frequently ignored or bypassed with exceptions to policy becoming commonplace.  Furthermore, sector limits and individual exposure limits, where they existed, were regularly exceeded.

5.2.8  Real estate valuations in a rising property market created a ‘confirmation bias’ and frequently went unchallenged in the credit functions.  The practice of equity release reduced the collateral buffers held by the banks and increased their risks accordingly.

Funding, Liquidity & Capital

5.2.9  On joining the EuroZone, Irish banks gained increased access to wholesale funding at a relatively low cost.  As retail and corporate deposits were not sufficient to fund lending growth, wholesale funding enabled the banks to respond to competition and to grow balance sheets and earnings at a pace that banks believed would protect their independence and market share.

5.2.10  Treasury operations, charged with the balanced and prudent funding of asset growth, were also profit centres.  This involved an inherent conflict as the use of cheaper short term funding frequently increased Treasury’s profitability at the expense of longer term funding stability.

5.2.11  There were significant increases in the loan-to-deposit ratios and in wholesale funding-to-total funding ratios.  Furthermore, risks associated with wholesale funding were not fully recognised or understood in many cases.  Banks consistently assumed that the uninterrupted and unlimited access to wholesale funding, at a low or reasonable cost, would remain.  They also believed that the option of securitising eligible portions of their portfolio would always be possible.

Risk Management

5.2.12  Risk management structures proved largely ineffective in prudently managing and controlling rapid growth.  As effective structures would have made high volume targets difficult to achieve, banks allowed their effectiveness to erode over time.  There was also insufficient understanding or acknowledgement of the risks associated with the adopted business strategies or the sector concentrations.  With easy access to funding, there was little effort by or incentive for the banks to diversify their property risks through measures such as syndications or loan selldown.  Furthermore, there was a general belief among bankers and others in political, media and academic circles (including some very influential commentators) that there would be, at worst, a soft landing.

Regulation as Seen by Banks

5.2.13  Banks, clearly somewhat in agreement with the Financial Regulator (FR) itself, believed that they were in a better position than the FR to judge and decide upon what was most prudent in their own operations.  This belief was underpinned by the fact that regulation was ‘light touch’ and seemed to stress consumer issues rather than prudential issues.  There was almost an element of the FR being ‘fobbed off’ by banks that had particularly full confidence in the quality and sophistication of their models and systems.  Subject to this, the FR and its communications were normally, however, accorded proper formal respect.

5.2.14  There were numerous instances of non-compliance with respect to banking regulations and guidelines which went unsanctioned by the FR.  In some cases (Anglo and INBS), where the FR did raise concerns, they sometimes led to little real change and there was little follow through by the FR.  Bank management drew undeserved comfort from the acquiescence of the FR in relation to this non-compliance.

5.2.15  There existed a loop of excessive reliance between the various authorities on the one hand and between accounting standards, internal risk structures, credit grading systems and board sub-committees on the other.  This systemic failure resulted in the dangers inherent in the business models remaining undetected until it was much too late.

5.3  Findings – Authorities

5.3.1  The speed and severity of the crisis was exacerbated by worldwide economic events.  The main reason, however, was the unhindered expansion of the property bubble financed by the banks using wholesale market funding.  Government policies and pronouncements tended to support this expansion.  The attendant risks went undetected or were at least seriously misjudged by the authorities whose actions and warnings were modest and insufficient.

5.3.2  The Irish authorities had the data required to arouse suspicion about trends in the property and financial markets.  The relaxed attitude of the authorities was therefore the result of either a failure to understand the data or not being able to evaluate and analyse the implications correctly.  Both macro-economic and banking data could, particularly when combined, have provided the authorities with an understanding of what was going on.  The Financial Stability Reports (FSR) provided information on individual perceived risks but, in the Commission’s view, the data should have raised greater suspicions by end-2005 or, at the latest, by 2006.

The Financial Regulator

5.3.3  Provided the appropriate structures and processes were in place, the FR’s approach was to trust bank leadership to make proper and prudent decisions.  However, even when problems were identified and remarked upon, the FR did not subsequently ensure that sufficient corrective action was taken.  Thus, even insightful and critical investigation reports tended to have little impact on banking practices.  Furthermore, readily available information on, for instance, sector or borrower concentrations was not sufficiently critically analysed by the FR.  Even if it were accepted that the FR was significantly under-resourced throughout the Period, this would not explain why available information was not acted upon.

5.3.4  It seems remarkable that the FR in practice accepted the severe governance problems in INBS.  Allowing this bank to continue operations without major reforms or sanctions must, on the part of the FR, have reflected either a reluctance to pursue legal action or a profound trust in bank management and the board.  Similarly, the rapid and concentrated lending growth in Anglo, and later in other banks, did not lead to regulatory action, with reliance being placed on management assurances that all was basically well.  The FR continued to accept these assurances, even after the Guarantee decision in late 2008.

5.3.5  The Commission is aware of the view that the FR did not have sufficient powers to intervene.  This view is not persuasive given that the FR could have acted in concert with the Central Bank (CB) and, ideally though perhaps unrealistically, with Government support.  The real problem was not lack of powers but lack of scepticism and the appetite to prosecute challenges.

The Central Bank

5.3.6  The CB chose to rely on the FR appropriately handling individual bank stability issues, much as the FR in turn chose to trust bank leadership.  By implication, unless there were problems in the individual banks, there could not be major stability issues in the system as a whole.  The Financial Stability Report (FSR) was constrained to present benign conclusions with a number of almost routine warnings voiced in the text itself.  Simultaneously, macro-economic data signalling the emergence of the two key risks – growing dependence on foreign funding and the concentration of bank lending in the property sector – did not appear to have caused acute concern.

5.3.7  At least at policy level, the CB seems not to have sufficiently appreciated the possibility that, while each bank was following a strategy that made sense, in the aggregate, when followed by all banks, this strategy could have serious consequences for overall financial stability.  This was a classic macro-economic fallacy that must have been recognised in the CB and it remains unclear why it was not appreciated at senior levels there.  However, there are signs that a hierarchical culture, with elements of self-censorship at various levels, developed in the CB.  Of course, this eventually made it even harder to address the increasing instabilities in the financial market.

5.3.8  The Commission is aware of but disagrees with the view that the CB would not have been entitled to intervene to address stability issues concerning individual banks.  If the CB management had identified or given sufficient weight to macro-economic vulnerabilities, it could and should have initiated discussions with the FR to ensure a deeper analysis of individual banks’ regulatory returns.  However, as neither institution suspected any significant problems this does not appear to have been done.

The Department of Finance

5.3.9  The Department of Finance (DoF) did not, despite its mandate, see itself as concretely involved in financial stability issues; it also did not have the requisite professional staff for this.  There were regular formal contacts with the FR (via the approval process for its budget) and somewhat more frequently with the CB, both in practice responsible for operational stability assessments.  The DoF saw itself as preparing legislation to be implemented by the other authorities, but appears to have avoided addressing other financial market issues unless brought to the table by the FR or the CB (for instance, Credit Union issues during the Period).  This apparently was due to their legally independent status.  The Commission could find no evidence that the DoF formally tried to influence the FR in its work.  The DoF also did not make any efforts to strengthen its own financial market expertise despite crisis management exercises in the EU having shown a need for it among finance ministries.

5.3.10  Had the DoF taken a greater interest in financial market issues early on, preparations for dealing with the financial crisis would have been more comprehensive.  It is well documented that the DoF consistently, though not forcefully enough, supported a less expansive fiscal policy, particularly regarding property market incentives.  It also appears that worries about the developing financial situation were expressed internally from time to time by some DoF staff.  However, nothing came of this as the CB and FR were seen as responsible for financial stability.

The Guarantee Decision

5.3.11  From mid-2007 onwards, co-operation improved between the key institutions involved and some important preparatory crisis management work was undertaken.  However, the view that the only relevant problem was a threat to the liquidity position of the banks remained unchallenged throughout.  There appears to have been no fears and, at most, a modest discussion on possible underlying acute solvency problems.  This is true of the banks themselves, as well as of the authorities.

5.3.12  The discussions for alternative measures before and on September 29, 2008, were conducted on the basis of very deficient information.  The authorities were apparently convinced that bank solvency issues were not pressing or significant, as were the banks themselves, and that it therefore would be possible to resolve the acute liquidity issue.  Furthermore, the liquidity problems appear to have been seen as temporary only and related mainly to international developments.  If more relevant information on and analysis of the underlying position of some of the banks had been available, discussions and policy recommendations may have been very different.

5.3.13  Given the information provided, the Commission understands the Government’s decision to provide a broad guarantee for the banks; if no major solvency problems were expected the Guarantee would not have to be called upon.  However, given the size of the amounts involved as well as the domestic and global uncertainties, it could have been useful to access available temporary funding to gain time to examine more thoroughly the advantages and disadvantages of alternative approaches.  These could have included limiting the scope and duration of the Guarantee.  However, there were concerns that the market would not have acted positively to such a delay at the time.

5.3.14  The lack of information on bank exposures among the Authorities over time had profound implications for the decision actually taken.  Had better information on exposures and thus the risk of future impairments already been readily available in earlier years, government advisors could have suggested, even much before September 2008, that such banks with reasonably foreseeable problems should be taken into public administration immediately and gradually closed or restructured.  Management could have been changed to eliminate further lending and risk-taking.  Banks could, alternatively, have been required to raise additional capital from the markets while it could be accessed; markets still were open for this.  However, authorities continued to believe that banks did not have excessive property exposure and even outside evaluators only gradually came to a different view.  As it turned out, no bank restructuring was contemplated until several months after the Guarantee when plans announced by the Government on a piecemeal basis had proved to be insufficient, thus reducing the credibility of the Irish authorities.

5.3.15  Crisis management in Ireland, therefore, was rendered less than fully effective by long-standing insufficient appreciation of bank exposures on the part of all the authorities.  Decision makers and their various advisors, in autumn 2008, still mainly shared the common view that the banks were, and would remain, solvent.

5.4  Why Did It All Come Together ?

5.4.1  It has been argued in this Report that during the Period the paradigm of efficient financial markets was widely accepted, particularly among developed nations.  Believers in a naïve version of this paradigm would tend to assume that developments in the financial markets, almost by definition, could not be seriously flawed from a systemic point of view.  Furthermore, they would also tend to assume that regulation of the financial markets would reduce innovation and efficiency without improving stability; less and lighter regulation was therefore better.  Since there was widespread international belief in this paradigm, the international nature of the financial crisis, as well as the general unpreparedness of banks and authorities, is easier to understand.

5.4.2  To the extent that this paradigm, in its naïve version, had become widely trusted among Irish financial professionals in private and public institutions, such an assumption may have been made both across institutions and within institutions (strengthened through groupthink).  These assumptions in turn would have led, in the absence of strong and specific proof, to a belief that virtually any market feature or development was benign almost by definition, whether in the property market, the financial market or, indeed, in any individual bank.  In effect, if it was financed by somebody, it must almost by definition be sound.

5.4.3  However, it is the belief of the Commission that stronger, irrational forces were also present.  The widespread consensus as well as the confidence, until the very last moment in late 2008, that everything would end relatively well points to the existence of a national speculative mania in Ireland during the Period, centred on the sale and acquisition of property.  Warning signs were ignored as continuing economic stability was confidently assumed.  Traditional values and practices were seen as less relevant in the new financial order. When the mania ended, participants had difficulty in accepting blame for their own part in it since everything had seemed so normal and acceptable at the time.

5.4.4  Given this background, it is easier to understand why developing and clearly visible problems in the Irish banks and markets could remain ignored by so many.  It also helps explain why banks so readily crowded into speculative property lending, which appeared to be a certain road to success (herding on the mania).  It makes it easier also to understand why the authorities, despite being provided with information on increasing fragilities in the banking system, could remain complacent for so long.  Finally, it goes some way towards explaining why the crisis, despite being the culmination of a number of clearly unsustainable developments, was so totally and generally unexpected almost up to the very last minute.

5.4.5  The general acceptance of the paradigm of efficient markets also throws light on why most international institutions, foreign analysts, rating agencies, lenders, authorities and commentators were as relaxed about Irish developments as people in Ireland themselves.  It is argued that the long period of benign conditions in Ireland played a substantial role in convincing observers that developments were stable.  Furthermore, if large numbers of people also believed in the naïve interpretation of the efficient financial markets paradigm, very few developments in the financial markets would appear unsound or imprudent to them anymore.

5.4.6  It may seem remarkable that people in Ireland (and elsewhere) with extensive experience in regulating and operating in financial markets may have accepted such fairly extreme assumptions for their daily work.  It has been argued that various bandwagon effects (see Section 1.6 above) may have played an important role in this, as may the fact that international supervisory and banking peers abroad also accepted these assumptions at least to some degree.

5.4.7  Ireland’s systemic banking crisis would have been impossible without a widespread suspension of prudence and care by those responsible for bank management as well as by those charged with ensuring responsible financial conduct.  Investors and other borrowers as well as bank executive management have an interest in doing deals with each other for profit and for glory; what went missing was prudence in ensuring that such deals were soundly based.  Bank boards and public authorities, whose role it is to make it difficult for the dealmakers to go overboard, continued with their traditional work.  However, their authority and, unfortunately, their vigilance as watchdogs were in decline.  The stability of markets was becoming more dependent on bank management and their risk management systems.

5.4.8  The majority of bank executive management, despite their apparent superior technical knowledge of the business, chose to follow the new but unsustainable banking model.  Lending was seen (and rewarded) as selling a loan or service rather than as acquiring a risky asset.  Banks’ management and boards embraced a lending sales culture at the expense of prudence and risk management.  This view then spread down through the ranks, partly through the effects of volume targets and bonus systems and partly through indoctrination, causing the massive run-up in risky assets.

5.4.9  The external watchdogs generally remained inactive as management’s new banking model was introduced and implemented.  There was no strong external reaction when management prudence eroded within the Irish banking system, as evidenced by the very rapid growth in lending and wholesale funding.  The Commission has not found any clear and documented cause for the simultaneous lack of action by various watchdog authorities; it can therefore offer only the partly hypothetical behavioural factors described earlier in this section.

5.5  Specific Irish Features

5.5.1  The Commission proposes that the crisis points towards some interesting features of how Irish society appears to have functioned during the period 2003 – 2009.  It is considered that these features may be specific only to Ireland and, if present, they would further help explain why there was little recognition and even less prevention of the property mania in Ireland.

5.5.2  Firstly, there seems to have been little suspicion or doubt among Irish decision makers that the path being followed was the correct one.  A great number of persons in very responsible management and watchdog positions insisted that, until the end, they had no idea that a serious and acute problem with lending and funding exposures in the banking system even existed.  In the stated absence of this knowledge, little was done to prevent the crisis.  This is true of politicians (whether in government or opposition), central bankers, regulators, department officials and bank board members as well as influential analysts in the media, academia and financial enterprises.

5.5.3  The Commission has been widely assured by bank management, non-executive board members and others that the problems in banks’ loan books came as a complete surprise.  There is regret, incredulity and guilt among them at the lending and funding policies pursued and the lack, at the time, of any recognition of what was happening.  The credibility of their assertions is increased by the fact that a number of them personally suffered substantial losses in the crisis, easily avoidable if advance warnings had been available and recognised.

5.5.4  This suggests to the Commission that, in the absence of a liquidity crisis at this time, things would have continued much as before in Ireland, at least for a time.  The property market would have continued to expand, though at a slowing pace, and banks’ portfolios of property loans would have continued to grow.  Therefore, banks would have had time to become even more dependent on market funding and even more exposed to the effect of any doubt regarding the value of their assets.  At some point, financial markets would have realised the risks on the Irish banks’ balance sheets.  While a soft landing always would have remained a possibility in principle, overall international experience with the bursting of property bubbles, the general lack of foresight as well as the scale of the exposures seems to argue against it.

5.5.5  Secondly, there was a conspicuous lack of timely critical debate and analysis by bank analysts within institutions and among the public at large.  The complacent views of Government, other authorities, banks and their customers appear to have been very well aligned with each other.  Public policy and discourse seems to have almost unanimously accepted and encouraged views and practices that later proved disastrous.  Examples are not difficult to find; for instance, the pervasive assumption of continued growth, the failure to see growing indebtedness as a serious policy problem, the ‘soft landing’ scenario and, finally, an unwillingness to recognise the existence of long-standing problems in some banks.  When alarms were finally sounded, they were too late for meaningful action; the problem loans were already on the banks’ books and were largely illiquid.

5.5.6  The very limited number of warning voices was largely ignored. Attempts by banking insiders during the Period to send cautionary signals to market participants about escalating property values were dismissed as ill informed and wrong.  Doubters (the few that identified themselves as such to the Commission) in the main grew unsure over the years when nothing seemed to go wrong.  It also appears that some stayed silent in part to avoid possible sanctions.  The Commission suspects, on the basis of discussions held with a wide number of people, that there may have been a strong belief in Ireland that contrarians, non-team players, fractious observers and whistleblowers would be informally (though sometimes even publicly) sanctioned or ignored, regardless of the quality of their analysis or their place in organizations.

5.5.7  Thirdly, many institutions in the broader financial sector seem to have operated in silos.  There appears to have been little appetite or opportunity for looking at ‘the bigger picture’ since, as related earlier, each part of that picture was ‘owned’ by different authorities or, within the banks, by specific departments.  While clear divisions of responsibility are important, in Ireland such divisions appear to have reduced also the desire or (legalistically argued) the ability to co-operate effectively.

5.5.8  For organisational silos to work well there must either be strong and frank communication between their leaders or, alternatively, little interdependence between them.  It is unclear which one of these, if any, was believed to operate.  One possible consequence of this ‘silo think’ was that the DoF, discouraged from interfering in the work of the independent FR and CB, remained seriously underweight in professional financial expertise and engagement.  The Commission considers it likely that the lack of overall analysis and responsibility in so many Irish public institutions may have allowed a number of warning signs to remain undetected.  Indeed, overlapping interest is not necessarily a bad thing as long as responsibilities remain clearly differentiated.

5.5.9  Fourthly, adhering to either formal or traditional, often voluntary, constraints and limits on banking and finance, does not seem to have been greatly valued in Ireland during the Period.  The wide acceptance of the new financial paradigm may have amplified any such tendency as it applies to the banking sector.  The consequences for financial stability are, in any case, severe in the longer term.

5.5.10  Regulations, rules, procedures, constraints and sanctions exist primarily to prevent management and staff from going overboard during good times.  The better and longer the good times are, the more important it is that these safeguards exist and are adhered to.  If they do not exist, or are ignored, exposures can grow dramatically as confidence grows and risk is underestimated.  The risk of systemic disturbances therefore increases greatly if political leaders and public institutions do not insist on these safeguards being consistently and efficiently followed.  Therefore, any greater than average lack of willingness in Ireland to follow rules and constraints is likely to make for a more fragile financial system than elsewhere in the long run.

5.5.11  The Commission considers that it cannot have remained a secret from banking and audit professionals that time-honoured prudential limits and procedures were gradually falling into disuse, particularly in some banks.  Examples and indications of serious governance and prudential problems were clearly available to professional observers, including the FR.  Increases in credit concentration, loan size and volumes, as well as changes in funding structures, were not concealed.  They could also have been inferred from macro-economic data.  Information about ongoing and accelerating property speculation was common in everyday Irish life.

5.5.12  The Commission accepts that the new, widespread paradigm, as well as the mania in the Irish property market, could create strong pressures for conformity in all the institutions discussed in this Report.  However, while this could explain such behaviour, it does not provide an excuse for those who conformed.  Only a naïve and opportunistic interpretation of the paradigm, together with a lack of either relevant experience, training or historical knowledge, could possibly have argued for a major dismantling of the traditional prudential safeguards.  History is replete with examples of what happens when bankers, authorities and others come to believe that ‘this time it’s different’.

5.5.13  The Commission therefore has reluctantly come to the conclusion that at least some of the financial market professionals at the time must have entertained private, undisclosed doubts on the sustainability of banks’ lending and funding policies.  However, for various reasons ‘the dance had to go on’.  Similarly, it seems likely that the public and private watchdogs remained less active than required, not only because they did not know, but also because it was not publicly acceptable, legally necessary or prudent to act at the time.

5.5.14  During much of the Period, Ireland was still seen as a success story that provided a large number of its inhabitants with self-esteem as well as rising incomes, wealth and welfare.  Anybody seriously interfering with this process would expect to be publicly castigated as causing the very distress, loss and crisis that they would have been trying to prevent.  Instead, by allowing the party and deal making to continue, management, investors and public and private watchdogs participated in its positive but temporary gifts.

5.5.15  That said, the Commission is not suggesting that financial professionals in Ireland consciously decided to let banks get into trouble.  As indicated earlier, it is much more likely that professional suspicions were explained away or suppressed, in light of the new financial dogma and a long period of good times, in order not to appear fractious, unprofessional or alarmist among colleagues, superiors and others who were believed to possess equal or even superior knowledge.

5.6  Lessons to be Learned from the Irish Experience

5.6.1  As already noted above (Section 1.4), emergence of a systemic banking crisis requires that a number of important safeguards all become ineffective simultaneously.  The likelihood of this is not large, since some part of society and the banking sector is likely to remain vigilant even if other parts do not.  However, as has been seen in a number of countries and regions before, at times the unlikely occurs.

5.6.2  The Commission has, having extensively examined the most relevant available documentation as well as interviewed very many people involved in the run-up to the crisis, explained the crisis essentially as a consequence of applying a naïve version of the efficient market paradigm, supported by groupthink and herding.  This helped create and strengthen a mania in the Irish property market.  Professionals and non-professionals alike became convinced, and convinced each other, that financial markets were stable by themselves, despite historical evidence to the contrary.  The implications of this conviction seemed to be in the immediate interest of the overwhelming part of Irish society.  The resulting activity was something that, later on, seemed quite unsustainable, puzzling and contrary to prudential requirements and common sense.

5.6.3  The development of excess indebtedness and property market overheating appears to have been fairly common in many countries in recent years and decades.  This Report contains a short indication of how a groupthink and herding mechanism could support a theory of recurring financial cycles.  The Commission has detected signs of such a mechanism both within Irish banks and within Irish public authorities during the run-up to the crisis.  This mechanism may have been particularly strong because of the widespread existence of a belief in self-regulating, efficient markets.

5.6.4  If this hypothesis is accepted, an important implication emerges.  Because the real reason for the crisis is the spread of an ultimately irrational point of view, regulations and watchdog institutions cannot be counted on to be efficient preventers of a systemic crisis.  As has been seen in Ireland and other countries, central bankers and regulators embraced much the same paradigm as the market participants and adapted their policies to their convictions.  The result, as shown by the crisis itself, was that no effective brake on risk-taking existed for years.  It does not appear wholly unfair to propose that this is what may happen also in the future if and when another new financial or banking paradigm appears.  Many of the very reforms that recently have been undertaken, at short notice, to shore up the functioning of the present financial system could turn out, once again, to be ineffective.

5.6.5  Permanently improving financial stability therefore should perhaps, instead, be done in ways that do not necessarily demand the unfailing attention, prescience or vigilance of ministries, central banks or regulators.  Arguably, the most important goal of such a system should be to directly reduce the likelihood of serious disturbances to the real economy.  A number of suggestions have been made to primarily address this problem.  They seem to have been made mostly by policy makers and practitioners; academic economists have often remained unconvinced by at least the more radical of these suggestions.

5.6.6  The prevalence of problem banks that are large in relation to both the economy and the sovereign (too big to fail and too big to save) suggests that measures limiting the size and growth of banks and the banking system in relation to the economy could be useful.  One alternative, not widely supported due to its arbitrary nature, would be to directly set a limit on the absolute size of a bank’s balance sheet.  Other alternatives, briefly discussed below, are indirect and would operate by raising the cost of expanding the (properly risk-weighted) balance sheet.  Such alternatives include: a high and progressive minimum capital requirement (set nationally); limiting implicit government subsidies to certain bank activity clusters only; and raising the potential default costs for investors in banks.  These alternatives can, of course, be combined.

5.6.7  Radically increasing the capital requirements of banks would reduce their vulnerability to both funding and solvency shocks.  Since banks would need much more capital to operate, the resulting buffer of private capital would be larger in case of a default.  Capital requirements could also be made progressive in relation to the size of the balance sheet.  Since different countries would be able to support different-sized banks, such reform would have to be nationally determined.  Competitiveness would be affected, creating pressure for an internationally agreed formula.  As indicated by the discussions around Basel III, the issues of definition and of interaction with other prudential constraints are always significant.  Problems of acceptance are likely to arise particularly in large countries able to support large (potentially problem) banks.

5.6.8  Banks are routinely provided with a number of indirect government subsidies.  These include, inter alia: entry-limiting licensing requirements; monopoly on gathering retail deposits; access to central bank facilities; and the possibility of government assistance.  Because such subsidies are designed to make the system more stable it would not be useful to eliminate them.  What may prove feasible, however, is to delimit types of allowed funding and lending activities in a way that makes government assistance dependent on the type of banking license provided.  This would limit the part of the banking system explicitly supported by the sovereign and increase ex ante the responsibility of private investors for the rest of the system.  Such a separation would need some way of, additionally, severely limiting both ownership and funding links between different types of license holders.  Competition issues would create pressure for international agreement on how various activities are defined and which may or may not be publicly assisted.  Similar, though not identical, effects could be achieved through sufficiently divergent capital requirements for various asset classes.  Nevertheless, if license groups are appropriately defined, much of the functionality of the present system could remain.

5.6.9  Accepting special restructuring regimes for financial enterprises would make it possible to address bad loans before the enterprise is insolvent.  Introducing mandatory, collective action clauses for bank and sovereign bonds would reduce the supply of unsustainably cheap bank funding, as well as weaken any implicit demand on and credibility of sovereigns to protect bondholders.  Both these features may be introduced more generally already as a result of the present crisis.

5.6.10  The costs to the economy of such reforms are undeniable; higher cost of credit (though mitigated by lower risk premia) and concentration of the banking business of large international enterprises to a smaller number of major international banks being the two most obvious.  However, given the losses suffered through systemic banking crises over recent decades, this might be an acceptable price to pay for less systemic fragility and attendant resource misallocations.  There is no free lunch and increased financial stability will always have costs.  In the end, of course, the extent to which the present crisis causes a rethink on the basic model for maintaining a stable financial system will remain a very political decision with a major impact on important and influential financial institutions.

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POSTSCRIPT

2011-10-16:  Two days ago, on 14 October 2011, in Dublin … the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)  presented its latest Economic Survey of Ireland.

Becoming a Mature Independent National State, within a still developing system of shared sovereignty, balanced across all aspects of European Society … the European Union (EU) … must, sometimes, be a painful experience …

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development

OECD Economic Surveys – Ireland (October 2011)

OVERVIEW SUMMARY

The Irish Economy was hit by a severe crisis in 2008, after over a decade of strong growth that propelled Ireland to the fourth highest level of GDP per capita in the OECD.  Initially growth was well founded on solid productivity increases.  However, during a period of low-cost funding on international markets and low risk aversion globally, the expansion became increasingly reliant on a speculative housing bubble financed by lax bank lending standards and excessive credit expansion that collapsed in 2008 in the midst of the global economic and financial crisis.  During the latter part of the boom, the acceleration of wages eroded international cost-competitiveness and the banking system became over-extended and, once the bubble burst, would have been insolvent without state support.  Capital injections to help resolve the crisis have resulted in a sharply higher public debt.  In the aftermath, households have been hit by wage cuts, job losses, tax increases and falling house prices, though living standards and perceptions of wellbeing remain high by international standards.

Since 2008, the government has carried out a very sizeable fiscal consolidation.  This effort is continuing.  The three-year adjustment programme with financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) is on track and has started to tackle the roots of the imbalances.  Following comprehensive stress tests, the banking system has been recapitalised, but the banks still require liquidity support from the Euro System.  Good progress is being made to cut the fiscal deficit, but more needs to be done.  Against a challenging international backdrop of contagion risk and uncertainty about the policy of euro area governments on sovereign debt, financial-market sentiment towards Ireland worsened considerably but did improve somewhat during the summer.  The crisis caused a sharp rise in joblessness and large numbers of young less-educated males remain unemployed.  The risk is that joblessness becomes persistent, which could undermine the social consensus that is underpinning the economic and fiscal adjustment.  A modest recovery is underway, driven by gains in competitiveness and increases in exports, but it comes with significant downside risks associated with market fears regarding financial stability in the Euro Area.  While government gross debt as a share of GDP has reached one of the highest levels in the OECD area and official financial support remains indispensable in the near term, an orderly return towards a more balanced financial position is possible, provided that tight fiscal policies and wage restraint are in place sufficiently long.  To increase the chances of success, the authorities need to continue vigorously implementing the measures required to complete the unwinding of imbalances, ensure that the burden is fairly shared and capitalise on the structural strengths of the Irish economy.  These include its business-friendly environment, its flexible labour markets and a skilled labour force.

This Survey argues that the authorities should:

Persevere on the Path of Fiscal Consolidation

• Continue to fully comply with the conditions and targets of the EU-IMF Programme ;
• Reduce the budget deficit to below 3% of GDP by 2015 ;
• Reduce the budget deficit faster than required by the Programme to help regain credibility in financial markets if economic growth allows ;
• Focus spending restraint on public-sector efficiency, welfare reform and scaling back infrastructure projects ;
• Broaden the tax base by reducing tax expenditures and proceeding with the planned property taxes ;
• Strengthen the fiscal framework by focusing on the debt-to-GDP target to be met by a specified date; legislating multi-year budget plans; and introducing a nominal expenditure ceiling.

Exit from the Banking Crisis and Restore the Banking System to Health

• As financial market confidence returns, restrict the bank eligible liability guarantee scheme to a narrower range of liabilities, with fees that are commensurate to risk ;
• To help prevent future crises, focus supervision on a set of indicators including: a simple leverage ratio; loan-to-value ratio; loans-to-income ratio; and capital requirements linked to bank size.  Also establish a credit register to prevent excessive exposures ;
• To prevent the recurrence of problems with regulatory forbearance, adopt a process where the breach of identified thresholds, such as excessive growth in overall lending, would accelerate a formal assessment of what, if any, corrective action may be required.

Prevent High Unemployment from Becoming Structural

• Engage the employment services more actively with job seekers, and require participation in relevant training and job search in return ;
• To promote return to work, relate unemployment benefits to unemployment duration ;
• Review the work incentive effects of other welfare benefits, especially housing allowances ;
• Better attune training programmes to labour market needs; in particular enlarge the set of trades covered by apprenticeships and temporarily close apprentice admission in construction trades ;
• Extend the duration of the current cut in employers’ social security contributions.

Further Improve Competitiveness in Order to Support Export-led Growth

• A further decline in unit labour cost is essential to support exports ;
• Enhance competition in the electricity sector by clearly separating generation, transmission, distribution and supply ;
• Focus feed-in electricity tariff support on the most cost-efficient renewable sources ;
• Introduce civil fines in competition law, so as to reduce incentives for anti-competitive behaviour ;
• To enhance the quality of education, systematically evaluate teachers’ and schools’ performance.

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END

A certain fascination with the 1959 Cuban Revolution and its Leaders … and a large dose of curiosity about the countryside and its people … were the principal drivers behind an extensive Family Tour in April 2007 … before Fidel Castro departed the scene.  At the time, he was seriously ill.

Straight away, therefore, let me clarify that I do not consider the Tourist Resort of Varadero to be an accurate representation of everyday life and living in Cuba.  And I mean that in the worst possible way !   Similarly, the illegally occupied U.S. Military Base at Guantánamo Bay must be excluded as a valid island experience … the annexation of the bay area remains, to this day, an international act of piracy – see the  1901 Platt Amendment  and later Treaties with Cuba procured by the threat or use of force.

Getting back to those ‘experts’ … sometimes, they might be rabid, Older Generation Cuban Exiles now living in Miami (USA) … the privileged island classes of the 1950′s … who either left hurriedly or were booted out after the success of the Castro Revolution.  At other times, the ‘experts’ might be Criminal Ex-Members of Dictator Fulgencio Batista’s Military and Police Forces who are still working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.  For some unknown reason, however, both groups continue to hold the United States Political System – at Florida State and Federal Levels – by the balls !   Sad, but true !!

In its early days, Castro’s Revolutionary Government abolished racial discrimination, reduced rents and the cost of electricity, nationalized American and British commercial firms, and permanently ‘evicted’ the American Mafia.  The new government, however, was far from being firmly rooted, confident and stable … but all of that changed, utterly, after events in April 1961 …

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On Saturday last, 16 April 2011 … I attended a day long ‘Girón 50′ Symposium and Victory Celebration, which was held in Liberty Hall, Dublin.  This special occasion commemorated the 50th Anniversary of the Cuban Victory at the Bay of Pigs (Bahia de Cochinos) … scene of the ill-fated 1961 U.S. Inspired, Financed and Resourced Counter-Revolutionary Invasion of Cuba.

Colour photograph showing a roadside hoarding near Playa Girón, in the Bay of Pigs (Bahia de Cochinos) area of Cuba. In Spanish ... telling it like it really was, and still is ... "The First Defeat of Yankee Imperialism in Latin America". Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2007-04-13. Click to enlarge.

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Colour photograph showing the entrance to the small Museum near Playa Girón, in the Bay of Pigs (Bahia de Cochinos) area of Cuba. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2007-04-13. Click to enlarge.

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The route taken by the 1961 U.S. Invasion Force was elaborate and circuitous …

Colour photograph showing the elaborate and circuitous route taken by the 1961 U.S. Invasion Force from Florida to the Bay of Pigs (Bahia de Cochinos), in Cuba. From a display at Girón Museum. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2007-04-13. Click to enlarge.

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Playa Girón was one of the landing points in the 1961 U.S. Bay of Pigs (Bahia de Cochinos) Invasion …

Colour photograph showing the deployment and movement of forces during the attempted U.S. Invasion of the Bay of Pigs (Bahia de Cochinos), in April 1961. Playa Girón is the lower of the two coastal landing points in view ... Playa Larga, the other. From a display at Girón Museum. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2007-04-13. Click to enlarge.

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2011 Dublin ‘Girón 50′ Victory Symposium – Liberty Hall

FINAL DECLARATION

We, the participants in the ‘Girón 50′ Conference commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Cuban Victory at the Bay of Pigs:

1.  Express our firm solidarity with the Cuban Revolution and Its People in their struggle for the defence of their independence, sovereignty and right to build a social and political system of their own choice, with no outside interference.

2.  Salute the process of comprehensive and popular debate in Cuban Society which led to the set of guidelines to be discussed and approved during the next few days by the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, which is aimed at renewing and updating its economic policy in accordance with the current domestic, regional and international situation.

3.  Condemn the illegal and criminal U.S. Economic, Financial and Trade Blockade, which Cuba has suffered for over five decades and which continues to be a flagrant violation of the right of an entire nation to self-determination and the main obstacle to Cuba’s development.

4.  Call on the European Union (E.U.) to unconditionally rescind the 1996 E.U. Common Position 96/697/CFSP on Cuba, and to seriously engage in a process of normalization of relations with the island, based on mutual respect and non-interference in their internal affairs.

5.  Condemn the ongoing U.S. Sponsored Subversion and Terrorist Actions aimed at overthrowing the Cuban Revolution, and U.S. Double Standards in its War on Terror … once again illustrated by the recent acquittal of Luis Posada Carilles, self-confessed instigator of the Bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight CU-455, which killed all 73 people on board, as it travelled from Venezuela to Cuba, via Barbados, on 6 October 1976.

6.  Extend our support for the International Campaign of Freedom & Exoneration for the Miami Five – Gerardo Hernández, Antonio Guerrero, Ramón Labañino, René González and Fernando González – the Five Cubans illegally and unjustly imprisoned in the U.S. for fighting terrorism … and join the growing international call on President Obama, including that of Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, to release them immediately.

7.  Call on the Irish Government to continue the development of Bilateral Relations with Cuba, and Ireland’s support for the lifting of the U.S. Blockade and the rescinding of the E.U. Common Position on Cuba.

8.  Commit ourselves to undertake the relevant Solidarity Actions in support of Cuba.

Liberty Hall, Dublin.

16 April 2011.

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AS WE approach Easter Sunday, 2011 … let us remember the Miami Five who have been unjustly incarcerated for much too long …

Colour photograph showing a Miami Five Freedom Campaign Hoarding on the top of a building in Cienfuegos, Cuba. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2007-04-14. Click to enlarge.

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AND … after the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, many countries in Central & South America, Iraq and Afghanistan … let us ponder, at length, on the question of when, if ever, the United States of America will learn to join the International Community of Nations … as an equal !

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END

And yet … here they go again with Libya … the Rogue’s Gallery of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Qatar … with the  League of Arab States  providing the necessary cover of respectability.  How will this military intervention turn out ?

There is now, however, a U.N. Resolution.  But … will the scope and terms of the Resolution be respected ?   Judge for yourselves, as events unfold …

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)

17 March 2011 – 6498th Meeting

The Situation in Libya

Click the Link Above to read and/or download PDF File (52kb)

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Without any further delay … the present structure and legal framework of the United Nations must be revised, and updated, to meet the changed circumstances of the 21st Century.

Respect for International Law … Human and Social Rights for All … and Lasting Peace … are essential prerequisites for Sustainable Human & Social Development !

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END

Many people directly or indirectly involved with Disability-Related Issues in Europe … may not yet know that, a few weeks ago, the European Union ratified the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD).  They may not even know that their own country, as a Member State of the European Union, had perhaps already ratified the UN Convention one or two years earlier.

At this time, the majority of Member States have proceeded, voluntarily, to ratify the Convention … with some of those, inexplicably, declining/refusing to ratify the Convention’s Optional Protocol.

Human & Social Rights can be a difficult subject area !

Ireland has not ratified the UN Convention … and, unfortunately, the attitude of many policy-makers and decision-makers within our Irish Institutions of State, large and small, is that it’s business as usual … no need to worry or fuss, or give a damn … until this country does actually sign on the Convention’s bottom line … an attitude which displays a magnificent ignorance of the changed reality, post Lisbon Treaty, which is the European Union’s Current Legal Environment !!

Please examine carefully, for yourselves, the findings of this Legal Study, recently approved for publication by the European Commission …

European Foundation Centre (EFC)

Brussels, October 2010

Study on Challenges and Good Practices in the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

Click the Link Above to read and/or download PDF File (1.46 Mb)

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EU RATIFICATION OF THE UN CRPD – ASPECTS OF EU LAW

The following are selected extracts from the EFC Study … my selection (!) … to answer specific issues relating to UN CRPD Implementation within the European Union.  Typographical errors in the Study have also been corrected … and, post Lisbon Treaty, references to the EU Treaties have been properly updated …

The legal basis for the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD) signals the appropriate legal basis for its implementation within the European Union (EU).  In this respect, and in line with Article 4 of the UN Convention, implementation implies that instruments may be adopted or modified by the Union in order to comply with the Convention and give effect to its provisions and principles.  Although the choice of the legal basis for the decision concluding an international agreement is very important, it is not decisive for implementation.  In European Court of Justice Case C-178/0345, which concerned the implementation of the Rotterdam Convention on International Trade in Hazardous Chemicals, the Court stated that ” the fact that one or more provisions of the Treaty have been chosen as legal bases for the approval of an international agreement is not sufficient to show that those same provisions must also be used as legal bases for the adoption of measures intended to implement that agreement at Community level “.   The latter statement means that EU Treaty provisions other than those mentioned in EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC to conclude the UN CRPD can be used as legal bases to implement UN CRPD obligations in specific fields.

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The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD) is an international human rights agreement where both the European Union (EU) and its Member States are contracting parties.  The UN Convention is thus a Mixed Agreement.  Mixed Agreements involve a Shared Contractual Relationship between the EU, its Member States and one or more third countries and/or international organisations.  As a Mixed Agreement, the UN CRPD covers fields that fall in part within the competence of the EU, in part within that of the Member States and in part within the shared competence of the EU and its Member States.  It is therefore essential for the EU and the Member States to closely co-operate, in order to implement legislation stemming from the Convention in a coherent manner and ensure unity in the international representation of the Union.

EU Member States, when participating in Mixed Agreements, do not act as entirely autonomous subjects of international law; they are subject to a Duty of Loyal Co-Operation between one another and the EU.  This duty extends to each of the negotiation, conclusion and implementation phases.  In this sense, there is a collective management of the obligations under international law.  The duty of loyal co-operation, deriving from Article 4.3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), embraces two sets of obligations: first, Member States shall take appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the EC Treaty or resulting from action taken by the EU Institutions;  and second: Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives … which are set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

Treaty on European Union (TEU) – Consolidated Version, as Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon

Article 4.3

Pursuant to the principle of sincere mutual co-operation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.

The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.

The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.

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In relation to EU Member States‘ Compliance with a Mixed Agreement concluded by the EU … the European Court of Justice has inferred that for matters falling within EU competence … the Member States fulfil, within the EU system, an obligation in relation to the Union which has assumed responsibility for due performance of the agreement.  In other words, if a Member State fails to take all appropriate measures to implement provisions of the Mixed Agreement that fall within the competence of the EU … it not only fails to fulfil its international obligation, but is also acting in breach of EU Law.  The European Commission may thus bring an infringement case against a Member State that has not properly fulfilled its duty.  The principle underpinning such mechanisms is the ‘duty of loyal co-operation’, which provides the foundation for managing shared competence within Mixed Agreements.

The line dividing international responsibility for implementation of the International Mixed Agreement between the EU and its Member States depends on the obligations respectively assumed.  The UN CRPD contains a clause setting out ‘separate’ responsibility.  According to Article 44.1, Regional Integration Organisations acceding to the Convention shall declare, in their instruments of formal confirmation or accession, the extent of their competence.  This division of responsibility for implementation implies that the European Union only bears responsibility for the breach of those obligations it has assumed.

EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC on the conclusion of the UN CRPD refers to EU competence in respect of those matters governed by the UN CRPD, and lists EU Instruments which demonstrate such competence.

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STRUCTURE OF THE EFC REPORT

The main objective of the Study was to analyse the obligations set out in the UN CRPD and, in particular, to gather information about the various practices of the EU Member States and the European Union in implementing the UN CRPD.

The work was carried out by the European Foundation Centre (EFC), representing the European Consortium of Foundations on Human Rights and Disability … under Contract No. VC/2008/1214 … for the European Commission‘s Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion.

Section 1 of this Report sets the appropriate background for the analysis that will follow.

Section 2 of the Report provides an overview and general recommendations on the implementation of the social model of disability, and core obligations deriving from Article 1 and Preamble Paragraph (e) of the UN CRPD.

Section 3 of the Report provides an overview and general recommendations on the implementation of Article 3 (General Principles), Article 4 (General Obligations), Article 5 (Equality and Non-Discrimination), and Article 9 (Accessibility) of the UN CRPD.  The section also reviews UN CRPD articles on Inter-Sectionality, namely Articles 6 (Women with Disabilities) and Article 7 (Children with Disabilities).  It is worth noting that the articles addressed in this section are articles of general and crosscutting application, and therefore their application is relevant for the implementation of all articles of the Convention.

Section 4 of the Report provides an overview and general recommendations on the implementation of selected substantive provisions of the UN CRPD which apply existing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights within the context of disability.  Specifically, the section considers the implementation of Articles 16 (Freedom from Exploitation, Violence and Abuse) and 17 (Protecting the Integrity of the Person), which are seeking to assert protections that underscore the humanity of all persons with disabilities.  The section also considers the implementation of Articles 12 (Equal Recognition before the Law) and 19 (Living Independently and Being Included in the Community), both of which aim at maintaining and safeguarding the autonomy of the person.  Furthermore, articles on specific accessibility rights, namely Article 13 (Access to Justice) and Article 29 (Participation in Political and Public Life), are likewise addressed.  Finally, the section considers the implementation of Articles 24 (Education) and 27 (Work and Employment).

Section 5 of the Report contains an overview and general recommendations on the implementation of articles which outline steps that are necessary to support reforms.  Specifically, the section considers the implementation of Article 31 (Statistics and Data Collection), Article 32 (International Co-Operation), and Article 33 (National Implementation and Monitoring).

Section 6 of the Report suggests good practices for the EU and national policy-makers for the future and overall implementation of the Convention, and the effective achievement of its objectives.

It is worth noting that, while it is hard to be definitive, given that the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is still in its infancy and has yet to pronounce on the obligations of the UN CRPD … it is nevertheless possible on the basis of the general principles of the Convention and interpretative tools, such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to identify illustrative challenges to the implementation of the UN CRPD.  For the purposes of this Study, the review of EU and Member States policies and legal instruments is based on the analysis of the UN CRPD and checklists that were produced from this Study to measure progress.

Finally, for the purposes of the Study, a challenge is defined as a ‘difficulty’ posed by existing national or EU practice which may potentially hamper the full and effective implementation of the UN CRPD by the EU Member States and/or the European Union.  In order to meet such challenges, it will be necessary, inter alia, for the EU (as appropriate) and/or its Member States to review legislation and/or policy with a view to full compliance.  On the other hand, a practice is defined as good if it fulfils certain requirements of the Convention or mainstreams the general principles, consistent with Article 3 of the UN CRPD, and has an awareness-raising impact.

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END