'A Gentle Whisper in Your Ear' » CJ Walsh

Progressive Collapse of WTC 7 – 2008 NIST Recommendations – Part 2 of 2

CJ Walsh — Sun, 22 Jan 2012 18:20:54 +0000

1st Series of Posts on the 2005 NIST WTC 1 & 2 Collapse Recommendations … which began towards the end of 2011 …

2011-10-25: NIST’s Recommendations on the 9-11 WTC Building Collapses … GROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity – Recommendations 1, 2 & 3 (out of 30)

Previous Post in this New Series …

2012-01-18: Progressive Collapse of WTC 7 – 2008 NIST Recommendations - Part 1 of 2 … GROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity – Recommendation A … and GROUP 2. Enhanced Fire Endurance of Structures – Recommendations B, C, D & E (out of 13)

2012-01-22: SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS …

1. Keeping my ear closely to the ground … I hear you wondering: ”So … how did the fires actually start in World Trade Center Building 7 ?”

Extracts from the Executive Summary (pages xxxi – xxxv) – 2008 NIST NCSTAR 1A …

[ Refer back to the WTC 1 & 2 Collapse Damage Plan in the previous post.]

The fires in WTC Building 7 were ignited as a result of the impact of debris from the collapse of WTC Tower 1, which was approximately 110 metres to the south. The debris also caused some structural damage to the south-west perimeter of WTC 7. The fires were ignited on at least 10 floors; however, only the fires on Floors 7 to 9 and 11 to 13 grew and lasted until the time of building collapse. These uncontrolled fires had characteristics similar to those that have occurred previously in tall buildings. Their growth and spread were consistent with ordinary building content fires. Had a water supply for the automatic sprinkler system been available and had the sprinkler system operated as designed, it is likely that the fires in WTC 7 would have been controlled, and the collapse prevented. However, the collapse of WTC 7 highlights the importance of designing fire resisting structures for situations where sprinklers are not present, do not function (e.g. due to disconnected or impaired water supply), or are overwhelmed.

and …

There were no serious injuries or fatalities, because the estimated 4,000 occupants of WTC 7 reacted to the airplane impacts on the two WTC Towers and began evacuating before there was significant damage to WTC 7. The occupants were able to use both the elevators and the stairs, which were as yet not damaged, obstructed, or smoke-filled. Evacuation of the building took just over an hour. The potential for injuries to people leaving the building was mitigated by building management personnel holding the occupants in the lobby until they identified an exit path that was safe from the debris falling from WTC Tower 1. The decisions not to continue evaluating the building and not to fight the fires were made hours before the building collapsed, so no emergency responders were in or near the building when the collapse occurred.

and …

The design of WTC 7 was generally consistent with the New York City Building Code of 1968 (NYCBC), with which, by policy, it was to comply. The installed thickness of the thermal insulation on the floor beams was below that required for unsprinklered or sprinklered buildings, but it is unlikely that the collapse of WTC 7 could have been prevented even if the thickness had been consistent with building code requirements. The stairwells were narrower than those required by the NYCBC, but, combined with the elevators, were adequate for a timely evacuation on 11 September 2001, since the number of building occupants was only about half that expected during normal business hours.

The collapse of WTC 7 could not have been prevented without controlling the fires before most of the combustible building contents were consumed. There were two sources of water (gravity-fed overhead tanks and the city water main) for the standpipe and automatic sprinkler systems serving Floor 21 and above, and some of the early fires on those upper floors might have actually been controlled in this manner. However, consistent with the NYCBC, both the primary and back-up source of water for the sprinkler system in the lower 20 floors of WTC 7 was the city water main. Since the collapses of the WTC Towers had damaged the water main, there was no water available (such as the gravity-fed overhead tanks that supplied water to Floor 21 and above) to control those fires that eventually led to the building collapse.

Link to read and/or download a copy of the 2008 NIST NCSTAR 1A Report … www.fireox-international.eu/fire/structdesfire.htm

2. On a separate subject and quite by chance … a few days ago, I was invited to review a technical paper for a reputable international fire engineering journal (which shall remain nameless). The paper was discussing a certain aspect of steel column critical temperatures. After three days, I replied to the journal’s editor as follows …

2012-01-18.

Most regrettably, I must decline your invitation to review Paper XYZ.

The ‘critical temperature’ approach to the fire engineering design of steel-framed structures is deeply flawed … and obsolete.

C. J. Walsh, FireOx International – Ireland, Italy & Turkey.

The ‘critical temperature’ approach is antiquated … and this nonsense has got to stop ! NOW … would be the best time !!

3. In the last post, I wrote …

Structural Fire Engineering is concerned with those aspects of fire engineering which relate to structural design for fire, and the complex architectural interaction between a building’s structure and fabric, i.e. non-structure, under conditions of fire and its immediate aftermath.

Indeed ! But, more needs to be added …

I hope it is becoming clearer now that Structural Fire Engineering is not just ambient structural engineering with a few extra ‘bells and whistles’ grafted on … in token consideration of what could happen in fire conditions, i.e. at high temperatures.

[ If, in some jurisdictions, there are no legal requirements to add even those 'bells and whistles' ... then, typically, even they will be omitted ! ]

This brings me right back to the typical education of Civil/Structural Engineers; because: (i) they exit the educational system with little understanding of anything beyond ‘structure’ … in other words, a ‘real’ building, which also comprises ‘fabric’, i.e. non-structure, is a mystery to them; and (ii) they have difficulty reading architectural drawings … which is why a walk-through inspection of a building, as it is nearing completion, is much preferred over a detailed discussion about drawings at the most appropriate stage, which is well before construction commences … when faults can be readily identified and easily rectified !

In ambient conditions … the architectural interaction between a building’s structure and fabric is difficult, not being entirely static. Before the surface finishes have been applied, it is immediately obvious when this interaction has been properly ‘designed’, and looks neat and tidy … or, on the vast majority of construction sites, when this interaction is a ‘traffic accident’, and the results are desperately ugly … and you know that they can’t apply the surface finishes quickly enough in order to hide everything from view !

In fire conditions … this architectural interaction between building fabric and structure is complex, certainly very dynamic … and fluid !

It would be more appropriate to think of Structural Fire Engineering as ‘Design in the Hot Form’ … which is a completely different mindset.

It is essential, therefore, that Fire Engineers understand ‘real’ buildings … most importantly, the ‘design’ of real buildings … and, that they know which end is ‘up’ on a real construction site !! See NIST WTC 7 Recommendation L below.

4. Since the collapse of WTC Building 7 on 11 September 2001, it has been generally assumed that Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse is a large-scale, macro-phenomenon only. But, believe it or not, this phenomenon has also been observed at micro-level in small building types.

In fact … Progressive Collapse was already receiving sporadic attention, in Ireland, as far back as the 1980′s …

As organizer of the 1987 Dublin International Fire Conference: ‘Fire, Access & Safety in Residential Buildings’, I requested that the following Paper be presented … ‘Design against Progressive Collapse in Fire’ … by Dr. Willie Crowe, who was Head of Construction Technology, in the old Institute for Industrial Research & Standards (IIRS) in Ireland. He later became Manager of the Irish Agrément Board (IAB). Those were the days … and Willie really knew his stuff !

Mr. Noel C. Manning, of FireBar in Ireland (www.firebar.ie), and I both contributed to the development of his Paper.

And now is as good a time as any to give full credit to Noel Manning for his innovative approach to Structural Fire Engineering back in the early 1980′s. He’s a ‘hard man’ … a term that we use for some special people in Ireland !

Link to the Dublin International Fire Conferences, and a copy of this Paper … www.fireox-international.eu/fire/dublinfire.htm

For approximately 12 years from the mid-1980′s, I was a Member of the National Masonry Panel – the National Standards Authority of Ireland (NSAI) Masonry Standards Advisory Committee. A small, but substantial, text on Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse in Buildings was included, by me, in the following standard … Irish Standard 325: Code of Practice for Use in Masonry – Part 2: Masonry Construction (1995). Appendix A – Determination of Movement in Masonry. A.3 – Thermal Movement. Once again … those were the days … when I was the only architect in a sea of engineers !! Not a pretty experience.

5. What next ? A final draft of the International CIB W14 Research WG IV Reflection Document on Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse will be completed in time for circulation to all CIB W14 members before the end of March 2012 … well in time for the next CIB W14 Meetings in Greece, near the end of April 2012.

2008 NIST WTC 7 RECOMMENDATIONS (Final Report NCSTAR 1A)

5.1.3 GROUP 3. New Methods for Fire Resisting Design of Structures

The procedures and practices used in the fire resisting design of structures should be enhanced by requiring an objective that uncontrolled fires result in burnout without partial or global (total) collapse. Performance-based methods are an alternative to prescriptive design methods. This effort should include the development and evaluation of new fire resisting coating materials and technologies, and evaluation of the fire performance of conventional and high-performance structural materials.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation F (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 8).

NIST recommends that the fire resistance of structures be enhanced by requiring a performance objective that uncontrolled building fires result in burnout without partial or global (total) collapse. Such a provision should recognize that sprinklers could be compromised, non-operational, or non-existent. Current methods for determining the fire resistance of structural assemblies do not explicitly specify a performance objective. The rating resulting from current test methods indicates that the assembly (component or sub-system) continued to support its superimposed load (simulating a maximum load condition) during the test exposure without collapse. Model Building Codes: This Recommendation should be included in the national model building codes as an objective, and adopted as an integral pert of the fire resistance design for structures. The issue of non-operational sprinklers could be addressed using the existing concept of Design Scenario 8 of NFPA 5000, where such compromise is assumed and the result is required to be acceptable to the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). Affected Standards: ASCE-7, AISC Specifications, ACI 318, and ASCE/SFPE 29.

Relevance to WTC 7: Large, uncontrolled fires led to failure of a critical column and consequently the complete collapse of WTC 7. In the region of the collapse initiation (i.e. on the east side of Floor 13), the fire had consumed virtually all of the combustible building contents, yet collapse was not prevented.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation G (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 9).

NIST recommends the development of: (1) performance-based standards and code provisions, as an alternative to current prescriptive design methods, to enable the design and retrofit of structures to resist real building fire conditions, including their ability to achieve the performance objective of burnout without structural or local fire collapse; and (2) the tools, guidelines, and test methods necessary to evaluate the fire performance of the structure as a whole system. Standards development organizations, including the American Institute of Steel Construction, have already begun developing performance-based provisions to consider the effects of fire in structural design.

a. Standard methodology, supported by performance criteria, analytical design tools, and practical design guidance; related building standards and codes for fire resistance design and retrofit of structures, working through the consensus process for nationwide adoption; comprehensive design rules and guidelines; methodology for evaluating thermo-structural performance of structures; and computational models and analysis procedures for use in routine design practice.

b. Standard methodology for specifying multi-compartment, multi-floor fire scenarios for use in the design and analysis of structures to resist fires, accounting for building-specific conditions such as geometry, compartmentation, fuel load (e.g. building contents and any flammable fuels such as oil and gas), fire spread, and ventilation; and methodology for rating the fire resistance of structural systems and barriers under realistic design-basis fire scenarios.

c. Publicly available computational software to predict the effects of fires in buildings – developed, validated, and maintained through a national effort – for use in the design of fire protection systems and the analysis of building response to fires. Improvements should include the fire behaviour and contribution of real combustibles; the performance of openings, including door openings and window breakage, that controls the amount of oxygen available to support the growth and spread of fires and whether the fire is fuel-controlled or ventilation-controlled; the floor-to-floor flame spread; the temperature rise in both insulated and un-insulated structural members and fire barriers; and the structural response of components, sub-systems, and the total building system due to the fire.

d. Temperature-dependent thermal and mechanical property data for conventional and innovative construction materials.

e. New test methods, together with associated conformance assessment criteria, to support the performance-based methods for fire resistance design and retrofit of structures. The performance objective of burnout without collapse will require the development of standard fire exposures that differ from those currently used.

There is a critical gap in knowledge about how structures perform in real fires, particularly concerning: the effects of fire on the entire structural system (including thermal expansion effects at lower temperatures); interaction between the sub-systems, elements, and connections; and scaling of fire test results to full-scale structures (especially for structures with long-span floor systems).

Relevance to WTC 7: A performance-based assessment of the effects of fire on WTC 7, had it considered all of the relevant thermal effects (e.g. thermal expansion effects that occur at lower temperatures), would have identified the vulnerability of the building to fire-induced progressive collapse and allowed alternative designs for the structural system.

5.1.4 GROUP 4. Improved Active Fire Protection

Active fire protection systems (i.e. sprinklers, standpipes/hoses, fire alarms, and smoke management systems) should be enhanced through improvements to the design, performance, reliability, and redundancy of such systems.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation H (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 12).

NIST recommends that the performance, and possibly the redundancy and reliability of active fire protection systems (sprinklers, standpipes/hoses, fire alarms, and smoke management systems), in buildings be enhanced to accommodate the greater risks associated with increasing building height and population, increased use of open spaces, high-risk building activities, fire department response limits, transient fuel loads, and higher threat profile.

Reliability is affected by (a) redundancy, such that when one water supply is out of service (usually for maintenance), the other interconnected water supply can continue to protect the building and its occupants; (b) automatic operation of water supply systems (not only for starting fire pumps but also for testing and tank replenishment, with appropriate remote alarms to the fire department and local alarms for notifying emergency personnel); and (c) the use of suitable equipment and techniques to regulate unusual pressure considerations.

Relevance to WTC 7: No water was available for the automatic suppression systems on the lower 20 storeys of WTC 7, once water from street-level mains was disrupted. This lack of reliability in the source of the primary and secondary water supplies allowed the growth and spread of fires that ultimately resulted in collapse of the building.

5.1.5 GROUP 6. Improved Emergency Response

Technologies and procedures for emergency response should be improved to enable better access to buildings, response operations, emergency communications, and command and control in large-scale emergencies.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation I (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 24).

NIST recommends the establishment and implementation of codes and protocols for ensuring effective and uninterrupted operation of the command and control system for large-scale building emergencies.

a. State, local, and federal jurisdictions should implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The jurisdictions should work with the Department of Homeland Security to review, test, evaluate, and implement an effective unified command and control system. NIMS addresses interagency co-ordination and establishes a response matrix – assigning lead agency responsibilities for different types of emergencies, and functions. At a minimum, each supporting agency should assign an individual to provide co-ordination with the lead agency at each incident command post.

b. State, local, and federal emergency operations centres (EOC’s) should be located, designed, built, and operated with security and operational integrity as a key consideration.

c. Command posts should be established outside the potential collapse footprint of any building which shows evidence of large multi-floor fires or has serious structural damage. A continuous assessment of building stability and safety should be made in such emergencies to guide ongoing operations and enhance emergency responder safety. The information necessary to make these assessments should be made available to those assigned responsibility (see related Recommendations 15 and 23 in NIST NCSTAR 1).

d. An effective command system should be established and operating before a large number of emergency responders and apparatus are dispatched and deployed. Through training and drills, emergency responders and ambulances should be required to await dispatch requests from the incident command system and not to self-dispatch in large-scale emergencies.

e. Actions should be taken via training and drills to ensure a co-ordinated and effective emergency response at all levels of the incident command chain by requiring all emergency responders that are given an assignment to immediately adopt and execute the assignment objectives.

f. Command post information and incident operations data should be managed and broadcast to command and control centres at remote locations so that information is secure and accessible by all personnel needing the information. Methods should be developed and implemented so that any information that is available at an interior information centre is transmitted to an emergency responder vehicle or command post outside the building.

Relevance to WTC 7: (1) The New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was located in WTC 7 and was evacuated before key fire ground decisions had to be made. The location of OEM in WTC 7, which collapsed due to ordinary building fires, contributed to the loss of robust interagency command and control on 11 September 2001. (2) Due to the collapse of the WTC Towers and the loss of responders and fire control resources, there was an evolving site leadership during the morning and afternoon. Key decisions (e.g. not to fight the fires in WTC 7 and to turn off power to the Con Edison substation) were reasonable and would not have changed the outcome on 11 September 2001, but were not made promptly. Under different circumstances (e.g. if WTC 7 had collapsed sooner and firefighters were still evaluating the building condition), the outcome could have been very different.

5.1.6 GROUP 7. Improved Procedures and Practices

The procedures and practices used in the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of buildings should be improved to include encouraging code compliance by non-governmental and quasi-governmental entities, adoption and application of evacuation and sprinkler requirements in codes for existing buildings, and retention and availability of building documents over the life of a building.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation J (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 27).

NIST recommends that building codes incorporate a provision that requires building owners to retain documents, including supporting calculations and test data, related to building design, construction, maintenance, and modifications over the entire life of the building.* Means should be developed for off-site storage and maintenance of the documents. In addition, NIST recommends that relevant information be made available in suitably designed hard copy or electronic formats for use by emergency responders. Such information should be easily accessible by responders during emergencies.

[ * F-12 The availability of inexpensive electronic storage media and tools for creating large searchable databases makes this feasible.]

Relevance to WTC 7: The efforts required in locating and acquiring drawings, specifications, tenant layouts, and material certifications, and especially shop fabrication drawings, significantly lengthened the investigation into the collapse of WTC 7.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation K (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 28).

NIST recommends that the role of the ‘Design Professional in Responsible Charge’* be clarified to ensure that: (1) all appropriate design professionals (including, e.g. the fire protection engineer) are part of the design team providing the highest standard of care when designing buildings employing innovative or unusual fire safety systems; and (2) all appropriate design professionals (including, e.g. the structural engineer and the fire protection engineer) are part of the design team providing the highest standard of care when designing the structure to resist fires, in buildings that employ innovative or unusual structural and fire safety systems.

[ * F-13 In projects involving a design team, the 'Design Professional in Responsible Charge' - usually the lead architect - ensures that the team members use consistent design data and assumptions, co-ordinates overlapping specifications, and serves as the liaison between the enforcement and reviewing officials and the owner. This term is defined in the International Building Code (IBC) and in the International Code Council's Performance Code for Buildings and Facilities (where it is the Principal Design Professional).]

Relevance to WTC 7: Following typical practice, none of the design professionals in charge of the WTC 7 Project (i.e. architect - structural engineer - fire protection engineer) was assigned the responsibility to explicitly evaluate the fire performance of the structural system. Holistic consideration of thermal and structural factors during the design or review stage could have identified the potential for the failure and might have prevented the collapse of the building.

5.1.7 GROUP 8. Education and Training

The professional skills of building and fire safety professionals should be upgraded through a national education and training effort for fire protection engineers, structural engineers, and architects. The skills of building regulatory and fire service personnel should also be upgraded to provide sufficient understanding and the necessary skills to conduct the review, inspection, and approval tasks for which they are responsible.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation L (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 29).

NIST recommends that continuing education curricula be developed, and programmes be implemented for: (1) training fire protection engineers and architects in structural engineering principles and design; and (2) training structural engineers, architects, fire protection engineers, and code enforcement officials in modern fire protection principles and technologies, including the fire resisting design of structures; and (3) training building regulatory and fire service personnel to upgrade their understanding and skills to conduct the review, inspection, and approval tasks for which they are responsible. The outcome would further the integration of the disciplines in effective fire-safe design of buildings.

Relevance to WTC 7: Discerning the fire-structure interactions that led to the collapse of WTC 7 required research professionals with expertise in both disciplines. Assuring the safety of future buildings will require that participants in the design and review processes possess a combined knowledge of fire science, materials science, heat transfer, and structural engineering, and design.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation M (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 30).

NIST recommends that academic, professional short-course, and web-based training materials in the use of computational fire dynamics and thermo-structural analysis tools be developed and delivered to strengthen the base of available technical capabilities and human resources.

Relevance to WTC 7: NIST stretched the state-of-the-art in the computational tools needed to reconstruct a fire-induced progressive collapse. This enabled identification of the critical processes that led to that collapse. Making these expanded tools and derivative, validated, and simplified modelling approaches usable by practitioners could prevent future disasters.

END

Progressive Collapse of WTC 7 – 2008 NIST Recommendations – Part 1 of 2

CJ Walsh — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 17:29:05 +0000

See the 1st Series of Posts on the 2005 NIST WTC 1 & 2 Collapse Recommendations … which began, here, towards the end of 2011 …

2011-10-25: NIST’s Recommendations on the 9-11 WTC Building Collapses … GROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity – Recommendations 1, 2 & 3 (out of 30)

Colour plan showing the World Trade Center Complex in New York City, and its surrounding neighbourhood in Manhattan. By means of yellow shading and annotation in red text, the extent of direct damage caused by the collapse of the 2 WTC Towers on 11 September 2001 is shown. Not shown is the much greater extent of indirect damage caused, e.g. dust and debris from the collapses clogged up and destroyed air conditioning systems and ductwork in buildings. Everywhere south of Canal Street was a disaster zone. Also not shown is the damage caused by WTC 7, at the north-eastern tip of the Complex, which collapsed late on the afternoon of 9-11. Click to enlarge.

2012-01-18: SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS …

1. World Trade Center Building 7 was a 47 Storey Office Building located at the north -eastern tip of the WTC Complex in Lower Manhattan, New York City. It had been built on top of an existing Consolidated Edison of New York electric power substation, on land owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

On Tuesday, 11 September 2001 … WTC Building 7 was on fire for almost seven hours … from the time of the collapse of WTC Tower 1 – North Tower, just before 10.30 hrs (local time), until 17.21 hrs … when WTC 7 failed completely, collapsing progressively as a result of ‘real’ fires – as distinct from ‘standard test’ fires – on many floors.

There were only two certainties on that fateful day (9-11) … the Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse of WTC Building 7 could no longer be ignored by the International Fire Science and Engineering Community … and the ‘reality’, which Modern Fire Engineering must now confront, was significantly altered. Secondly, it is NEVER acceptable to a general population for buildings to collapse !

Later in 2008, the Mumbai ‘Hive’ Attacks would add a sinister new ingredient to the standard threat profile for buildings, their occupants, and emergency services.

However, long before 9-11 and Mumbai, the growing complexity of modern communities and their rapidly evolving architectural forms had left the Fire Engineer far behind, unable to respond to the new fire safety challenges posed.

2. The second of the NIST Publications being referenced in this New Series of Posts is as follows …

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). August 2008. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7. NIST NCSTAR 1A. Gaithersburg, MD, USA.

This 2008 NIST Report contains, in Chapter 5, a list of 13 Recommendations for Action (A-M), grouped together under the same 8 Subject Headings used in the 2005 NIST Report (NCSTAR 1) …

i) Increased structural integrity … Recommendation A ;

ii) Enhanced fire endurance of structures … Recommendations B, C, D & E ;

iii) New methods for fire resisting design of structures … Recommendations F & G ;

iv) Improved active fire protection … Recommendation H ;

v) Improved building evacuation … Long before its collapse, all occupants/users had evacuated WTC 7 … No Recommendation ;

vi) Improved emergency response … Recommendation I ;

vii) Improved procedures and practices … Recommendations J & K ; and

viii) Education and training … Recommendations L & M.

NIST has clearly stated that “the urgency of these Recommendations is substantially reinforced by their pertinence to the collapse of a tall building that was based on a structural system design that is in widespread use”.

3. The Colour Coding of Texts which I am using in this new series of posts … where NIST has presented new texts relating to WTC Building 7, these are shown in blue … where NIST has chosen to reinforce earlier texts from the 2005 Report on the WTC Towers 1 & 2 Collapses, these are shown in black. The important new paragraphs describing the critical relevance of WTC Building 7 are shown in red.

Please pay particular attention to these Red Paragraphs. Having carefully digested their contents … then if, by any chance, you happen to encounter somebody who still insists that the NIST 9-11 WTC Recommendations have no relevance to the design, construction, management and operation of ALL Buildings … that person is either living in Alice’s Wonderland … or he/she has never bothered to read the NIST Recommendations in the first place !!

4. While it is still essential to distinguish clearly between the two closely related structural concepts below … I would like to take this opportunity to bring to your attention a necessary and important modification … more, a refinement … to the definition of Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse …

Disproportionate Damage

The failure of a building’s structural system (i) remote from the scene of an isolated overloading action; and (ii) to an extent which is not in reasonable proportion to that action.

Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse

The sequential growth and intensification of structural distortion and displacement, beyond fire engineering design parameters, and the eventual failure of elements of construction in a building – during a fire and the ‘cooling phase’ afterwards – which, if unchecked, will result in disproportionate damage, and may lead to total building collapse.

This modification/refinement recognizes the following … that Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse may commence long before any breach occurs in a Fire Compartment Boundary … that, as a result of rampant commercial pressures in our societies, the tendency is for Compartment Volumes to become far too large to be any longer effective … and in the case of a Sustainable Building, for example, where natural patterns of air movement in buildings are used for either heating or cooling purposes, there may be no Compartments at all !

Restricting the application of one or both of these structural concepts, in law, to Multi-Storey Buildings, i.e. in many jurisdictions, those buildings having 5 or more storeys … is a purely arbitrary cut-off point.

CIB W14′s Research Working Group IV: ‘Structural Reliability & Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse’ would argue, rationally, that both of these concepts are fundamental to all structural fire engineering design.

5. Structural Fire Engineering is concerned with those aspects of fire engineering which relate to structural design for fire, and the complex architectural interaction between a building’s structure and fabric, i.e. non-structure, under conditions of fire and its immediate aftermath.

As Chair of CIB W14′s Research Working Group IV … I will shortly be making a Workshop Presentation in Europe, the aim of which will be to set the scene for the launch of an International CIB W14 Research WG IV Reflection Document; the specific objective of the Presentation, however, will be to accurately describe the phenomenon that is Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse … and to outline a necessary new design approach which will fulfil future requirements, legal and otherwise, concerning adequate resistance to this phenomenon.

It will be shown that the new design approach is fully compatible with the Recommendations contained in the 2005 and 2008 NIST Reports on the 9-11 World Trade Center Buildings 1, 2 & 7 Collapses – NCSTAR 1 & NCSTAR 1A.

2008 NIST WTC 7 RECOMMENDATIONS (Final Report NCSTAR 1A)

5.1 GENERAL

In its final report on the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (NIST NCSTAR 1), NIST made 30 Recommendations for improving the safety of buildings, occupants, and emergency responders. These encompass increased structural integrity, enhanced fire endurance of structures, new methods for fire resisting design of structures, improved active fire protection, improved building evacuation, improved emergency response, improved procedures and practices, and education and training.

WTC 7 was unlike the WTC Towers in many respects. It was a more typical tall building in the design of its structural system. It was not struck by an airplane. The fires in WTC 7 were quite different from those in the Towers. Since WTC 7 was not doused with thousands of litres of jet fuel, large areas of any floor were not ignited simultaneously. Instead, the fires in WTC 7 were similar to those that have occurred previously in several tall buildings where the sprinklers did not function or were not present. These other buildings did not succumb to their fires and collapse, because they were of structural designs that differed from that of WTC 7.

The Investigation Team has compiled a list of key factors that enabled ordinary fires to result in an extraordinary outcome. In so doing, the Team recognized that there were additional aspects to be included in the content of some of the earlier 30 Recommendations.

Based on the findings of this Investigation, NIST has identified 1 New Recommendation and has reiterated 12 Recommendations from the Investigation of the WTC Towers.

The urgency of the Prior Recommendations is substantially reinforced by their pertinence to the collapse of a tall building that is based on a structural system design that is in widespread use. A few of the Prior Recommendations have been modified to reflect the findings of this Investigation.

The partial or total collapse of a building due to fires is an infrequent event. This is particularly true for buildings with a reliably operating active fire protection system, such as an automatic fire sprinkler system. A properly designed and operating automatic sprinkler system will contain fires while they are small and, in most instances, prevent them from growing and spreading to threaten structural integrity.

The intent of current practice, based on prescriptive standards and codes, is to achieve life safety, not collapse prevention. However, the key premise of NIST’s Recommendations is that buildings should not collapse in infrequent (worst-case) fires that may occur when active fire protection systems are rendered ineffective, e.g. when sprinklers do not exist, are not functional, or are overwhelmed by the fire.

Fire scenarios for structural design based on single compartment or single floor fires are not appropriate representations of infrequent fire events. Such events have occurred in several tall buildings resulting in unexpected substantial losses. Instead, historical data suggests that infrequent fires which should be considered in structural design have characteristics that include: ordinary combustibles and combustible load levels, local fire origin on any given floor, no widespread use of accelerants, consecutive fire spread from combustible to combustible, fire-induced window breakage providing ventilation for continued fire spread and accelerated fire growth, concurrent fires on multiple floors, and active fire protection systems rendered ineffective. The fires in WTC 7 had all of these characteristics.

NIST believes the Recommendations are realistic, appropriate, and achievable within a reasonable period of time. NIST strongly urges that immediate and serious consideration be given to these Recommendations by the building and fire safety communities in order to achieve appropriate improvements in the way buildings are designed, constructed, maintained, and used – with the goal of making buildings safer in future emergencies.

A complete listing of all 13 Recommendations (Recommendations A through L) based on this Investigation follows. Under a few of the Recommendations, the pertinent lesson from the reconstruction of the WTC 7 Collapse is reflected in the form of a modification. For the 12 Reiterated Recommendations, the pertinent codes, standards, and organizations were listed in Table 9-1, and Tables 9-2a through 9-2c of NIST NCSTAR 1 and are not repeated here. For the 1 New Recommendation, B, this information is provided in the text.

5.1.1 GROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity

The standards for estimating the load effects of potential hazards (e.g. progressive collapse, wind) and the design of structural systems to mitigate the effects of those hazards should be improved to enhance structural integrity.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation A (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 1).

NIST recommends that: (1) progressive collapse be prevented in buildings through the development and nationwide adoption of consensus standards and code provisions, along with the tools and guidelines needed for their use in practice; and (2) a standard methodology be developed – supported by analytical design tools and practical design guidance – to reliably predict the potential for complex failures in structural systems subjected to multiple hazards.

Relevance to WTC 7: Had WTC 7 been expressly designed for prevention of fire-induced progressive collapse, it would have been sufficiently robust to withstand local failure due to the fires without suffering total collapse.

5.1.2 GROUP 2. Enhanced Fire Endurance of Structures

The procedures and practices used to ensure the fire endurance of structures should be enhanced by improving the technical basis for construction classifications and fire resistance ratings, improving the technical basis for standard fire resistance testing methods, use of the ‘structural frame’ approach to fire resistance ratings, and developing in-service performance requirements and conformance criteria for sprayed fire resisting materials.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation B (New)

NIST recommends that buildings be explicitly evaluated to ensure the adequate performance of the structural system under worst-case design fires with any active fire protection system rendered ineffective. Of particular concern are the effects of thermal expansion in buildings with one or more of the following features: (1) long-span floor systems* which experience significant thermal expansion and sagging effects; (2) connection designs (especially shear connections) that cannot accommodate thermal effects; (3) floor framing that induces asymmetric thermally-induced (i.e. net lateral) forces on girders; (4) shear studs that could fail due to differential thermal expansion in composite floor systems; and (5) lack of shear studs on girders. Careful consideration should also be given to the possibility of other design features that may adversely affect the performance of the structural system under fire conditions.

[ * F-6 Typical floor span lengths in tall office buildings are in the range of 12-15 metres; this range is considered to represent long-span systems. Thermal effects (e.g. thermal expansion) that may be significant in long-span buildings may also be present in buildings with shorter span lengths, depending on the design of the structural system.]

Building owners, operators, and designers are strongly urged to act upon this Recommendation. Engineers should be able to design cost-effective fixes to address any areas of concern that are identified by these evaluations. Several existing, emerging, or even anticipated capabilities could have helped prevent the collapse of WTC 7. The degree to which these capabilities improve performance remains to be evaluated. Possible options for developing cost-effective fixes include:

More robust connections and framing systems to better resist the effects of thermal expansion on the structural system ;
Structural systems expressly designed to prevent progressive collapse. The current model building codes do not require that buildings be designed to resist progressive collapse ;
Better thermal insulation (i.e. reduced conductivity and/or increased thickness) to limit heating of structural steel and to minimize both thermal expansion and weakening effects. Currently, insulation is used to protect steel strength, but it could also be used to maintain a lower temperature in the steel framing to limit thermal expansion ;
Improved compartmentation in tenant areas to limit spread of fires ;
Thermally resisting window assemblies which limit breakage, reduce air supply, and retard fire growth.

Industry should partner with the research community to fill critical gaps in knowledge about how structures perform in real fires, particularly considering: the effects of fire on the entire structural system; the interactions between sub-systems, elements, and connections; and scaling of fire test results to full-scale structures, especially for structures with long-span floor systems.

Affected Standards: ASCE 7, ASCE/SFPE 29, AISC Specifications, and ACI 318. Development of performance objectives, design criteria, evaluation methods, design guidance, and computational tools should begin promptly, leading to new standards.

Model Building Codes: The new standard should be adopted in model building codes (IBC, NFPA 5000) by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

Relevance to WTC 7: The effects of restraint of free thermal expansion on the steel framing systems, especially for the long spans on the east side of WTC 7, were not considered in the structural design and led to the initiation of the building collapse.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation C (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 4).

NIST recommends evaluating, and where needed improving, the technical basis for determining appropriate construction classifications and fire rating requirements (especially for tall buildings) – and making related code changes now, as much as possible – by explicitly considering factors including:*

[ * F-7 The construction classification and fire rating requirements should be risk-consistent with respect to the design-basis hazards and the consequences of those hazards. The fire rating requirements, which were originally developed based on experience with buildings less than 20 storeys in height, have generally decreased over the past 80 years since historical fire data for buildings suggest considerable conservatism in those requirements. For tall buildings, the likely consequences of a given threat to an occupant on the upper floors are more severe than the consequences to an occupant on the first floor or the lower floors. For example, with non-functioning elevators, both of the time requirements are much greater for full building evacuation from upper floors and emergency responder access to those floors. The current height and areas tables in building codes do not provide the technical basis for the progressively increasing risk to an occupant on the upper floors of tall buildings that are much greater than 20 storeys in height.]

timely access by emergency responders and full evacuation of occupants, or the time required for burnout without partial collapse ;
the extent to which redundancy in active fire protection systems (sprinklers and standpipe, fire alarm, and smoke management) should be credited for occupant life safety ;*

[ * F-8 Occupant life safety, prevention of fire spread, and structural integrity are considered separate safety objectives.]

the need for redundancy in fire protection systems that are critical to structural integrity ;*

[ * F-9 The passive fire protection system (including the application of fire protection insulation, compartmentation, and fire stopping) and the active sprinkler system each provide redundancy for maintaining structural integrity in a building fire, should one of the systems fail to perform its intended function.]

the ability of the structure and local floor systems to withstand a maximum credible fire scenario* without collapse, recognizing that sprinklers could be compromised, not operational, or non-existent ;

[ * F-10 A maximum credible fire scenario includes conditions that are severe, but reasonable to anticipate, conditions related to building construction, occupancy, fire loads, ignition sources, compartment geometry, fire control methods, etc., as well as adverse, but reasonable to anticipate operating conditions.]

compartmentation requirements (e.g. 1,200 sq.m*) to protect the structure, including fire rated doorsets and automatic enclosures, and limiting air supply (e.g. thermally resisting window assemblies) to retard fire spread in buildings with large, open floor plans ;

[ * F-11 Or a more appropriate limit, which represents a reasonable area for active fire fighting operations.]

the effect of spaces containing unusually large fuel concentrations for the expected occupancy of the building ; and
the extent to which fire control systems, including suppression by automatic or manual means, should be credited as part of the prevention of fire spread.

Relevance to WTC 7: The floor systems in WTC 7 failed at lower temperatures because thermal effects within the structural system, especially thermal expansion, were not considered in setting the fire rating requirements in the construction classification, which are determined using the ASTM E 119 or equivalent testing standard.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation D (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 5).

NIST recommends that the technical basis for the century-old standard for fire resistance testing of components, assemblies and systems be improved through a national effort. Necessary guidance also should be developed for extrapolating the results of tested assemblies to prototypical building systems. A key step in fulfilling this Recommendation is to establish a capability for studying and testing components, assemblies, and systems under realistic fire and load conditions.

Of particular concern is that the Standard Fire Resistance Test does not adequately capture important thermally-induced interactions between structural sub-systems, elements, and connections that are critical to structural integrity. System-level interactions, especially due to thermal expansion, are not considered in the standard test method since columns, girders, and floor sub-assemblies are tested separately. Also, the performance of connections under both gravity and thermal effects is not considered. The United States currently does not have the capability for studying and testing these important fire-induced phenomena critical to structural safety.

Relevance to WTC 7: The floor systems failed in WTC 7 at shorter fire exposure times than the specified fire rating (two hours) and at lower temperatures because thermal effects within the structural system, especially thermal expansion, were not considered in setting the endpoint criteria when using the ASTM E 110 or equivalent testing standard. The structural breakdowns that led to the initiating event, and the eventual collapse of WTC 7, occurred at temperatures that were hundreds of degrees below the criteria that determine structural fire resistance ratings.

NIST WTC 7 Recommendation E (NCSTAR 1 Recommendation 7).

NIST recommends the adoption and use of the ‘structural frame’ approach to fire resistance ratings. This approach requires all members that comprise the primary structural frame (such as columns, girders, beams, trusses, and spandrels) be fire protected to the higher fire resistance rating required for the columns. The definition of the primary structural frame should be expanded to include bracing members that are essential to the vertical stability of the primary structural frame under gravity loading (e.g. girders, diagonal bracing, composite floor systems that provide lateral bracing to the girders) whether or not the bracing members carry gravity loads. Some of these bracing members may not have direct connections to the columns, but provide stability to those members directly connected to the columns. This Recommendation modifies the definition of the primary structural frame adopted in the 2007 supplement to the International Building Code (IBC). The IBC considers members of floor or roof construction that are not connected to the columns not to be part of the primary structural frame. This Recommendation ensures consistency in the fire protection provided to all of the structural elements that contribute to overall structural stability. State and local jurisdictions should adopt and enforce this requirement.

Relevance to WTC 7: Thermally-induced breakdown of the floor system in WTC 7 was a determining step in causing failure initiation and progressive collapse. Therefore, the floor system should be considered as an integral part of the primary structural frame.

END

Accessible Toilet Room in a Japanese Public Place – Kanazawa

CJ Walsh — Mon, 28 Nov 2011 13:08:08 +0000

2011-11-28: Further to my post, dated 20 October 2010 …

A valuable and essential facility in the grounds of Kanazawa Castle, Japan … entered directly from the exterior … is this Accessible Toilet Room / WC / Bathroom / Hygiene Room / Rest Room / Sanitary Room (whichever term you are familiar with) provided for public use. There is no attendant permanently present, and no camera surveillance of the external entrance area. However, it is regularly cleaned and properly maintained during the Castle’s opening hours.

Colour photograph showing Kanazawa Castle and its grounds, in Japan. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2010-04-27. Click to enlarge.

The following photographs show a far more ‘developed’, ‘civilized’ and ‘person-centred’ approach to the design and fit-out of these public facilities (quite common in Japan) … than here in Europe.

Real Accessibility-for-All in action … with no messing around …

Colour photograph showing a Public Toilet Room in the grounds of Kanazawa Castle, Japan ... which is Accessible-for-All. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2010-04-27. Click to enlarge.

Colour photograph showing a Public Toilet Room in the grounds of Kanazawa Castle, Japan ... which is Accessible-for-All. Detailed view of toilet controls and accessories. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2010-04-27. Click to enlarge.

END

Sustainable Fire Engineering – IABSE Lecture 1 December 2011

CJ Walsh — Mon, 14 Nov 2011 19:07:15 +0000

2011-11-14 …

On Thursday evening, 1st December 2011, at 19.00 hrs … in the Dublin Institute of Technology … I will present an IABSE-Ireland Sponsored Lecture on the subject: ‘Sustainable Fire Engineering IS THE FUTURE !’.

This Presentation has been in continuous development across a snaking international path … Dubayy (UAE) in 2008 … Lund (Sweden) and Bengaluru (India) in 2009 … Dilli (India), Zurich (Switzerland) and Dublin (Ireland) in 2010 … Paris (France), the IFE’s International Fire Conference in Cardiff (Wales) and the ASFP-Ireland Fire Seminar in 2011 … and on 1 December next, in Dublin, I will be introducing some tough new realities for fire engineering generally … not just in Ireland …

Colour photograph showing the impact of witnessing the 9-11 WTC Incident in New York. Sustainable Fire Engineering must be 'reliability-based' & 'person-centred'. But ... do building designers, including fire engineers, actually understand that the people who use their buildings are 'individuals' ... each having a different range of abilities ? Photograph by Marty Lederhandler/AP. Click to enlarge.

IABSE Irish National Group Sponsored Lecture

Dublin Institute of Technology, Bolton Street – Michael O’Donnell Room (259)

Thursday, 1 December 2011 @ 19.00 hrs / 7.00 p.m.

CJ Walsh: Sustainable Fire Engineering IS THE FUTURE ! (Lecture Flyer, PDF File, 259 kb)

The aim of Sustainable Fire Engineering is to realize a safe and sustainable built environment.

Responding ethically, in built and/or wrought form, to the still evolving concept of sustainable human and social development … a principal objective of Sustainable Fire Engineering is to design for maximum credible fire and user scenarios … in order to maintain a proper and satisfactory level of fire safety and protection over the full life cycle of, for example, a building … and for a Sustainable Building, that life cycle is 100 years minimum.

Sustainable Fire Engineering must, therefore, be ‘reliability-based’ & ‘person-centred’.

This presentation will examine the authentic language and meaning of sustainability … and will then track how this impacts on the professional practice of fire engineering. Special mention will be made of Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse.

See you all there ! And I will be looking forward to a lot of challenging feedback on the night !!

END

The Future of Disability Policy in Ireland – Recent SDI Submission

CJ Walsh — Sun, 06 Nov 2011 17:37:45 +0000

2011-11-06 …

Some time ago … Irish Minister of State at the Department of Health & Children, Ms. Kathleen Lynch T.D., released to the public a report on the future policy of disability in Ireland. The report was drawn up by an Expert Reference Group at the request of the Department. Submissions were sought from the public and interested groups on this document, entitled ‘Report of Disability Policy Review’.

The Report, and other ‘supporting’ information, can be downloaded from the Department’s WebSite at … http://www.dohc.ie/consultations/

Submissions had to be received by the Department, at the latest, on Friday 4 November 2011.

As you read through the SDI Submission below, please also note well that on the 2 Web Pages of the Department’s Site …

Background to Report of Disability Policy Review ; and
Summary of Key Proposals from The Review of Disability Policy ;

… there is not one single mention of the word ‘rights’ !

In a post back on 17 February 2009 … concerning another disability matter, i.e. the complete lack of ‘accessible’ emergency services for people with a hearing impairment in our country, I wrote:

‘ Irish Politicians and Senior Civil Servants would all rather commit ritual suicide on Merrion Street (outside the Dáil and Government Buildings) than give people with disabilities their rights.’

The following is the recent Submission made by Sustainable Design International … and submitted to the Department of Health & Children on 4 November 2011 …

Re: The Future of Disability Policy in Ireland – SDI Submission

Ms. Kathleen Lynch T.D., Minister of State, c/o Office for Disability & Mental Health, Department of Health & Children, Hawkins House, Dublin 2.

Dear Minister,

It is reassuring to see that the following two documents, available for download from the Department’s WebSite, contain extensive references to Human Rights and, particularly, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities …

- Report of Disability Policy Review – Prepared by Ms. Fiona Keogh PhD, on behalf of the Expert Reference Group on Disability Policy (October 2011) ;

- Report on Public Consultation: Efficiency & Effectiveness of Disability Services in Ireland – Review of Disability Services under the Value for Money & Policy Review Initiative 2009-2011 (December 2010).

And yet … the following document, also available for download from the Department’s WebSite, does not make one single reference to Human Rights …

- Summary of Key Proposals from The Review of Disability Policy (October 2011).

It is a matter of deep concern how such a fundamental issue can suddenly, and with malign intent, be erased from view … and understanding !

Whether or not Ireland has ratified the United Nations 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is no longer relevant.

The European Union (EU), having its own legal personality after the Lisbon Treaty, did ratify the UN Convention … back on 23 December 2010.

Therefore, Ireland is now bound by a Duty of Loyal Co-Operation, deriving from Article 4.3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

This Duty embraces two sets of obligations: 1) All EU Member States shall take appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the EU Treaties or resulting from action taken by the EU Institutions; and 2) All EU Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the European Union’s tasks, and shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.

In complete contrast to Ireland’s Current Disability Policy … Future Disability Policy must now be re-drafted, and implemented, in a manner where:

a) Explicit reference is made, throughout, to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities … and to the fact that there is now a robust rights-based foundation to Ireland’s National Disability Policy ;

and

b) There is a full, comprehensive and correct response to all of the contents of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

I would specifically draw your attention to Articles 31 & 33 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities … which together mandate that implementation is taken seriously … that it is competent and effective … and, most importantly, that independent monitoring and verification is a fundamental part of the whole policy development and implementation process.

In closing, may I add that the treatment of ‘Accessibility’ in all of the documents is careless, and disgracefully inadequate !!

Sustainable Design International is a professional and multi-disciplinary design, engineering, research and consultancy practice – specializing in the theory and implementation of a Sustainable Human Environment (social - built - virtual - economic).

Our Organization possesses a unique level of expertise on all aspects of Human Environment Accessibility for People with Activity Limitations.

Yours,

C. J. Walsh, Consultant Architect, Fire Engineer & Technical Controller.

Managing Director, Sustainable Design International Ltd. – Ireland & Italy. Sürdürülebilir Tasarım Tic.Ltd.Şti. – Turkey.

END

NIST’s Recommendations on the 9-11 WTC Building Collapses

CJ Walsh — Tue, 25 Oct 2011 21:56:16 +0000

2011-10-25: Since shortly after my visit to Lower Manhattan in mid-October 2001 … we have maintained an Archive Page on ‘Structural Fire Engineering, World Trade Center Incident (9-11) & Fire Serviceability Limit States‘ … at SDI’s Corporate WebSite. And I have referenced here … many, many times … the Recommendations contained in the 2005 & 2008 Final Reports of the U.S. National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) on the 9-11 World Trade Center Building 1, 2 & 7 Collapses.

In this post (and a series of future posts) … I find it most necessary that the 2005 & 2008 NIST Recommendations now be presented for everyone to read. Yes, some of Recommendations apply specifically to Tall and Very Tall Buildings … and Building Designers in India, China, Brazil, Russia & South Africa (BRICS), the Arab Gulf Region, Europe and North America, etc., should be fully aware of their contents.

BUT … I am also strongly convinced … precisely because I am an Architect, a Fire Engineer and a Technical Controller … that most of the NIST Recommendations apply to ALL Buildings … so catastrophic was the failure exposed on that fateful day (11 September 2001) … in all of our common design and construction practices … and our operation, maintenance and emergency response procedures !

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

1. Extract from Paragraph #9.2, Chapter 9, NIST Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers – Report Reference NIST NCSTAR 1 (2005) …

NIST believes that these Recommendations are both realistic and achievable within a reasonable period of time, and that their implementation would make buildings safer for occupants and emergency responders in future emergencies.
NIST strongly urges that immediate and serious consideration be given to these Recommendations by the building and fire safety communities – especially designers, owners, developers, codes and standards development organizations, regulators, fire safety professionals, and emergency responders.
NIST also strongly urges building owners and public officials to: (i) evaluate the safety implications of these Recommendations for their existing inventory of buildings; and (ii) take the steps necessary to mitigate any unwarranted risks without waiting for changes to occur in codes, standards, and practices.

2. At the time of writing … it is important to point out that although they are related Structural Concepts … and there is still, to this day, a lot of confusion about these concepts in the USA … it is important to clearly distinguish between …

Disproportionate Damage

The failure of a building’s structural system (i) remote from the scene of an isolated overloading action; and (ii) to an extent which is not in reasonable proportion to that action.

Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse

The sequential growth and intensification of distortion, displacement and failure of elements of construction in a building – during a fire and the ‘cooling phase’ afterwards – which, if unchecked, will result in disproportionate damage, and may lead to total building collapse.

3. Recommendation 2, below, would certainly need to be understood and implemented within today’s additional design constraints of Sustainable Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience to Severe Weather Events. Therefore … Design Wind Speeds must be increased, accordingly, for ALL Buildings.

4. As such a high level of performance is expected … indeed demanded … of a Sustainable Building … Sustainable Fire Engineering must be ‘reliability-based’. In other words, it must have a rational, empirical and scientifically robust basis … unlike conventional fire engineering, which is yet aimlessly wandering around in pre-historic caves !

5. Finally … there is no use trying to hide the fact that progress on implementing the NIST Recommendations, within the USA, has been lamentably slow. Outside that jurisdiction, the response has ranged from mild interest, to complete apathy, and even to vehement antipathy. The implications arising from implementation are much too hard to digest … for long established fire safety professionals and researchers who are unswervingly committed to the flawed and out-of-date practices and procedures of conventional fire engineering and, especially, for vested interests !

However … is it either in society’s interest, or in the interests of our clients/client organizations … that, to give you a simple example which is relevant close to home, British Standard 9999 (published on 31 October 2008): ‘Code of Practice for Fire Safety in the Design, Management and Use of Buildings’ takes absolutely no account of any of the NIST Recommendations ? As far as the British Standards Institution is concerned … 9-11 never happened … which I think is an inexcusable and unforgivable technical oversight !

For this reason, the General Public in ALL of our societies and Clients/Client Organizations in ALL countries should also be fully aware of the contents of these Recommendations …

Colour photograph showing the two World Trade Center Towers immediately after the impact of the second plane. At a fundamental level, this was a very serious 'real' fire incident ... which was extensively, and very thoroughly, investigated by the U.S. National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) ... and resulted in the important 2005 & 2008 NIST Recommendations. Click to enlarge.

2005 NIST WTC RECOMMENDATIONS

GROUP 1. Increased Structural Integrity

NIST WTC Recommendation 1.

a. Progressive collapse* should be prevented in buildings.

[ * F-19 Progressive collapse (or disproportionate damage) occurs when an initial local failure spreads from structural element to structural element resulting in the collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part of it.]

The primary structural systems should provide alternate paths for carrying loads in case certain components fail (e.g. transfer girders or columns). This is especially important in buildings where structural components (e.g. columns, girders) support unusually large floor areas.*

[ * F-20 While the WTC towers eventually collapsed, they had the capacity to redistribute loads from impact and fire damaged structural components and sub-systems to undamaged components and sub-systems. However, the core columns in the WTC towers lacked sufficient redundant (alternative) paths for carrying gravity loads.]

Progressive collapse is addressed only in a very limited way in practice and by codes and standards. For example, the initiating event in design to prevent progressive collapse may be removal of one or two columns at the bottom of the structure. Initiating events at multiple locations within the structure, or involving other key components and sub-systems, should be analyzed commensurate with the risks considered in the design. The effectiveness of mitigation approaches involving new system and sub-system design concepts should be evaluated with conventional approaches based on indirect design (continuity, strength and ductility of connections), direct design (local hardening), and redundant (alternate) load paths. The capability to prevent progressive collapse due to abnormal loads should include: (i) comprehensive design rules and practice guides; (ii) evaluation criteria, methodology, and tools for assessing the vulnerability of structures to progressive collapse; (iii) performance-based criteria for abnormal loads and load combinations; (iv) analytical tools to predict potential collapse mechanisms; and (v) computer models and analysis procedures for use in routine design practice. The federal government should co-ordinate the existing programmes that address this need: those in the Department of Defence; the General Services Administration; the Defence Threat Reduction Agency; and NIST. Affected Standards: ASCE-7, AISC Specifications, and ACI 318. These standards and other relevant committees should draw on expertise from ASCE/SFPE 29 for issues concerning progressive collapse under fire conditions. Model Building Codes: The consensus standards should be adopted in model building codes (i.e. the International Building Code and NFPA 5000) by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard. State and local jurisdictions should adopt and enforce the improved model building codes and national standards based on all 30 WTC Recommendations (2005). The codes and standards may vary from the WTC Recommendations, but satisfy their intent.

b. A robust, integrated predictive capability should be developed, validated, and maintained to routinely assess the vulnerability of whole structures to the effects of credible hazards. This capability to evaluate the performance and reserve capacity of structures does not exist and is a significant cause for concern. This capability would also assist in investigations of building failure – as demonstrated by the analyses of the WTC building collapses carried out in this Investigation. The failure analysis capability should include all possible complex failure phenomena that may occur under multiple hazards (e.g. bomb blasts, fires, impacts, gas explosions, earthquakes, and hurricane winds), experimentally validated models, and robust tools for routine analysis to predict such failures and their consequences. This capability should be developed via a co-ordinated effort involving federal, private sector, and academic research organizations in close partnership with practicing engineers.

NIST WTC Recommendation 2.

NIST recommends that nationally accepted performance standards be developed for: (1) conducting wind tunnel testing of prototype structures based on sound technical methods that result in repeatable and reproducible results among testing laboratories; and (2) estimating wind loads and their effects on tall buildings for use in design, based on wind tunnel testing data and directional wind speed data. Wind loads specified in current prescriptive codes may not be appropriate for the design of very tall buildings since they do not account for building-specific aerodynamic effects. Further, a review of wind load estimates for the WTC towers indicated differences by as much as 40 % from wind tunnel studies conducted in 2002 by two independent commercial laboratories. Major sources of differences in estimation methods currently used in practice occur in the selection of design wind speeds and directionality, the nature of hurricane wind profiles, the estimation of ‘component’ wind effects by integrating wind tunnel data with wind speed and direction information, and the estimation of ‘resultant’ wind effects using load combination methods. Wind loads were a major factor in the design of the WTC tower structures and were relevant to evaluating the baseline capacity of the structures to withstand abnormal events such as major fires or impact damage. Yet, there is lack of consensus on how to evaluate and estimate winds and their load effects on buildings.

a. Nationally accepted standards should be developed and implemented for conducting wind tunnel tests, estimating site-specific wind speed and directionality based on available data, and estimating wind loads associated with specific design probabilities from wind tunnel test results and directional wind speed data.

b. Nationally accepted standards should be developed for estimating wind loads in the design of tall buildings. The development of performance standards for estimating wind loads should consider: (1) appropriate load combinations and load factors, including performance criteria for static and dynamic behaviour, based on both ultimate and serviceability limit states; and (2) validation of wind load provisions in prescriptive design standards for tall buildings, given the universally acknowledged use of wind tunnel testing and associated performance criteria. Limitations to the use of prescriptive wind load provisions should be clearly identified in codes and standards.

The standards development work can begin immediately to address many of the above needs. The results of those efforts should be adopted in practice as soon as they become available. The research that will be required to address the remaining needs also should begin immediately and results should be made available for standards development and use in practice. Affected National Standard: ASCE-7. Model Building Codes: The standard should be adopted in model building codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

NIST WTC Recommendation 3.

NIST recommends that an appropriate criterion be developed and implemented to enhance the performance of tall buildings by limiting how much they sway under lateral load design conditions (e.g. winds and earthquakes). The stability and safety of tall buildings depend upon, among other factors, the magnitude of building sway or deflection, which tends to increase with building height. Conventional strength-based methods, such as those used in the design of the WTC towers, do not limit deflections. The deflection limit state criterion, which is proposed here is in addition to the stress limit state and serviceability requirement; it should be adopted either to complement the safety provided by conventional strength-based design or independently as an alternate deflection-based approach to the design of tall buildings for life safety. The recommended deflection limit state criterion is independent of the criterion used to ensure occupant comfort, which is met in current practice by limiting accelerations (e.g. in the 15 to 20 milli-g range). Lateral deflections, which already are limited in the design of tall buildings to control damage in earthquake-prone regions, should also be limited in non-seismic areas.*

[ * F-22 Analysis of baseline performance under the original design wind loads indicated that the WTC towers would need to have been between 50 % and 90 % stiffer to achieve a typical drift ratio used in current practice for non-seismic regions, though not required by building codes. Limiting drift would have required increasing exterior column areas in lower stories and/or significant additional damping.]

Affected National standards: ASCE-7, AISC Specifications, and ACI 318. Model Building Codes: The standard should be adopted in model building codes by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard.

END

Public Procurement & ‘Design for All’ – It’s Crunch Time, Folks !

CJ Walsh — Wed, 12 Oct 2011 18:41:15 +0000

2011-10-12 & 2011-10-17: Close your eyes … and imagine, for a split second, the value and material extent of all the Public Procurement Contracts being tendered for and awarded each week, throughout Europe. ‘Enormous’ is the only appropriate word which must spring to your mind ! If you don’t believe me, check out the statistics for yourself !! And that value is going to keep increasing !!!

The European Commission has recently proposed that suitable instruments be developed which will permit the operation of the Accessibility / Design for All Requirements in EU Public Procurement Directives to commence, with full effect. This process is proving to be problematic … and it is certainly not as open and transparent as it should be.

Leaving aside the utilities sectors (water, energy, transport and postal services) … recall that EU Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 31 March 2004, on the Co-Ordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts had to be implemented, at national level in all of the EU Member States, no later than 31 January 2006. This Directive was amended, in a minor way, by Directives 2005/51/EC and 2005/75/EC. In spite of these amendments, 31 January 2006 remained the target date for national implementation.

[ Ireland's national implementing legislation ... European Communities (Award of Public Authorities' Contracts) Regulations 2006 ... came into operation on 22 June 2006.]

In addition, each Member State had to ensure that Directive 2004/18/EC was properly implemented by using effective, available and transparent Monitoring Mechanisms.

With regard to specific rules governing specifications and contract documents … Article 23.1 of Directive 2004/18/EC stated, and still does state …

‘ The technical specifications as defined in point 1 of Annex VI shall be set out in the contract documentation, such as contract notices, contract documents or additional documents. Whenever possible these technical specifications should be defined so as to take into account accessibility criteria for people with disabilities or design for all users.’

Not the strongest possible language to encourage ‘accessibility’ … there’s nothing quite like a shall to concentrate minds !

[ However, in Ireland ... with regard to the same specific rules governing specifications and contract documents ... Section 23 (2) of the European Communities (Award of Public Authorities' Contracts) Regulations 2006 states ...

' In awarding a public contract, a contracting authority shall, as far as practicable, ensure that the technical specifications for the contract take account of the need to prescribe accessibility criteria for all persons who are likely to use the relevant works, products or service, particularly those who have disabilities.' ]

As already discussed in my post, dated 2 November 2010 … many people in the European Union Institutions would prefer to steer completely away from the Social Aspects of Sustainable Human and Social Development … fuzzy areas, not capable of easy quantification … leaving small, peripheral groups in the Institutions (neither well connected to the mainstream, nor fully aware of the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of that mainstream) to look after the Social Aspects.

Public Procurement in the European Union (EU)

The Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts concluded in the EU Member States on behalf of State, Regional or Local Authorities and other bodies governed by public law entities, is subject to the respect of Principles enshrined in the EU Treaties and, in particular, to …

the principle of freedom of movement of goods ;
the principle of freedom of establishment ;
the principle of freedom to provide services ; and
the principles deriving therefrom, such as the principle of equal treatment, the principle of non-discrimination, the principle of mutual recognition, the principle of proportionality and the principle of transparency.

For Public Contracts Above A Certain Value … it has been deemed necessary to draw up provisions of Community Co-Ordination of National Procedures for the award of such contracts, which are based on these principles so as to ensure the effects of them and to guarantee the opening-up of public procurement to competition.

- Adapted from Preamble Paragraph #2, EU Directive 2004/18/EC

Is Europe Serious about Implementing the Public Procurement Accessibility / Design for All Requirements ?

Before looking at how Accessibility / Design for All is being handled within the fast evolving European Public Procurement Framework … it is sobering to compare and contrast how DG Environment (ENV), in the European Commission, is promoting and actively supporting Green Public Procurement, i.e. Public Procurement which is environment-friendly … http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm … no messing about there !

If we (speaking as a European) are serious, therefore, about the ‘real’ implementation of Accessibility for All / Design for All / Inclusive Design / Universal Design / Barrier-Free Design in the Built Environment … it is of fundamental importance that an easily assimilated Standard (as defined in Paragraph #2, ANNEX VI of Directive 2004/18/EC) be produced ‘on the table’ for reference by Public Contracting Authorities … NOW !!!

Built Environment: Anywhere there is, or has been, a man-made or wrought (worked) intervention in the natural environment, e.g. cities, towns, villages, rural settlements, service utilities, transport systems, roads, bridges, tunnels, and cultivated lands, lakes, rivers, coasts, and seas, etc … including the Virtual Environment.

Virtual Environment: A designed environment, electronically generated from within the built environment, which may have the appearance, form, functionality and impact – to the person perceiving and actually experiencing it – of a real, imagined and/or utopian world.

The Built and Virtual Environments continue to merge into a new Augmented Reality.

A comprehensive document capable of answering a major portion of Europe’s current needs in this area is on the verge of being published as a full International Standard … ISO 21542: ‘Building Construction – Accessibility & Usability of the Built Environment’. And … as is the case with hundreds of ISO Standards in other sectors, this standard could easily be approved by CEN, one of Europe’s Standards Organisations, as an EN (European Standard) … under the Vienna Agreement on Technical Co-Operation between ISO and CEN, which was confirmed by both organizations in 2001 … and the period to practical application of ISO 21542 on the ground would be relatively swift.

Every delay represents not only a precious opportunity missed to improve the Accessibility of the Built Environment … but another blatant Denial of Human and Social Rights to vulnerable groups of people in all our communities !

Yes, this document was badly managed at the beginning of its very long gestation period, and its contents were a bit of a mess for the first few years … AND European countries were indignant, then, at the prospect of it becoming a European Standard. However, walking around any major city in any country in Europe today, and witnessing the universally appalling and miserable efforts at Accessibility Implementation … you would have to be outraged at the level of hypocrisy and blatant self-delusion practiced by Europeans !

BUT NOW … ISO FDIS 21542 … the Final Draft of the International Standard which was issued for voting, beginning on 22 September 2011 … is a very respectable looking document altogether. It makes important statements about ‘creating a sustainable built environment which is accessible’. Its purpose is ‘to define how the built environment should be designed, constructed and managed to enable people to approach, enter, use, egress from and evacuate a building independently, in an equitable and dignified manner and to the greatest extent possible’ … ‘principles which are supported by Preamble (g) and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’. I could go on, and on … but I will resist the temptation, since I was heavily involved in the development of this ISO Standard !

The point is … there is no longer any reason for European countries to complain about the inadequacy of this International Standard … and it should be the preferred instrument of choice to facilitate the immediate operation of the Accessibility / Design for All Requirements in EU Public Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC.

Unfortunately, this may not happen !

Years too late, near the end of 2007 … DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion (EMPL), in the European Commission, issued the following Mandate …

M/420 EN – Brussels, 21 December 2007

Standardization Mandate 420 to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in Support of European Accessibility Requirements for Public Procurement in the Built Environment

Click the Link Above to read and/or download PDF File (67.4 kb)

This Mandate covers 2 Phases of Work. Phase I deals with compiling an inventory of existing accessibility-related standards and an analysis of any gaps … as well as with issues of accessibility implementation monitoring and conformity assessment. Phase II is the actual accessibility standard(s) development phase.

However … Mandate M/420 EN is a flawed document, and it should have received much closer scrutiny from the European Standards Organizations named in the document title … before any work in Phase I commenced. Failing that … the first work item on the Phase I Agenda should certainly have been a critical examination of the mandate.

In a post, dated 15 January 2011 … I wrote …

” The European Union’s Accessibility Strategy, related Policies and Programmes … and the monitoring, targeting and independent verification of Accessibility Implementation … all require a radical overhaul !

All those Officials in the European Commission who are involved, in any way, shape or form, with Accessibility of the ‘Human Environment’ would do well to RE-READ AND MEDITATE DEEPLY on the contents of the 2003 Final Report from the Group of Accessibility Experts, which was established by the European Commission itself … “

The Final Report from the 2003 EU Group of Accessibility Experts, of which I was a Member, can be downloaded towards the end of that post.

The Officials who drafted Commission Mandate M/420 EN paid little, if any, attention to that 2003 Expert Group Report.

At the end of Phase I … in response to the European Commission’s Mandate M/420 EN … a long, rambling CEN Joint Report (document ref. CEN/BT/WG 207 N 29) of 425 Pages was issued, dated 8 August 2011, for general discussion and comment.

Some Comments on the CEN Joint Report …

1. Terminology

CEN Joint Report – CEN/BT/WG 207 N 29

3.4 Conclusions View, Findings and Recommendations

3.4.1 Overview

Terms such as ‘procurement’, ‘inclusion’, ‘accessibility’ and ‘compliance’ are difficult to define precisely, and they are often not fully understood by those responsible for managing or providing the products or environments people use. They are also not readily understood by those administrating and triggering the procurement process.

It is strange, therefore … and unacceptable … that this Report does not attempt to reduce and/or remove the ambiguity surrounding these terms … by providing a clear definition, with a supporting explanatory text, for each of the terms listed above.

I’m not even sure that the large numbers of people who helped to draft the CEN Joint Report fully understand those terms !

Most importantly, the Report is not at all precise about … and in fact appears to be completely confused by … the clear distinction which must be made between ‘accessibility’ and ‘access’.

2. ‘Accessibility’ & UN CRPD

Accessibility does not begin and end with Article 9 of the United Nations 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) !!! See my post, dated 15 January 2011 … and #6 below.

3. EU Ratification of UN CRPD

The full implications arising from European Union (EU) Ratification, on 23 December 2010, of the United Nations 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) … for both EU Institutions, and the EU Member States (whether or not they have individually ratified the UN Convention) … have not been properly examined in the CEN Joint Report.

See my post, dated 5 February 2011 .

4. Mainstreaming ‘Accessibility’

For the majority of people involved in the spatial planning, design and development of the European Built Environment, Accessibility is all about transport issues … for example, how far a proposed new building is from a transportation node.

We are communicating such a confused message (is it Accessibility for All, Design for All, Inclusive Design, Universal Design, or Barrier-Free Design ?) … that many policy and decision makers just could not be bothered. And who, in Europe, is really concerned with the quality of Accessibility Implementation ???

In addition … the CEN Joint Report neglected to deal adequately … or at all … with a major body of EU Legislation which has been implemented at national level, in the Member States, many years ago … Safety at Work Legislation ! All of the EU Directives require that workplaces be accessible. Yet, I know for a fact that, in Ireland, the Health & Safety Authority (HSA) is doing absolutely nothing to check whether this requirement is being complied with or not.

A Sustainable Built Environment is Accessible for All ! So many different types of International/European/National Legislation mandate that the Built Environment shall be Accessible for All !! Good Design demands that the Built Environment is Accessible for All !!!

So why is Accessibility not being properly integrated into the operation of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Legislation ?

Environmental Impact: Any effect caused by a given activity on the environment, including human health, safety and welfare, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, climate, landscape and historical monuments or other physical structures, or the interactions among these factors; it also includes effects on accessibility, cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to those factors.

No case need be made for the integration of Accessibility into Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) … it self-evidently must be !

Sustainability Impact Assessment: A continual evaluation and optimization process – informing initial decision-making, or design, and shaping activity/product/service realization, useful life and termination, or final disposal – of the interrelated positive and negative social, environmental, economic, institutional, political and legal impacts on balanced and equitable implementation of Sustainable Human and Social Development.

5. What Is The Overriding European Social Priority ?

The overriding European Social Priority is to commence operation, with full effect, of the Accessibility / Design for All Requirements within the fast evolving European Public Procurement Framework … as quickly as possible.

Do we have to wait another 2 or 3 years, at least, for the production of an ‘acceptable’ European Accessibility Standard ?? Instead, why not approve ISO 21542 as the European Standard when it is published as a full standard … which will be very soon ? ISO 21542 is already being used as the benchmark in the CEN Joint Report !

AND … do we have to wait, for who knows how long … before Effective Monitoring Procedures … and Independent Verification Procedures … are put in place at European and National/Regional/Local Levels ???

Quality of European Accessibility Implementation … is critical !

2011-10-17 …

6. Post UN CRPD – A More Demanding Scope & Quality of Implementation

Not unexpected … but it has still been a most enlightening experience to read the recent UN CRPD Committee Report on Spain … selected extracts from which are reproduced below. The language used by the Committee is strong and direct … finally !

This is not a good report and, in places, it makes for unpleasant reading … a concrete example of the ‘hypocrisy and blatant self-delusion practiced by Europeans’, which I talked about earlier.

In accordance with Article 36.3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) … the UN Secretary-General will be making this Report available to all States Parties.

United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

Sixth Session – 19 to 23 September 2011

Concluding Observations on Initial Report of Spain

(Article 35 of UN CRPD)

The Committee considered the initial report of Spain (CRPD/C/ESP/1) at its 56th and 57th meetings, held on 20 September 2011, and adopted the following concluding observations at its 62nd meeting, held on 23 September 2011.

III. Principal Areas of Concern & Recommendations

A. General Principles & Obligations (Articles 1 & 4)

11. The Committee takes note of the adoption of Act 26/2011 which introduces the concept of ‘person with disabilities’ as defined in the Convention and expands the protection of persons with disabilities. However, it is concerned that not all persons with disabilities are covered by the law.

12. The Committee urges the State Party to ensure that all persons with disabilities enjoy protection against discrimination and have access to equal opportunities irrespective of their level of disability.

13. The Committee welcomes Act 49/2007, dated 26 December 2007, establishing the Permanent Specialized Office to deal with offences and sanctions in equal opportunities, non-discrimination and universal accessibility by persons with disabilities. However, it is concerned by the slow development and lack of promotion of this arbitration system at the regional government level; by the lack of information on the number of sanctions submitted and resolved; and by the failure of the State Party to report on actions undertaken to implement this law. The Committee is concerned about the overall effectiveness of the system.

14. The Committee recommends that the State Party raise awareness among persons with disabilities about the system of arbitration; increase the level of free legal aid; and ensure the regulation of offences and sanctions at the regional government level.

15. The Committee regrets the lack of information on the meaningful participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organisations at the regional level in designing, and evaluating the implementation of legislation, policy and decision-making processes; and the participation of children with disabilities at all levels.

16. The Committee recommends that the State Party take specific measures to: ensure the active participation of persons with disabilities in public decision-making processes at the regional level; and to include children with disabilities at all levels.

17. The Committee takes note of Act 2/2010 of 3 March 2010 on sexual and reproductive health decriminalizing voluntary termination of pregnancy, allowing pregnancy to be terminated up to 14 weeks and including two specific cases in which abortion is allowed for longer time limits due to the fact that the foetus has a disability: until 22 weeks of gestation, provided there is ‘a risk of serious anomalies in the foetus’, and beyond week 22 when, inter alia, ‘an extremely serious and incurable illness is detected in the foetus’. It also notes the explanations provided by the State Party for maintaining this distinction.

18. The Committee recommends that the State Party abolish the distinction made in Act 2/2010 in the period allowed under law within which a pregnancy can be terminated, based solely on disability.

B. Specific Rights (Articles 5-30)

Equality and non-discrimination (Article 5)

19. The Committee welcomes the adoption of Act 26/2011 amending regulations which will abolish the need to have a disability certificate to bring a discrimination claim before a judicial body. However, it regrets the lack of information on cases of discrimination, and it is concerned that persons with disabilities will still be marginalized. The Committee is further concerned by the lack of information on reasonable accommodation. It is also concerned that in practice disability affects parents’ guardianship or custody of their children and that legal protection against discrimination on the grounds of disability is not enforceable in cases of discrimination due to perceived disability or association with a person with a disability.

20. The Committee urges the State Party to expand the protection of discrimination on the grounds of disability to explicitly cover multiple disability, perceived disability and association with a person with a disability, and to ensure the protection from denial of reasonable accommodation, as a form of discrimination, regardless of the level of disability. Moreover guidance, awareness raising and training should be given to ensure a better comprehension by all stakeholders, including persons with disabilities, of the concept of reasonable accommodation and prevention of discrimination.

Article 8 – Awareness-Raising

25. The Committee commends the many initiatives taken by the State Party to implement the Convention. However, it notes that more needs to be done to increase awareness in society, in the media and amongst persons with disabilities themselves of the right of persons with disabilities.

26. The Committee calls upon the State Party to take proactive measures to enhance awareness of the Convention and its Optional Protocol at all levels, in particular among the judiciary and the legal profession, political parties, Parliament and Government officials, civil society, media, persons with disabilities, as well as the general public.

Article 9 – Accessibility

27. The Committee takes note that Act 26/2011 amends regulations which will shorten the timelines for meeting accessibility requirements in public facilities; and goods and services available to the public. However, it remains concerned at the low level of compliance with these requirements, in particular, at regional and local levels, in the private sector, and in relation to existing facilities. The Committee is aware of situations of discrimination faced by air passengers with disabilities, including situations of denial of boarding. The Committee reminds the State Party that Article 9 of the Convention also demands access to information and communication.

28. The Committee recommends that sufficient financial and human resources be allocated as soon as possible to implement, promote and monitor compliance with accessibility legislation through national measures as well as through international cooperation.

Article 11 – Situations of Risk & Humanitarian Emergencies

31. The Committee is concerned at the insufficiency of specific protocols for persons with disabilities in emergency situations.

32. The Committee calls upon the State Party to review its laws and policies related to emergency situations with a view to including provisions guaranteeing the security and protection of persons with disabilities.

[ My Comment: This is a gross understatement of a serious problem which continues to fester not only in Spain but, more generally, in Europe ! ]

Article 19 – Living Independently & Being Included in the Community

39. The Committee is concerned at the lack of resources and services to guarantee the right to live independently and to be included in the community, in particular in rural areas. It is further concerned that the choice of residence of persons with disabilities is limited by the availability of the necessary services, and that those living in residential institutions are reported to have no alternative to institutionalization. Finally, the Committee is concerned about linking eligibility of social services to a specific grade of disability.

40. The Committee encourages the State Party to ensure that an adequate level of funding is made available to effectively enable persons with disabilities to: enjoy the freedom to choose their residence on an equal basis with others; access a full range of in-home, residential and other community services for daily life, including personal assistance; and to enjoy reasonable accommodation so as to better integrate into their communities.

41. The Committee is concerned that the law for the promotion of autonomy limits the resources to hire personal assistants only to those persons who have level 3 disabilities and only for education and work.

42. The Committee encourages the State Party to expand resources for personal assistants for all persons with disabilities in accordance with their requirements.

Article 24 – Education

43. The Committee welcomes the fact that the principle of inclusion governs the schooling of pupils with special educational needs; that discrimination in education is prohibited; and that most children with disabilities are included in the regular education system. It commends the enactment of Organic Act 2/2006 on Education, which obliges the education authorities to provide specialist teachers, qualified professionals and the necessary materials and resources, as well as the laws that oblige schools to make necessary curricular adjustments and diversifications for pupils with disabilities. However, the Committee is concerned by the implementation of these laws in practice, in view of reported cases of failure to provide reasonable accommodation, of continued segregation and exclusion, of financial arguments used as justification for discrimination, and of the cases of children enrolled in special education against their parents’ will. The Committee notes with concern that parents challenging the placement of their children with disabilities in special education have no possibility of appeal and that their only alternative is to educate them at their own expense or pay for the reasonable accommodation of their child in the regular education system.

44. The Committee reiterates that denial of reasonable accommodation constitutes discrimination and the duty to provide reasonable accommodation is immediately applicable and not subject to progressive realisation. It recommends the State Party to:

(a) Increase its efforts to provide reasonable accommodation in education, allocating sufficient financial and human resources to implement the right to inclusive education; paying particular attention to assessing the availability of teachers with specialist qualifications; and ensuring that educational departments of local governments understand their obligations under the Convention and act in conformity with its provisions ;

(b) Ensure that the decisions to place children with a disability in a special school or in special classes, or to offer them solely a reduced standard curriculum, are taken in consultation with the parents ;

(c) Ensure that the parents of children with disabilities are not obliged to pay for the education or for the measures of reasonable accommodation in mainstream schools ;

(d) Ensure that decisions on placing children in segregated settings can be appealed swiftly and effectively.

C. Specific Obligations (Articles 31-33)

Statistics and data collection (Article 31)

49. The Committee regrets the low level of disaggregated data on persons with disabilities. The Committee recalls that such information is indispensable to: understanding the situations of specific groups of persons with disabilities in the State Party who may be subject to varying degrees of vulnerability; developing laws, policies and programmes adapted to their situations; and assessing the implementation of the Convention.

50. The Committee recommends that the State party systematize the collection, analysis and dissemination of data, disaggregated by sex, age and disability; enhance capacity building in this regard; and develop gender-sensitive indicators to support legislative developments, policymaking and institutional strengthening for monitoring and reporting on progress made with regard to the implementation of the various provisions of the Convention.

51. The Committee regrets that the situation of children with disabilities is not reflected in the data on the protection of children.

52. The Committee recommends that the State Party systematically collect, analyse and disseminate data, disaggregated by sex, age and disability, on abuse and violence against children.

END

Remembering Dr. Ernesto ‘EL CHE’ Guevara de la Serna Lynch ?

CJ Walsh — Mon, 10 Oct 2011 16:36:48 +0000

2011-10-10: Yesterday … did anyone remember the myth that is … and the man of Latin America that was … Dr. Ernesto ‘EL CHE’ Guevara de la Serna Lynch … assassinated on 9 October 1967, in Bolivia ??

Colour photograph showing a framed head and shoulders of the young Dr. Ernesto 'CHE' Guevara de la Serna Lynch in a small museum in the central square of Yara (Plaza Grito de Yara), Cuba. Centuries earlier, nearby, the Indian hero Hatuey was burned at the stake. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2007-04-10. Click to enlarge.

Colour photograph showing the memorial in Plaza de la Revolución, Santa Clara, Cuba ... built to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Battle for Santa Clara. Unveiled on 28 December 1988, it was designed by the Architect Jorge Cao Campos and the Sculptor José Delarra. The memorial complex also comprises the mausoleum of Che Guevara and a museum. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2007-04-14. Click to enlarge.

Colour photograph showing a hoarding on the roof of a building in Cienfuegos, Cuba ... which comprises an image of CHE, with the accompanying text "Tu Ejemplo Vive - Tus Ideas Perduran". Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2007-04-13. Click to enlarge.

END

Buildings & Firefighters Not Yet Safer ! – 10 Years After 9-11 (II)

CJ Walsh — Tue, 20 Sep 2011 16:58:50 +0000

2011-09-20: Continuing on from where I left off on 11 September 2011 …

Applying the Recommendations contained in the 2005 & 2008 National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST – USA) Reports on the 9-11 WTC Buildings 1, 2 & 7 Collapses to the everyday practice of Architecture and Fire Engineering has been a central part of our work for many years. Long discussions on this subject have taken place within CIB (International Council for Building Research) Working Commission 14: ‘Fire Safety’ … and I also chair Commission 14′s Research Working Group IV on ‘Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse’.

My particular interest in Disproportionate Damage and Progressive Collapse reaches back as far as the late 1980′s !

So I was intrigued, amused … and at the same time, highly concerned … to read the following Letter to the Editor of the Irish Times Newspaper, on Saturday 10 September 2011 …

Recalling 9/11

Sir, – One of the most important factors in the tragedy of 9/11, and one that has received scant attention, was the mode of failure of the towers.

They were struck high up on their structures and failed via progressive collapse. Had they been designed this side of the Atlantic, they would not have collapsed. These were flimsy structures. -

Yours, etc,

Jim Ryan, Chartered Structural Engineer,

Waterfall, Cork.

JIM … If the WTC Towers (which were not flimsy structures !) had been designed on this side of the Atlantic … they would have collapsed.

Furthermore … If the Towers had only been completed last week in the USA, Ireland, England & Wales, India or China … they would still collapse, if a similar event were to occur next year.

To be crystal clear … What we witnessed, on Tuesday 11 September 2001, was a Collapse Level Event (CLE) which exposed, very harshly and cruelly, a catastrophic failure in all of our common Design and Construction Practices and Procedures used in/by/as …

Architectural Design | (Ambient) Structural Engineering | Fire Engineering ;
Building Management Systems ;
Emergency Responders | Firefighters | Rescue Teams ;
Technical Control Organizations Having Authority (AHJ’s) or Jurisdiction ;
Fire Safety Objectives in Building Legislation, Codes and Standards.

To the average ‘person in the street’ … Whether he/she lives in Manhattan or Chicago in the USA, Dublin or Cork in Ireland, Cardiff or London in Britain, Dilli or Mumbai in India, Beijing or Shanghai or Hong Kong in China … it is unacceptable that buildings collapse … entirely unacceptable !!

COLLAPSE OF WTC BUILDINGS 1, 2 & 7

JIM … Unless you believe in conspiracy theories, please study the 2005 & 2008 NIST(USA) Reports on the 9-11 WTC Buildings 1, 2 & 7 Collapses. The 2 Final Reports can be downloaded from this Page on Sustainable Design International’s Corporate WebSite … http://www.sustainable-design.ie/fire/structdesfire.htm … along with other key documents and links.

Some indication of the enormous quantity of 9-11 WTC Incident Documentation issued by NIST(USA) can be seen below …

Colour photograph showing the enormous quantity of 9-11 WTC Incident Documentation, issued by the U.S. National Institute of Standards & Technology, which is still readily available for the public to access and download.

PUBLIC SAFETY 10 YEARS AFTER 9-11 ?

If it is entirely unacceptable to the Public that buildings collapse … in how many National Building Codes does the following Critical Public Safety Equation appear today ? The answer is NONE !

Colour image showing Page 21 from my Overhead Presentation on 'Sustainable Fire Engineering' ... scheduled for this Thursday, 22 September 2011, at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar & Workshop ... to be held at the RDS, in Ballsbridge, Dublin. Click to enlarge.

Is there some fundamental reason why Levels of Safety for the Public should vary so much from one country to another ? NO, there is not !

Within Europe, and in relation to the New EU Construction Product Regulation 305/2011, which I discussed here a few days ago … the European Commission, in a discussion document dating back to the mid-1980′s, suggested that the only way to effectively realize a Single Market for Construction Products would be to introduce Harmonized EU Building Regulations in all of the EU Member States. Of course the Member States, at the time, went ballistic at the very mention of this idea … and it was quickly withdrawn. I take great pleasure in repeating that important idea today.

Jim … The Critical Public Safety Statement above is fully consistent with … and meets … the ‘Basic Requirements for Construction Works’ in Annex I of EU Regulation 305/2011.

However, in relation to any one EU Member State … let’s take Ireland as an example … compare a situation where, in a remote rural location, it might take almost an hour for a sufficient fire service presence to arrive at the scene of a building fire emergency … with a similar situation in the middle of a city, or large town, where the time required will not be greater than 15 minutes … then, although the Level of Safety for the Public can be / should be / must be the same in both situations … I would expect, in the remote rural location having a poor fire service support infrastructure, that the range of Fire Protection Measures to be employed in a typical building would be more extensive, and the performance expected of those Measures would be higher … in order to achieve an Equivalent Level of Safety in both rural and urban locations. Is that not a rational idea ??

Unfortunately, that’s not how the present systems work … National or European ! Levels of Public Safety differ from one country to the next … and from one region, within any one country, to the next … without any good reason … and without meaningful consultation and the full understanding of the Public.

BUILDINGS & FIREFIGHTERS ARE NOT YET SAFER

JIM … In spite of all of the spin coming from the other side of the Atlantic … and discounting criminality and fraud in construction practices … Buildings and Firefighters are not yet safer … because the large, difficult, complex flaws and failures in Conventional Fire Engineering have not yet been aggressively confronted … and properly solved.

In a post last year, on 18 October 2010 … I referred to the Cul-de-Sac of Current Fire Engineering … and illustrated a typical architectural detail in a Dublin Building – a common detail also to be found in India, China, USA, England & Wales, etc., etc – which demonstrates a Fundamental Flaw at the very core of conventional thinking and practice.

On Thursday next … 22 September 2011 … at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar and Workshop in the RDS, Dublin … I will present this flawed detail … and a solution which is fully compatible with … and answers … the NIST Recommendations !

BUT … would anybody like to show me where any National Building Codes have been revised and updated to solve this Fundamental Flaw ?

Colour image showing Page 33 from my Overhead Presentation on 'Sustainable Fire Engineering' ... scheduled for this Thursday, 22 September 2011, at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar & Workshop ... to be held at the RDS, in Ballsbridge, Dublin. Click to enlarge.

Colour image showing Page 35 from my Overhead Presentation on 'Sustainable Fire Engineering' ... scheduled for this Thursday, 22 September 2011, at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar & Workshop ... to be held at the RDS, in Ballsbridge, Dublin. Click to enlarge.

Colour image showing Page 36 from my Overhead Presentation on 'Sustainable Fire Engineering' ... scheduled for this Thursday, 22 September 2011, at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar & Workshop ... to be held at the RDS, in Ballsbridge, Dublin. Click to enlarge.

Colour image showing Page 37 from my Overhead Presentation on 'Sustainable Fire Engineering' ... scheduled for this Thursday, 22 September 2011, at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar & Workshop ... to be held at the RDS, in Ballsbridge, Dublin. Click to enlarge.

Colour image showing Page 38 from my Overhead Presentation on 'Sustainable Fire Engineering' ... scheduled for this Thursday, 22 September 2011, at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar & Workshop ... to be held at the RDS, in Ballsbridge, Dublin. Click to enlarge.

A CASE STUDY OF ENGLAND & WALES

10 years after 9-11 … there are two reasons for taking a closer look at England & Wales (Britain) …

The Building Regulations for England & Wales were used as the model for the Irish Building Regulations, which were first introduced here in the early 1990′s. And, in the absence of Harmonized European Standards … British National Standards tend, with only a few exceptions, to become the default Irish National Standard ;
British National Standards are being applied in many different parts of the world outside England & Wales … in most cases, without any proper consideration of content … or adaptation to local conditions.

Colour image showing the Cover Page of Approved Document B: 'Fire Safety' ... Volume 2 - Buildings Other Than Dwellinghouses ... from the Building Regulations for England & Wales. Click to enlarge.

The Institution of Fire Engineers (Ireland) Annual Fire Conference, which was held last year, on Wednesday 20th October 2010 … in the Dublin Fire Brigade Training Centre, Marino, Dublin … threw up some interesting ‘notions’ for consideration by a diverse range of participants.

One curious proposition … repeated quite often during the day … was that Approved Document B, in the British System of Building Regulations, was basically still a sound document … and that it should pass an upcoming major review with little difficulty.

I don’t agree … Approved Document B is inadequate and dysfunctional !

With regard to Structural Performance in Fire … instead of referring to Approved Document A – Structure … the reader is referred to Appendices at the back of Approved Document B, which only reinforce the erroneous concept of Single Structural Element Fire Protection …

And along with its many other major problems … see my post, dated 2009-06-14 … British Standard BS 9999 takes no account of any of the 2005 & 2008 NIST Recommendations, Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse or Disproportionate Damage … and, in fact, directly conflicts with aspects of the Building Regulations for England & Wales …

Colour image showing Page 51 in the Appendix of my Overhead Presentation on 'Sustainable Fire Engineering' ... scheduled for this Thursday, 22 September 2011, at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar & Workshop ... to be held at the RDS, in Ballsbridge, Dublin. Click to enlarge.

In order to take a close look at Approved Document B … I used the vehicle of a Notional Hotel Project in Cardiff, Wales … similar to the Early 1990′s Dublin Hotel Project shown above …

Colour image showing Page 52 in the Appendix of my Overhead Presentation on 'Sustainable Fire Engineering' ... scheduled for this Thursday, 22 September 2011, at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar & Workshop ... to be held at the RDS, in Ballsbridge, Dublin. Click to enlarge.

With regard to properly showing Fitness for Intended Use of Fire Protection related Products and Building Systems … instead of referring to Regulation 7 … the reader is again referred to Appendices at the back of Approved Document B … which explains why we have such serious problems, i.e. lack of Durability and very low Resistance to Mechanical Damage, with the Thermal Insulation Products used for the Fire Protection of Structural Steelwork …

I also had to quote from Part D of the Irish Building Regulations to fill a gap in the British Regulation 7 …

Colour image showing Page 53 in the Appendix of my Overhead Presentation on 'Sustainable Fire Engineering' ... scheduled for this Thursday, 22 September 2011, at the ASFP Ireland Fire Seminar & Workshop ... to be held at the RDS, in Ballsbridge, Dublin. Click to enlarge.

END

Building Design Must Improve Firefighter Safety in Fire Incidents !

CJ Walsh — Tue, 05 Jul 2011 11:54:38 +0000

2011-07-05 …

It has been a harsh experience to leave the last post undisturbed for a few weeks ! It was necessary … and I feel better as a result.

Back to the present … and in any jurisdiction, news of Firefighter Fatalities and/or Injuries is very distressing. It has been remarkable to note, however, how some countries, e.g. Japan, are expending significant time and resources on developing innovative ways to improve firefighter safety in buildings … while most countries are not. Over many years, I have formed the clear impression that, generally, firefighters are regarded in much the same way as soldiers, i.e. they are a disposable asset … ‘Theirs not to reason why / Theirs but to do and die’ … etc., etc. This situation is entirely unacceptable, and in need of urgent resolution !

On 6th & 7th July … in Cardiff, Wales … I have been invited by the International President of the Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE), Mr. HG Tay, to make a presentation on ‘Sustainable Fire Engineering’ at the 2011 IFE International Fire Conference and Annual General Meeting. I am greatly honoured by this invitation.

During the course of that presentation, I will be referring to Firefighter Safety … but much more needs to be said, beforehand, in relation to the untapped contribution of building design to greater levels of firefighter safety …

INTRODUCTION

It may be obvious for some (but, believe me, not for all !) that with regard to fighting fires in buildings … Firefighters have 2 Basic Functions :

to rescue people who are trapped in a Fire Building (i.e. a building which is on fire) … or people who, for some reason, cannot independently evacuate the building (e.g. people with activity limitations) ; and
to fight those fires, and ensure that they are properly extinguished.

Note: Extinction of a fire is confirmed only after a thorough visual inspection by a competent person.

DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION

In a previous post, dated 13 December 2010 … I said that it was no longer ethically acceptable to ignore the issue of Firefighter Safety in the design and construction of buildings … because design can make a major contribution to their safety.

Unfortunately, Firefighter Safety must continue to remain an ethical issue because Building Regulations in most countries rarely, if ever, refer to this important aspect of design and construction. Safety at Work Legislation has a related, but different, intent.

Regrettably, most of the building design professions either have no Code of Ethics … or there is a Code which is ‘lite-lite-lite’, i.e. very weak on ethics … or, worse still, they have a Code … but it is called a Code of Professional Conduct, the principal intent of which is to preserve and protect the profession and its vested interests.

At European Level …

Essential Requirements 1 & 2 (of 6 … for the time being) … in Annex I of European Union (EU) Council Directive 89/106/EEC, of 21 December 1988, on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to Construction Products … state the following …

1. Mechanical Resistance & Stability

The construction works must be designed and built in such a way that the loadings that are liable to act on it during its construction and use will not lead to any of the following:

(a) collapse of the whole or part of the works ;

(b) major deformations to an inadmissible degree ;

(c) damage to other parts of the works or to fittings or installed equipment as a result of major deformation of the load-bearing construction ;

(d) damage by an event to an extent disproportionate to the original cause.

2. Safety in Case of Fire

The construction works must be designed and built in such a way that in the event of an outbreak of fire:

- the load-bearing capacity of the construction can be assumed for a specific period of time ;

- the generation and spread of fire and smoke within the works are limited ;

- the spread of the fire to neighbouring construction works is limited ;

- occupants can leave the works or be rescued by other means ;

- the safety of rescue teams is taken into consideration.

Sweden … has incorporated all 6 Essential Requirements of EU Construction Products Directive 89/106/EEC into its National Building Regulations … but has omitted the reference to the ‘safety of rescue teams’, i.e. Firefighter Safety. Why is that ?

Ireland, along with England & Wales, has not incorporated the EU CPD Essential Requirements into its National Building Regulations. There is no requirement, in Part B of the Building Regulations of either of these two separate jurisdictions, to consider Firefighter Safety in the design and construction of buildings.

In these three specific cases, taken as a simple example, this is a serious legal flaw … especially since the European Template, above, has existed since the late 1980′s !

Let me illustrate how Building Design & Construction can make a major contribution to improved levels of Firefighter Safety …

A. Accessible Internal Staircases Having Sufficient Unobstructed Width

From a building user’s point of view … the success of a building depends, to a large extent, on the ‘quality’ of its circulation spaces. During the design process, however, an architect is typically concerned with the relationship between different functions and spaces … while, at the same time, he/she is shaping and moulding the internal and external forms of the building.

The full range of tasks and activities in these circulation spaces is rarely, if ever, considered by the building designer. The subject is not covered in Architectural Schools … and in later professional life, a reluctance to carry out Building Post-Occupation Evaluations (POE’s) reinforces this low level of awareness.

Some Tasks & Activities in Building Circulation Spaces …

Access to the building’s spaces and use of its services and facilities ;
Egress from the building during normal, everyday circumstances ;
Independent Evacuation, in the event of an emergency ;
Assisted Evacuation by others, or Rescue by Firefighters, for those building users who cannot independently evacuate the building, e.g. people with activity limitations ;
Firefighter Access & Reconnaissance, in the event of an emergency ;
Firefighter Attack, as they approach the proximity of the fire scene ;
Firefighter Removal from the building, by colleagues, in the event of injury, impairment, or a fire event induced health condition ;
Firefighter Withdrawal at the successful conclusion of firefighting operations.

Colour photograph showing an injured, or impaired, firefighter being assisted by two colleagues in an upward staircase removal exercise. For reasons outlined in a previous post (2010-12-13) ... all three firefighters must continue to wear full Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) ... and use Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). Click to enlarge.

The photograph above was extracted from this 2010 Poster Presentation …

Daniel DiRenzo, Cherry Hill Fire Department, New Jersey, USA

Building Fires – Personal Harness Use – Firefighter Removals

Click the Link Above to read and/or download PDF File (1.73 Mb)

No matter what the jurisdiction … no matter what Building Regulations do or do not require … it is clear that, during a ‘real’ fire emergency, patterns of circulation are not simple … and they cannot easily be segregated into categories with simple titles. They are complex … and, quite often, they overlap.

In the case of the firefighter removal on a staircase (shown above) … there is a necessity to consider another type of ‘Contraflow’ … where the injured, or impaired, firefighter with two of his/her colleagues rendering assistance are together moving away from the scene of the fire … while other firefighters are moving in the opposite direction, towards the fire.

In all but the most simple and smallest building types, this is what a Fire Evacuation Staircase should look like below … having a clear unobstructed staircase width, between handrails, of 1500 mm … with a stair going/tread of 300 mm, and a stair riser of 150 mm. Proper attention by the designer to Accessibility Design Criteria will also make the staircase far, far easier … and safer … for Firefighter Movement …

Colour drawing taken from International Standard ISO FDIS 21542, and associated inset photographs ... showing a Fire Evacuation Staircase suitable for All Building Types, which is designed for Firefighter Safety. The staircase is also designed to accommodate Building User Evacuation/Firefighter Contraflow, illustrated with an inset colour photograph ... the Rescue/Assisted Evacuation of People with Activity Limitations, also illustrated with an inset colour photograph ... and the Use of a Stretcher. The staircase design is based on the work of CJ Walsh. Click to enlarge.

B. Accessible Façade Walkways in High-Rise Buildings

With today’s powerful drivers of greater energy conservation and efficiency in buildings, adaptation to climate change, and a paradigm shift in thinking on the reduction of adverse environmental impact by buildings … External Façade Design is rapidly evolving … becoming far more complex and, in many cases, comprising multiple ‘skins’.

Just check out this architectural feature, below, in an Osaka (Japan) High-Rise Hotel … which not only serves as an accessible route for evacuation and/or rescue in the event of a fire incident … but also permits much easier access for maintenance and window cleaning.

This architectural feature should be mandatory in the case of high-rise buildings with a single, central core …

Colour photograph showing the High-Rise Swissôtel Nankai in Osaka, Japan. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2010-04-20. Click to enlarge.

Colour photograph showing the External Walkway on the Building Façade of the High-Rise Swissôtel Nankai in Osaka, Japan. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2010-04-19. Click to enlarge.

Colour photograph showing the Hotel Room Evacuation Panel to the External Façade Walkway, which can also facilitate rescue by firefighters during a fire incident. Photograph by CJ Walsh. 2010-04-19. Click to enlarge.

Building Design can make a substantial contribution to greater Firefighter Safety !!

BUT … who is raising the awareness of building designers about this issue ???

END