fire-induced progressive collapse
2009 Camberwell Fire – Today’s Fire Engineering Challenges
In Ireland, it is rarely the case that there is an opportunity to practice Rational, Evidence-Based Fire Engineering … and to apply its Principles in a manner which is both professional and project-specific. The grim reality of everyday fire consultancy revolves around playing ‘cat and mouse’ with current national building and fire regulations/codes … with ‘cost effectiveness’, i.e. to achieve a defined objective at the lowest cost, or to achieve the greatest benefit at a given cost … being the real, hidden driver behind such dangerous games ! Who wants to hear that the Irish Fire Safety Certification System is little more than a charade … an elaborate, resource consuming paper exercise … made all the more meaningless because Part B: ‘Fire Safety’ (of the Second Schedule to the 1997 Building Regulations, as amended) is isolated from a necessary and vital consideration of the other Parts, particularly Parts A: ‘Structure’; D: ‘Materials & Workmanship’; K: ‘Stairways, Ladders, Ramps & Guards’; and M: ‘Access for People with Disabilities’ ?
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Colour photograph showing an external view of Lakanal House, Sceaux Estate, Camberwell, London (GB) ... after the Fatal Fire which occurred at 16.19 hrs, on 3rd July 2009. The fire was caused by a faulty television set, and resulted in the loss of 6 lives, with 15 residents and 1 firefighter left injured. London Fire Brigade was required to assist the evacuation of a further 40 building occupants to safety. Along with the serious loss of life, and the large number of injured people ... over 90 families had to vacate their flats.
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Discussing the Principles of Fire Engineering … and elaborating on the significant differences between the limited Fire Safety Objectives of legal regulations/codes … and the much broader range of Fire Engineering Design Objectives intended to fully protect social wellbeing and the interests of clients/client organizations, i.e. to properly protect their asses and their assets, in the event of a fire … is a constant, tortuous, but rewarding, struggle. Masochism does help !
However, the 2009 Fire in a High-Rise Flat Complex at Camberwell, London (GB) … from just looking at the photograph above and reading available information about the spread of fire internally … raises some challenging fire engineering issues for building designers, property managers and construction organizations.
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1. Reliability of People Strategies in a Fire Emergency ?
In spite of the People Strategies elaborated in current Fire Codes/Regulations/Standards … it is totally and utterly irresponsible to advise people to wait in their own flats/apartments during a fire incident, or to develop fire safety strategies based on this approach … unless the confidence level (of ‘Competent Persons’ in Control … managers, designers and builders … of the flat/apartment complex) with regard to the following aspects of construction is very high …
- reliability of both passive and active fire protection measures ;
- reliability of fire compartmentation (see below) ;
- reliability of not just the building’s structural stability, but also its serviceability, during the fire and for a minimum period of time afterwards, i.e. the ‘cooling’ phase.
Competent Person: A person capable of making sound value judgements in the area of professional endeavour in which he/she possesses profound knowledge, understanding and practical experience.
Fire Codes/Regulations/Standards, wherever or whatever their origin, are NOT Infallible … and it is unbelievably mind-boggling, and sad, to witness a blind and unquestioning faith in such documents !
Looking beyond the headline figure of 6 Fatalities in the 2009 Camberwell Fire … adequate attention should also be focused on the 16 Injured … comprising building occupants and firefighters … the lengthy disruption of community wellbeing resulting from the fire … 90 Families had to be re-located … and, of course, the tremendous amount of direct and indirect damage to property and the environment. And, I wonder … how did the more vulnerable occupants … and there may also have been visitors present in the complex at the time … cope in this emergency situation ?
This is why Fire Safety, Protection and Evacuation for All must be a Priority on any ‘Sustainability’ Agenda.
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2. Independent Technical Control of AHJ Construction ?
I have said this before, but it is worth repeating here again … Self-Regulation Is No Regulation ! Surely this lesson has been burnt into our souls, following the recent scandals, financial and otherwise, in Ireland ? National and Local Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJ’s) … Government Departments & Agencies, Semi-State Organizations, a myriad of Qwangos, the Office of Public Works and Local Authorities are complacent, careless and stubborn concerning proper compliance with even the minimal performance requirements specified in fire regulations, codes and standards.
The 2005 & 2008 National Institute of Standards & Technology (USA) Reports on the 9-11 WTC Incident in New York presented us with some stark language … and a set of important Recommendations which must be heeded …
‘ NIST recommends that such entities be encouraged to provide a level of safety that equals or exceeds the level of safety that would be provided by strict compliance with the code requirements of an appropriate governmental jurisdiction.
To gain broad public confidence … NIST further recommends that as-designed and as-built safety be certified by a qualified third party, independent of the building owner(s). The process should not use self-approval for code enforcement in areas including interpretation of code provisions, design approval, product acceptance, certification of the final construction, and post-occupancy inspections over the life of the buildings.’
[2005 NIST Final Report on WTC 1 & 2 Collapses - Recommendation No. 25]
Later posts, here, will examine the individual NIST Recommendations in more detail.
However … many individuals and organizations, with vested interests, are still trying to discredit and/or ignore the Recommendations contained in the 2005 & 2008 NIST Reports on the WTC 9-11 Incident. British Standard BS 9999:2008 is a typical case in point … a document which is slowly seeping into the marrow of the Irish Fire Establishment. The complete and abject failure to consider any of the NIST Recommendations during the long development of this British Standard, or even to reference the Reports in the Standard’s Bibliography … was an inexcusable and unforgivable technical oversight. The result was … and remains … a sloppy, crassly inadequate, deeply flawed and discriminatory national fire safety standard. The British Public deserves far better !
At this stage … reluctantly … I must invite the Chair of British Standards Institution Committee FSH/14, Mr. David B. Smith, to seriously re-consider his position.
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3. Fire Resistance, Compartmentation & Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse ?
Every person participating in the design, construction, management or operation of a building, no matter how simple or complex, must have a working knowledge and proper understanding of the Fire Engineering Principle of Fire Compartmentation:
The division of a building into fire-tight compartments, by fire and smoke resisting elements of construction, in order …
- to contain an outbreak of fire ;
- to prevent damage, within the building, to other adjoining compartments and/or spaces ;
- to protect a compartment interior from external fire attack, e.g. fire spread across the building’s facade or from an adjacent building ;
- to minimize adverse, or harmful, environmental impacts outside the building.
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BUT … But … but … buildings are no longer designed and constructed, today, as they were in the 18th or 19th Centuries …
In a fire situation, Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse may commence before any breach of ‘integrity’ occurs in the boundary of such a Fire Compartment, i.e. the building compartment of fire origin.
Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse: The sequential growth and intensification of distortion, displacement and failure of elements of construction in a building – during a fire and the ‘cooling phase’ afterwards – which, if unchecked, will result in disproportionate damage, and may lead to total building collapse.
… which is related to, but distinguishable from …
Disproportionate Damage: The failure of a building’s structural system … (i) remote from the scene of an isolated overloading action ; and (ii) to an extent which is not in reasonable proportion to that action.
Structural Fire Engineering: Those aspects of fire engineering concerned with structural design for fire, and the complex architectural interaction between a building’s structure and fabric, i.e. non-structure, under conditions of fire and its aftermath.
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AND … And … and … a designer of a Sustainable Building will want to utilize … in order to conserve energy … natural patterns of air movement for heating or cooling. This means that it will be necessary to have gaps between elements of construction which are continuously open … in direct conflict with the Principle of Fire Engineering just quoted above !
What happens when this sort of conflict … or lack of resolution (!) … occurs in modern, highly energy-efficient construction projects ? At the final stages of approval/certification … the Fire Prevention Officer will insist on following the outdated prescriptive approach in his/her rulebook. In other words, he/she will illegally apply the guidance text of Technical Guidance Document B as if it were prescriptive regulation. Fire Compartmentation will be uncompromisingly slapped onto ‘unresolved’ areas of a completed building design … to achieve the limited Fire Safety Objectives of Building Regulations … and the fire safety related construction will probably be badly executed, anyway, because the un-supervised sub-contractors of sub-contractors of sub-contractors couldn’t care less if it goes one way or the other ! The outcome is … nobody wins !!!
In Sustainable Building Design, therefore, Fire Resistance (a ‘passive’ protection concept) must not only be extended to consider a complementary relationship with ‘active’ fire protection concepts, but be stretched … ‘intelligently’ … to embrace the concept of ‘non-construction’ …
Building Sterile Space (Fire): An open space of sufficient and appropriate extent which is designed to retain an exceptionally low level of fire hazard and risk, and is ‘intelligently’ fitted with a suitable fire suppression system – in order to resist and control, for a specified time during a fire, the advance of heat, smoke and flame.
Fire Resistance: The inherent capability of a building assembly, or an element of construction, to resist the passage of heat, smoke and flame for a specified time during a fire.
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Yesterday’s Burj Dubai Inauguration – The Tallest ?? How ?
Yesterday (2010-01-04), the Burj Dubai … recently renamed the Burj Khalifa, in honour of Abu Dhabi’s Ruler … was inaugurated. Dubayy, as it is known locally, is situated in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Contrary to most reports, this building has a height of approximately 550 metres !
Colour photograph of the Burj Khalifa Tower in Dubayy, United Arab Emirates ... which was recently inaugurated on 4th January 2010. A romantic image, for now, of the World's Tallest Building. But ... how 'sustainable' ... and 'fire safe' ... is this building ? Click to enlarge.
Every single metre counts in the race of the ‘tallest’ ! So, the timing of the following CTBUH(USA) Press Announcement, back in November 2009, was most fortunate. In my opinion, the most meaningful height criterion is … Height to Occupied Floor. But, what do you think ? See below.
However … purposefully tripping you up as you race to read all about the height criteria of Tall and Super-Tall Buildings … we should all know and understand, I hope, that comparing the ‘size’ of structural members is a silly schoolboy’s game. So, I would like to pose Some Important Questions (discussed, ad nauseam, in previous posts) about the Burj Khalifa Tower …
- Dubayy (Dubai) is a crude reproduction of the nightmare that is the 20th Century North American City, i.e. it is on the opposite end of the scale from being ‘sustainable’ ! ’Greenwashing’ aside … How Sustainable is the Burj Khalifa Tower ?
- There is no effective system, in Dubayy, of Independent Monitoring and Technical Control of the processes of building design and construction by Local Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJ’s) or Competent Technical Controllers …
How Fire Safe is the Burj Khalifa Tower … for All of the large population, including People with Activity Limitations (2001 WHO ICF), who will undoubtedly be using/occupying the building during its long life cycle ?
Has the Tower been designed to adequately resist Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse ? ’Robustness’ and ‘Disproportionate Damage’ are separate, but related, structural concepts.
During my next visit to Dubayy … I will enjoy looking at, and photographing, the completed building. But, I will not be entering the Burj Khalifa Tower !
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Chicago, 2009-11-17: The Council on Tall Buildings & Urban Habitat (CTBUH) – the international body which arbitrates on tall building height and determines the title of ‘The World’s Tallest Building’ – has announced a change to its height criteria, as a reflection of recent developments with several super-tall buildings.
The new criteria wording – ‘Height is measured from the level of the lowest, significant, open air, pedestrian entrance to …’ allows for the recognition of the increasing numbers of multi-use tall buildings with often several different entrances at different levels, whilst also accommodating buildings constructed in non-traditional urban or suburban locations. The CTBUH Height Committee has determined that the previous description of where to measure tall building height from – ‘Height is measured from the sidewalk outside the main entrance to …’ is now no longer sufficient.
This will have an impact on both the height of tall buildings and their relative international height rankings. Burj Dubai, set to open as the world’s tallest building in January 2010, will now be measured from the lowest of its three main entrances (which opens into the entrance lobby for the tower’s corporate suite office function), while the recently completed Trump International Hotel & Towers in Chicago will be measured from the lower, publicly accessible Chicago Riverwalk. In the case of Trump, this additional 9 metres (approx.) means that it will surpass the Jin Mao Tower in Shanghai to occupy the rank of 6th tallest on the current list of completed buildings.
“Beginning in 2007, with the knowledge that Burj Dubai would be significantly taller than any structure ever built, the CTBUH Height Committee met to review the criteria by which we recognize and rank the height of buildings”, said Peter Weismantle, Chair of the CTBUH Height Committee and Director of Supertall Building Technology at Adrian Smith + Gordon Gill Architecture in Chicago. “As one might guess, with the committee being made up of architects, engineers, contractors, developers, building owners and academics, a variety of opinions and views were expressed. The resulting revisions, almost two years later, reflect a general consensus of the committee in recognizing the most recent trends in tall building development around the world.”
Also in response to the changing designs and forms of tall buildings, the Height Committee has elected to discard its previous ‘Height to Roof’ Category. “The roof category just doesn’t make sense anymore”, said CTBUH Executive Director Antony Wood. “In the era of the flat-topped modernist tower, a clearly defined roof could usually be identified, but in today’s tall building world – which is increasingly adopting elaborate forms, spires, parapets and other features at the top of the building – it is becoming difficult to determine a ‘roof’ at all, even less so to measure to it.”
Colour image showing the World's 10 Tallest Buildings ... ranked by the Council on Tall Buildings & Urban Habitat (CTBUH), in November 2009, according to the criterion 'Height to Highest Occupied Floor'. Also included is the Burj Khalifa Tower, which was inaugurated on 4th January 2010. Click to enlarge.
The Revised CTBUH Height Criteria and Diagrams of the Tallest 10 Buildings in the World as of November 2009 can be found here, ranked according to the three height categories now recognized by CTBUH. These are: (i) Height to Architectural Top, measured to the topmost architectural feature of the building including spires, but not including antennae, signage, flag poles or other functional-technical equipment; (ii) Height to Highest Occupied Floor, measured to the level of the highest, consistently occupied floor in the building (thus not including service or mechanical areas which experience occasional maintenance access); and (iii) Height to Tip, measured to the highest point of the building, irrespective of material or function of the highest element.
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9-11 World Trade Center Incident – Institutional Inertia ?
Yesterday afternoon, following the post upload of Concrete Testing Fraud in New York – 1 World Trade Center … I received an e-mail message from a close member of our extended family in New York State, USA:
” Another year goes by …
I’m sending this on to people who are an important part of my life – either then or now. Some of you are friends since 9/11/01 and may or may not know that Barry and I (Mary-Ellen) worked at the Trade Centers – others of you supported us through this difficult time. It was a single, cataclysmic event that changed our lives, and the lives of our colleagues and many others, forever. These images are poignant.
It’s worth remembering.”
These are the Images which Mary-Ellen sent …
‘WTC 9-11 Incident – Declassified Photographs (June 2009)’
Click above to download PowerPoint Presentation 4.46MB
The Recommendations contained in the 2005 & 2008 National Institute of Standards & Technology (USA) Reports on the 9-11 WTC Building Collapses (WTC 1, 2 & 7) provide an essential and invaluable empirical basis for the competent, ethical and professional practice of Effective Fire Engineering Design in today’s complex Built Environment.
8 Long Years After 9-11 … A Pattern Confirmed in Mumbai (November 2008) …
Why are so many Key Institutions & Organizations in the International Building Sector still desperately trying to ignore and/or deny the Recommendations in those 2 NIST Reports ?
Why have National Building & Fire Codes/Regulations & Standards not yet been revised to respond, properly and satisfactorily, to the NIST Recommendations ?
Why can we not yet use All Lifts (Elevators) in a Building during a fire incident ? Why are Lift (Elevator) Manufacturers still actively resisting this necessary change ?
I could go on … and on …
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Concrete Testing Fraud in New York – 1 World Trade Center
Background & Verification
Early 2008 … a New York Inquiry into the Concrete Testing Industry begins. At issue is the Structural Reliability of Current Major Public Works Projects in the City, including many Tall Buildings.
Internet Search: ‘New York Concrete Testing Inquiry’ … to discover the full measure of fraud and corruption.
I wonder how the U.S. Model Building & Fire Code Organizations … including the U.S. International Code Council … are responding to this growing scandal in New York. Are they responding at all ? AND … do they discuss this sort of issue openly, as they heavily ‘promote’ the adoption of U.S. Codes in Developing Countries around the world ?
What is the position of the Council on Tall Buildings & Urban Habitat (CTBUH) ???
2009-09-08 … by Niki May Young, News Editor, World Architecture News(.com) …
Robert LiMandri, New York’s Buildings Commissioner, has announced that concrete tests are to be carried out on 82 New York buildings following safety concerns arising from the indictment of Testwell Laboratories in January and a further firm in July. Testwell were accused of falsifying concrete mix design reports for the high profile Freedom Tower project (now 1 World Trade Center), Yankees Stadium, Jet Blue Terminal and a number of other projects and had their license suspended. Stallone Testing Laboratories were also indicted for falsifying concrete mix design reports in July.
The indictment of Testwell led to a lack of confidence in the safety of over 100 buildings in New York. Following investigations, 82 buildings are to be re-examined. The investigations come as part of an announcement by LiMandri of a new comprehensive program to increase the oversight and evaluation of concrete testing at construction projects throughout the City, including projects funded by the City and private developers. The program includes plans to build a city-owned and operated concrete-testing laboratory and the creation of a new Concrete Unit at the Department Of Buildings (DOB).
The new City laboratory, which will be operated by the Department of Design & Construction (DDC) and is expected to open as early as January, will offer testing services to all City agencies responsible for construction projects. New York City has 35 private concrete-testing firms currently licensed to do business in the City and the new facility will also make it possible to audit these firms.
“Concrete testing is a critical component of concrete operations, and the results should affirm the strength and quality of materials used for a building under construction,” said LiMandri. “However, the integrity of concrete-testing practices has come into serious question, and this new laboratory, as well as a new Concrete Unit and re-testing protocol, are three significant measures to ensure concrete testing procedures are lawful and the concrete used meets a project’s specific design requirements.”
DOB denied Testwell’s application to renew its concrete-testing license but a State Supreme Court Judge rejected DOB’s denial of the license renewal. DOB is now appealing that decision. Last Friday, DOB revoked Stallone’s concrete-testing license, prohibiting them from testing concrete in the City. The Department Of Buildings is currently working with property owners named in the Stallone indictment to determine whether a project’s final test results meet the structural design requirements. If they do not, the affected property owners will also be required to follow the re-testing protocol.
“New Yorkers must be confident the City’s buildings have been built to exacting standards and that the concrete, not usually visible, was mixed to proper construction specifications,” added Design and Construction Commissioner Burney.
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‘Sustainable Fire Engineering’ – Important Keynote Presentation at Indian National Fire Seminar
It is really enjoyable to be back behind my desk, here in Dublin. Apologies for the prolonged absence.
Since the middle of June last, my travels have taken me to Turkey, France, Italy, the south-west of Ireland to attend my cousin’s wedding in Cork … and back again to Bengaluru (Bangalore) in Southern India to make an important Keynote Presentation at the 2009 Fire & Safety Association of India (FSAI) National Fire Seminar: ‘Engineering a Safe & Secure India’, which was held on Friday, 28th August, at the Leela Palace Hotel.
My Presentation Title & Abstract …
Sustainable Fire Engineering: Fire Safety, Protection & Evacuation for All
India, like other economically advanced developing countries, is at an important crossroads. Difficult, resource-dependent decisions must be made in the next few short years concerning the rapid implementation of a Sustainable Built Environment across a vast country, i.e. one which must serve local needs and meet regional performance requirements during a long life cycle … one which will be adaptable to climate change, variability and extremes … will be in harmony and dynamic balance with the Natural Environment … and, not least, will be super energy-efficient.
Citizens of Developed Nations also have legitimate expectations. They will express anger when they witness recently constructed buildings in seismic zones collapse, in an earthquake, like a deck of cards (China 2008, Italy 2009) … or they discover that federal/state authorities having jurisdiction, which are funded by their taxes, are ill-prepared to respond effectively to intentional traumatic disruptions to the Social Environment (New York 2001, Mumbai 2008). Retaining the public’s confidence in national institutions is a fundamental political priority.
In the case of all new High-Rise Buildings, Iconic Buildings, and Buildings of Innovative Design or having a Critical Function … Trans-Disciplinary Building Design Teams must, at a minimum, properly respond to the Recommendations of the 2005 & 2008 NIST(USA) Final Reports on the 9-11 WTC 1, 2, and 7 Collapses. In practice, the majority of these Recommendations should be applied to the design of all new buildings !
Fire Engineers, competent concerning the processes of ‘real’ building design and construction, must begin to understand the ‘real’ people who occupy or use buildings, every day of every week, in all parts of India … and that they each have widely differing ranges of human abilities and activity limitations. Just as they are different from each other, they will react differently than expected in a ‘real’ building fire emergency.
Based on a Keynote Presentation before International Council for Building Research (CIB) Working Commission 14 : Fire and Sub-Committee 3 & 4 Members of ISO Technical Committee 92 : Fire Safety, at Lund University in Sweden … and his fire safety texts which have been fully incorporated into International Standard ISO DIS 21542 on Accessibility-for-All, currently under development and due for publication before the end of 2010 … CJ Walsh’s Presentation, at the FSAI National Fire Seminar in Bengaluru, will focus on ‘Fire Safety, Protection & Evacuation for All’.
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Architectural & Structural Engineering Design for Robustness !
Earlier in the year … a certain non-native English speaking colleague of mine, who is very active in European and International standardization work (and has very good English !), had never heard of the word ‘robust’. She just could not get her head around either the word or the concept … and thought I was making it all up !
Fast forward a few months … and as a long-time member of the International Association for Bridge & Structural Engineering (IABSE), an occasional ‘freebie’ lands on my desk. This one was a real treat !
Published by IABSE in Switzerland … Structural Engineering Document #11: Design for Robustness … was written, in language accessible to both structural engineers and architects alike, by Franz Knoll and Thomas Vogel.
The objective of these Structural Engineering Documents is to provide in-depth information to practicing architects and structural engineers, in reports of high scientific and technical standards, on a wide range of structural engineering topics.
Check out the IABSE Website … http://www.iabse.org/publications/orderform/ … and get yourself a copy … pronto !
In previous posts concerning Areas of Rescue Assistance in Buildings, for example, I have often referred to robust, fire resisting construction.
And the further development of Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse … will inevitably take place within wider considerations of Robustness.
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BS 9999:2008 & BS 8300:2009 – Sleepwalking into Problems ?
Ireland has no national standard codes of practice of its own covering building accessibility or fire safety in buildings. Instead, many people and organizations in this country will just switch to automatic pilot and – without thinking or questioning – adopt the following two standards of another jurisdiction as the default Irish national standards …
British Standard BS 9999:2008 – Code of Practice for Fire Safety in the Design, Management and Use of Buildings … was published on 31 October 2008.
British Standard BS 8300:2009 – Design of Buildings and Their Approaches to Meet the Needs of Disabled People. This Code of Practice was published on 28 February 2009.
If Ireland does not quickly open its eyes … we will be sleep walking into a very problematic legal environment, as far as building accessibility and fire safety in buildings is concerned.
1. An Immediate Challenge
How to develop a set of practical proposals, suitable for application in Ireland and compatible with European technical harmonization, on the following issues:
i) Clear Width of Internal & External Door Openings ;
ii) Turning Circles for Occupied Wheelchairs ;
iii) Car Parking Spaces ;
iv) Fire Safety Issues.
And how to encourage … given the absence of Irish national standards … the implementation of these proposals as part of everyday good accessibility design practice in this country.
2. Overview of BS 8300:2009 & BS 9999:2008
During the development of the Draft ISO Accessibility-for-All Standard, it has been unanimously agreed that Accessibility encompasses the full range of activity related to buildings: to approach, enter, use, egress from and evacuate a building independently, in an equitable and dignified manner (Introduction, 2nd Paragraph, Page 5). ‘Egress’ under normal, ambient conditions is distinguished from ‘Evacuation’ in the event of a fire emergency. Use of the word ‘Escape’ is discouraged in any circumstance. For the first time, fire safety texts have been fully incorporated into the main body of the Draft ISO Standard.
Accessibility within the British Standards Institution (BSI), on the other hand, is still segregated between BS 8300:2009 – approach, entry and use and BS 9999:2008 – fire evacuation. Conflicts and gaps in content naturally result from such a configuration, which can now be seen as outdated and fundamentally flawed.
This configuration has been replicated, in Irish Building Regulations, with the separate scopes of Part M / Technical Guidance Document M and Part B / Technical Guidance Document B. Integration between these 2 Technical Guidance Documents is very poor. In practice, fire safety for people with activity limitations is widely disregarded within the process of Fire Safety Certification.
2.1 BS 8300:2009
BSI has arrogantly gone on a solo run, and decided to deviate from some very widely accepted concepts of accessibility, e.g. ‘clear width’ of a door opening (discussed in more detail later). The ‘Ergonomic Research’ supporting door opening forces of 30 N is at complete variance with earlier research in Britain and must, therefore, be strongly questioned. Perhaps, it is the case that the Fire Services in England & Wales re-asserted their authority, supported by reference to European Fire Product Standards with little if any input from the European Disability Sector, and insisted on a ‘definite’, i.e. high, closing force being exerted on the door leaves in fire resisting doorsets.
2.2 BS 9999:2008
People with disabilities have a right, recognized in international law after 3rd May 2008, to equal opportunity and non-discrimination in matters of building fire safety, protection and evacuation. A minimum response to Article 11 (Situations of Risk) in the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is required, therefore, from fire regulators and code writers. Such a response is absent in British Standard BS 9999:2008.
A close examination of the fire safety texts relating to ‘disability’ in BS 9999:2008 shows that they have not been properly integrated into the ‘mainstream’ content. In fact, much of the content from the replaced BS 5588:Part 8 has just been grafted onto BS 9999, with very little change or alteration from the first version of Part 8 published in 1988 !
Compare Figure G.1 on Page 360 of BS 9999:2008 … with … Figure 4 on Page 8 of BS 5588:Part 8:1988 … both are exactly the same …
Black and white drawing showing both a token and an inadequate 'area of rescue assistance' in BS 9999:2008 - exactly as shown in the first version of BS 5588:Part 8 published back in 1988 ! Click to enlarge.
Two Critical Observations in relation to the ‘area of rescue assistance’ shown above:
- This drawing in BS 9999:2008 is in direct conflict with the text located directly above it … ‘where the wheelchair space is within a protected stairway, access to the wheelchair space should not obstruct the flow of persons escaping’ ;
but, more importantly …
- In BS 9999:2008, fire safety for people with activity limitations receives treatment which is superficial and merely token. Many times in relation to buildings generally, it is stated in Annex G.1, Page 359 …
‘A refuge needs to be of sufficient size both to accommodate a wheelchair and to allow the user to manoeuvre into the wheelchair space without undue difficulty.’
’In most premises, it is considered reasonable to have refuges of a size where each one is able to accommodate one wheelchair user. Where it is reasonably foreseeable that the proportion of disabled users in a building will be relatively high, or where the use of the premises is likely to result in groups of wheelchair users being present (e.g. some types of sporting, entertainment, transport or public assembly buildings), consideration should be given to increasing the size and/or number of refuges accordingly.’
’NOTE 3 Managers of sporting or other venues where a number of disabled people might be present are advised not to restrict the number of disabled people who can be admitted to that venue on the grounds of the size of refuges, since some disabled people who use mobility aids such as a wheelchair will be able to self-evacuate in the case of a real fire.’
and again in Annex G.2.2 on Page 367 …
‘Where it is reasonably foreseeable that the refuges will be used by more than one user (e.g. some types of sporting, entertainment, transport or public assembly buildings), … ‘
Within such an inadequate and token context, it is understandable that an unduly heavy reliance is placed on the practice of developing Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPS) for individuals with activity limitations. See Paragraph #46.7a) on Page 248, which states …
‘By taking into account the individual needs of a person when preparing a PEEP, management will be able to make any reasonable adjustments to the premises or procedures that are necessary.’
These Plans are flawed and discriminatory because they are:
- person specific ; and
- location specific ;
… with the underlying assumption in the text being that, beyond the specified location(s), the building is not properly accessible, i.e. does not meet the functional requirements of Parts B & M in the Building Regulations for England & Wales – or, in the case of Ireland, Parts B & M of our Building Regulations.
There are silly technical errors in BS 9999:2008, e.g. in Annex G.2.3 on Page 368, it states …
‘Unless a different order has been agreed with the fire authority, evacuation should normally be in the following order:
1) the fire floor ;
2) the floor immediately above the fire floor ; [This should read 'the floors immediately above and immediately below the fire floor' !]
3) other floors above the fire floor starting at the top storey ;
4) all remaining floors.’
A Technical Term is used in BS 9999:2008 – Place of Ultimate Safety – which complicates the already widely accepted term: ‘Place of Safety’. The definition provided for the British Term in Section 3: Terms & Definitions (#3.84, Page 17) is so vague that it is of no practical use to fire engineering designers, building managers or building users.
3. Comments: i) Clear Width of Door Openings
Paragraph #6.4.1, on Page 36 of BS 8300:2009 introduces a new understanding of ‘clear width’ for door openings, which is illustrated in Figure 11 (Page 37) … and also a new term ‘effective clear width’.
The new understanding of ‘clear width’ is a complete departure from the standard understanding, widely accepted throughout the world, which is shown in the bottom left hand drawing of Figure 11.
The new term ‘effective clear width’ will complicate the already difficult concept of ‘clear width’. Wasn’t the ‘clear width’ of a door opening always supposed to be ‘effective’, i.e. properly permit circulation for wheelchair users ?
However, the issue raised in the top right hand drawing of Figure 11 is valid …
Colour photograph showing the Final Fire Exit from a building (somewhere in Ireland). The 'clear width' of the door opening is seriously compromised - the door leaf cannot be fully opened and the panic bar reduces the 'clear width' still more. Click to enlarge.
Solution: Retain the current international/European/national understanding of ‘clear width’ for door openings in Ireland … but include text, with supporting drawings, in Revised Technical Guidance Documents B & M to ensure that there is no encroachment on that ‘clear width’ caused by protruding door leaf ironmongery or, more importantly, where the door leaf itself cannot be fully opened to 90o-100o.
4. Comments: i) Clear Width of Door Openings in Existing Buildings
Table 2, on Page 37 of BS 8300:2009, permits the ‘clear width’ for door openings in existing buildings to be reduced significantly below 800mm.
If buildings of historical, architectural and cultural importance are properly identified, and proper allowance is made for these specific building types in Revised Technical Guidance Documents B & M … there is no need to permit a general reduction in the ‘clear width’ for door openings in existing buildings.
Solution: Clearly indicate in the Revised Technical Guidance Document M that the last ‘Existing Buildings’ Column on the right of Table 2 in BS 8300 should be disregarded.
5. Comments: ii) Turning Circles for Occupied Wheelchairs
Down through the years, it has been just possible to communicate the concept of the ‘wheelchair turning circle’ to building designers and urban planners … whether it be the older 1.5m diameter circle or the newer 1.8m diameter circle.
The new Figures and Tables in Annexes C.3 and C.4 of BS 8300:2009 will be difficult to communicate … and may be a complication too far ?
6. Comments: iv) Fire Safety Issues
Colour photograph showing people trapped at the top of one of the WTC Towers. This Tower collapsed soon afterwards. Click to enlarge.
The Recommendations contained in the 2005 & 2008 National Institute of Standards & Technology (USA) Reports on the WTC 9-11 Incident in New York provide an invaluable and essential empirical basis for the practice of effective fire engineering design in today’s built environment.
The first of these two reports has special relevance for NSAI AASCC WG1 because the typical problems encountered by people with activity limitations during a ‘real’ building fire incident have been highlighted by NIST and closely investigated. As a result, three important fire engineering keywords have been re-stated with strong emphasis: ‘reality’ – ‘reliability’ – ‘redundancy’. And, a new key phrase in relation to way finding during evacuation has been introduced to the everyday practice of fire engineering design: ‘intuitive and obvious’.
The 2005 NIST Report, particularly, must be given proper consideration during the development of any reputable fire safety related standard or code of practice for the following reasons:
- at the time of the ‘real’ fire incident, approximately 8% of building users were people with disabilities, with 6% having mobility impairments ; [The percentage of 'building users with activity limitations' exceeded the 8% quoted above.]
- NIST found that the average surviving occupant in the buildings descended stairwells at about half the slowest speed previously measured for non-emergency/test evacuations. This raises a serious question over the use of standard movement times in fire engineering design calculations for evacuation ;
- NIST strongly recommended that fire-protected and structurally hardened lifts (elevators) should be installed in buildings to facilitate the evacuation of building users with disabilities, and to improve emergency response activities by providing timely emergency access to firefighters ; [In Ireland, building designers have already adopted this approach by constructing cores of reinforced concrete ... even in the absence of European/national standards.]
- it was recommended that evacuation routes should have consistent layouts, and be ‘intuitive and obvious’ for all building users, including visitors who may be unfamiliar with the building, during evacuations ;
- NIST recommended that staircase capacity and stair discharge door widths should be adequate to accommodate contraflow in circulation spaces, i.e. the simultaneous emergency access by firefighters into a building and towards a fire, while building users are still moving away from the fire and evacuating the building. This has implications for the minimum clear width of all fire evacuation staircases. Wider staircases facilitate the assisted evacuation and rescue of people with disabilities.
No consideration was given in BS 9999:2008, however, to any of the Recommendations contained in the 2005 & 2008 NIST Reports … there is not even a mention of either Report in the Bibliography (Pages 423-429).
- For such an important national standard in Europe – BS 9999:2008 – there is no understanding demonstrated of the Fundamental Functional Requirement for Public Safety in Buildings …
Buildings shall remain structurally stable and serviceable …
1. while people are waiting in ‘Areas of Rescue Assistance’ ; and
2. until all of these people can be rescued by Firefighters and can reach a ‘Place of Safety’, which is remote from a fire building – with an assurance of individual health, safety & welfare for the people involved ;
- There is a reference to ‘normal movement times’ which are used to calculate evacuation times in Mobility-Impaired People (Paragraph #46.2, Page 247), even though it was found by NIST that the average surviving occupant in the WTC Towers descended stairwells at about half the slowest speed previously measured for non-emergency evacuations. In a ‘real’ fire incident, there is no such thing as ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ evacuation movement times, and the idea that any building must be clear of occupants within a very short timeframe, e.g. 2.5-3.5 minutes, is ludicrous ;
- In the sensitive area of the Resistance to Damage of Enclosing and Separating Partitions (Paragraph #21.2.5 on Page 101) surrounding Firefighting Shafts, it is still permissible in BS 9999:2008 to use non-robust construction, e.g. lightweight plasterboard. Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse is not discussed in the BS 9999 … and neither is Disproportionate Collapse, which is one of the functional requirements – A3 – in Part A of the Building Regulations for England & Wales (and Ireland !) ;
- Although in Wheelchair Users (Paragraph #46.3 on Page 247), it is stated …
‘It should be noted that it can take as many as four people to use an evacuation chair safely and effectively.’
… the dimensions for the minimum width of staircases in Width of Escape Stairs (Table 14 on Page 88) and Firefighting Stairs (Paragraph #21.3.2 on Page 106) disregard the guidance given on Page 247 … and ignore the minimum staircase width (1.5m) required to safely assist the evacuation of a person in a manual wheelchair …
Black and white photograph (US FEMA 2002) showing the correct way to assist the fire evacuation of a wheelchair user in an evacuation staircase ... one person at each side, with another person behind.
And … for some unexplained reason, handrails are permitted to intrude into the ‘clear width’ of a firefighting staircase in BS 9999:2008 (Paragraph #21.3.2, Page 106).
Please note well … this method (shown below) of assisting the evacuation of a person in a manual wheelchair is incorrect. It is not possible to support any weight by holding the foot rests on a manual wheelchair, or by grasping the wheelchair by the front wheels …
Black & white sketch showing how definitely NOT to assist the fire evacuation of a wheelchair user in an evacuation staircase.
Manual handling of occupied wheelchairs in a fire evacuation staircase, even with adequate training for everyone directly and indirectly involved, is hazardous for the person in the wheelchair and those people – minimum three – giving assistance.
The weight of an average unoccupied powered wheelchair, alone, makes manual handling impractical. All lifts (elevators) in new buildings should, therefore, be capable of being used for evacuation in a fire situation. Lifts (elevators) in existing buildings, when being replaced or undergoing a major overhaul, should then be made capable of use for this purpose.
Contraflow Circulation, i.e. the simultaneous emergency access by firefighters into a building and towards a fire, while building users are still moving away from the fire and evacuating the building, has not been considered at all in BS 9999:2008.
A staircase width of 1.5m provides sufficient space for a mobile person to evacuate (700 mm) and a heavily protected and equipped firefighter to simultaneously move in the opposite direction (800 mm) …
Colour drawing, with photograph insets, showing the symbiotic relationship between Contraflow Circulation and Proper Assisted Evacuation in a building. Click to enlarge.
Human Behaviour in Fires should have been discussed in far more detail in BS 9999:2008 … but wasn’t. It is important for fire engineering designers to understand that the ‘real’ people who use ‘real’ buildings every day of every week, in all parts of the world, have widely differing ranges of human abilities and activity limitations … they are different from each other, and they will react differently in a fire emergency.
Building users need to be Skilled for Evacuation to a place, or places, of safety remote from a fire building. In the case of people with a mental or cognitive impairment, there is a particular need to encourage, foster and regularly practice the adaptive thinking which will be necessary during a ‘real’ fire evacuation.
Meaningful Consultation with every person known to occupy or use a building, for the purposes of receiving his/her active co-operation and obtaining his/her informed consent (involving a personal representative, if necessary), is an essential component of adequate pre-planning and preparation for a fire emergency.
Adequate Warning of a fire incident in a building should be communicated well in advance of the time when it is necessary to act and should continue for the full duration of the incident. Warnings should be informative, and easily assimilated in a form (e.g. oral, written, braille) and language understood by the people using the building.
Panic attacks, during evacuation in a ‘real’ fire incident, exist. The 2005 National Building Code of India refers extensively to this issue.
Solution: To resolve the technical inadequacies, inconsistencies and content gaps in BS 9999:2008 … it will be necessary to revise Technical Guidance Document B in Ireland. Fire safety, protection and evacuation from buildings for people with disabilities must be comprehensively included in the process of Fire Safety Certification.
7. Conclusions – BS 9999:2008 & BS 8300:2009
There are many gaps and conflicts between these two British Standards, principally because … they are two separate standards … drafted by two different Technical Committees within the British Standards Institution (BSI).
Because of its deviation from widely accepted concepts of accessibility and its tortuous use of terminology, BS 8003:2009 will have an adverse impact on the practice of Accessibility Design in Ireland … and has already complicated the development of the ISO Accessibility-for-All Standard (DIS ISO 21542).
Arrogance within BSI is not the only reason for such deviations. Distorting the European Union Single Market, for the purpose of introducing technical barriers to trade, is common in Britain … refer to the ‘deemed-to-satisfy’ status of the Approved Documents in the Building Regulations for England & Wales … and the Fire Protection Association’s ‘LPC Sprinkler Rules’.
Input from the Disability Sector during the drafting of BS 9999:2008 was not at all sufficient to ensure that there was a meaningful consideration of the problems encountered by people with activity limitations during a ‘real’ building fire incident. The necessary range of available and effective fire engineering solutions has not, therefore, been presented in the standard.
In addition, the complete and abject failure to consider the important Recommendations contained in the 2005 & 2008 National Institute of Standards & Technology (USA) Reports on the WTC 9-11 Incident in New York was an inexcusable and unforgivable technical oversight.
The result is a crassly inadequate, discriminatory and deeply flawed national fire safety standard in Great Britain & Northern Ireland. BS 9999:2008 became obsolete on the very day of its publication !
Postscript
Please refer to our 1999 Submission to the Department of the Environment & Local Government, in Dublin, concerning the use of British Standard BS 5588:Part 8 in Ireland …
http://www.sustainable-design.ie/arch/submissions.htm
Following this Submission, our understanding is that an ‘Internal’ Working Party was established within the Department. However, the Working Party never reported.
No proper response to this Submission has ever been received from the Minister or the Department.
On 29th November 2006, similar and very polite comments were sent directly to the British Standards Institution (BSI) by e-mail.
Receipt of this e-mail was never acknowledged by anyone in BSI.
The contents of the e-mail were ignored.
END
A Long Delayed Evolution in International Fire Engineering ?
At my request … Agenda Item #6 for the CIB W14 Meeting, recently held on the campus of Lund University in Sweden (see post: 2009-04-30), covered the following subject …
‘ 2005 & 2008 NIST Recommendations on WTC 9-11 Incident – Fundamental Implications for Fire Engineering Design & Practice ‘
I began the presentation by explaining that architects are frustrated people at the best of times …
[It is a never ending, soul-destroying struggle to faithfully realize an architectural 'vision' on a building site ... especially in the absence of craftsmen/women and access to a wide range of well-designed, 'approved' construction products.]
… but, I have been intensely frustrated for some time … as a fire engineer … in particular, for the following reasons:
1. Negative, Irresponsible Attitude of European Lift Manufacturers
In order to effectively solve the issues of safe fire evacuation for people with activity limitations … and the timely evacuation of everyone in tall buildings … we must have lifts/elevators capable of being used for evacuation … all lifts/elevators … in all building types. This should be the norm … the standard specification.
Ever since 2003, however, when I was a Member of the European Union (EU) Expert Group on Accessibility, I have been pressing Mr. Luc Rivet, Secretary General of the European Lift Association (ELA) to ensure that the Association acts responsibly and makes this happen in Europe … now … not at any far distant point in the future. The time for ‘pretty’, meaningless talk at conferences, seminars and workshops has ended.
The ELA still refuses to act responsibly !
2. Crass Inadequacy of British Standard BS 9999 : 2008
Of interest to me … but not a cause for undue concern … except that far too many people in Ireland are already giving this Standard the status of Default Irish National Standard … and too many people in other countries are doing likewise …
On 31st October 2008, the British Standards Institute (BSI) published British Standard BS 9999 – Code of Practice for Fire Safety in the Design, Management and Use of Buildings. It took many years to draft this new national standard.
During all of that time, however, it is not clear to me that the simple idea of considering the Recommendations contained in the 2005 & 2008 NIST Reports on the WTC 9-11 Incident ever saw the light of day within the BSI Technical Committee which drafted BS 9999. The whole basis for the British Standard might have to be entirely re-examined … how awfully dreadful !?!
This amazing technical oversight has ensured that BS 9999 became inadequate on the very day that it was published.
Furthermore, although I had received assurances from certain people that British Standard 5588 : Part 8 would be properly incorporated into DD 9999 during the earlier stages of its development … in fact, this never happened.
Far too late in the drafting process, BS 5588 : Part 8 appears to have been shoe-horned into DD 9999. The resulting disability-related texts in the new Standard are vague … and represent a step backwards from BS 5588 : Part 8. And, there were many problems even with that earlier British Standard.
Finally, it has become blatantly obvious to me that nobody from BSI should ever again be allowed near the fire engineering terminology for any International or European Standards. BSI has polluted the international terminology of fire engineering.
Let me give you an irritating example which has had a seriously adverse impact on fire safety in buildings, in many countries, down through the years …
The term Fire Door has no meaning, and should not be used … Not Ever … Never !
It still leads to endless confusion on building sites … and very poor construction. It has been a disaster, in my own direct experience … and for everybody else associated with fire safety in buildings … including fire prevention officers in Local Authorities.
On the other hand, the term Fire Resisting Doorset / Shutter Assembly means:
‘ A doorset / shutter assembly, suitably installed or mounted on site, the function of which is to resist the passage of heat, smoke and flame for a specified time during a fire.’
A single concept … explained in simple language that anyone can understand.
I could go on about BSI and British Standards … but, I would rapidly bore myself to sleep !
Presentation at the CIB W14 Lund Meeting …
International Fire Engineering must – now – evolve as a direct result of the WTC 9-11 Incident in New York. This necessary evolution has been delayed for far too long by selfish vested interests.
And it is essential that an Empirical and Rational Basis is clearly identified for the practice of Fire Engineering Design in the 21st Century, i.e. after 9-11. Architects and Engineers, specifically, are desperately seeking reliable design guidance.
Colour image showing the Title Page (only) of CJ Walsh's Presentation: 'A Delayed Evolution in Fire Engineering ?', at the recent CIB W14 Meeting in Lund, Sweden. Originally scheduled for 2 Days, all commission business was efficiently completed on 23rd April 2009. Click to enlarge.
CJ Walsh’s CIB W14 Lund Presentation – PDF File (1.74Mb)
Click to download the Full Presentation
The Recommendations of the 2005 & 2008 NIST Reports must, at the very least, be applied to the design of ‘High-Rise’, ‘Iconic’, ‘Critical Function’ & ‘Innovative Design’ Buildings. In a previous post, dated 2009-01-13, I had proposed that the Recommendations should generally be applied to High-Rise Buildings of more than 7 or 8 storeys and Iconic Buildings of more than 2 storeys. This is merely good fire engineering practice.
There are valuable lessons, from the NIST Reports, to be applied to the Fire Engineering Design of ALL buildings. This is demonstrated in the Lund Presentation … and, for any ‘Doubting Thomas’ out there, the collapse of WTC Building 7 makes this absolutely obvious.
For a more detailed discussion about the WTC 9-11 Incident and to download the 2005 & 2008 NIST Reports, please visit this Page on our Support WebSite …
http://www.sustainable-design.ie/fire/structdesfire.htm
Extensive content relating to other key words and phrases in the Lund Presentation can be found elsewhere on the Site.
Importance of the CIB W14 Lund Meeting …
The discussion which followed my Lund Presentation was lively and very interesting. This gave me an opportunity, throughout the rest of the meeting, to tweak the Proposed Future Work Programme of CIB W14 towards a more substantive consideration of the Recommendations from the 2 NIST Reports and the Continuing WTC Health Monitoring Studies.
Reluctantly … I will be the Project Leader for an International Team which will examine Fire-Induced Progressive Collapse over the next three years.
I will also be a Member of another Team which will examine Human Behaviour in Fire for a similar period. At the meeting, I indicated that I will be concentrating on Fire Evacuation for People with Activity Limitations (2001 WHO ICF). ‘People with Activity Limitations’ is translated into French as ‘Personnes à Performances Réduites’.
Another Page on CIB W14 : Fire Engineering will soon be added to this Technical Blog.
High-Rise Buildings – Inadequate Fire Safety ?
On Tuesday, 6th January 2009, The Irish Times carried two articles by Mr. Frank McDonald, Environment Editor, on the current review of Dublin City Council’s Future High-Rise Development Strategy for the City. Two high-rise types are identified in the strategy:
- 8-16 storeys ;
- over 16 storeys.
As a quick aside … I have told Frank, on more than a few occasions, that he has really mellowed over the years !
To widen out the discussion on high-rise development beyond Dublin … depending on local culture, approach to urban planning and fire service support infrastructure, to name but some relevant factors … there are contrasting interpretations of what the following building classifications mean in different parts of the world:
- ‘high-rise’ ;
- ‘tall’ ;
- ‘very tall’ ;
- ‘iconic’.
My serious concern, at this time of critical introspection within a depressed, deflated and demoralized International Building Sector, relates to the Inadequate Fire Engineering Design of High-Rise Buildings above 7 or 8 storeys and Iconic Buildings above 2 storeys … in whatever part of the world you care to consider. And … in regions where the Building Sector has been in extreme ‘over-heat’ mode, e.g. Ireland for the last 3-4 years or Dubayy (United Arab Emirates) for the last 8-10 years, and there is a consequent issue of poor quality of technical control over project design and construction … this concern increases even more.
Many of you reading this post will not easily forget the shocking television images of the 9-11 World Trade Center Incident in New York (2001).
Such was the catastrophic failure exposed on that fateful day – at every level – in common architectural, engineering, construction, technical control and regulatory practices and procedures … that a Critical New Benchmark for International Fire Engineering had to be immediately carved in stone … in all of our countries ! It is as if we, building design professionals, had passed through a black hole and there was no return.
Unfortunately, many in the Fire Engineering Community stuck their heads in the sand and tried to ignore what had happened … faces to save, and sacred cows to protect. Many Greedy Vested Interests, to their continuing shame, have attempted to blatantly deny 9-11 … and are still stalling vital revisions to national fire regulations and standards around the world.
Eventually – and many of you may not know this – the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in the United States of America, issued 2 Technical Reports after 9-11 which each contain important Recommendations:
-
September 2005 – NIST NCSTAR 1 ‘Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers’. 30 Recommendations can be found in Chapter 9.
This Report introduced three important keywords for fire engineering design: ‘reality’ – ‘reliability’ – ‘redundancy’ … and a new key phrase in relation to fire evacuation from buildings: ‘intuitive and obvious’.
Its Recommendations have further special relevance, for the following reasons:
- On 11th September 2001, approximately 8% of World Trade Center building users were people with activity limitations, with 6% having mobility impairments ;
- NIST found that the average surviving occupant in the WTC Towers descended stairwells at about half the slowest speed previously measured for non-emergency or test evacuations. This calls into serious question the concept of standard movement times for people evacuating ;
- NIST strongly recommended that fire-protected and structurally hardened lifts (elevators) should be installed in buildings to allow evacuation of building users with activity limitations, and to improve emergency response activities by providing timely emergency access to firefighters ;
- NIST recommended that evacuation routes should have consistent layouts, and be ‘intuitive and obvious’ for all building users, including visitors who may be unfamiliar with the building, during evacuations ;
- NIST recommended that staircase capacity and stair discharge door widths should be adequate to accommodate contraflow in circulation spaces, i.e. the simultaneous emergency access by firefighters into a building and towards a fire, while building users are still moving away from the fire and evacuating the building. This has implications for the minimum clear width of all staircases in all buildings. Wider staircases facilitate the assisted evacuation and rescue of people with activity limitations.
-
August 2008 – NIST NCSTAR 1A ‘Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7′. 13 Recommendations can be found in Chapter 5 (one Recommendation is new, with the remaining 12 being a more robust restatement of the earlier 2005 Recommendations).
NCSTAR 1A is the more stark report, from the point of view of the everyday fire engineering design of all buildings.
According to Mr. Shyam Sunder, Lead Investigator with NIST, at a Press Briefing for the launch of this Report on 21st August 2008 …
” The collapse of WTC 7 has been a source of extensive speculation. No planes hit the building. There was damage to the building from the collapse of World Trade Center Tower 1, which was approximately 110 metres to the south. But despite damage that severed seven exterior columns, Building 7 remained standing.
The debris from Tower 1, however, started fires on at least 10 floors of the building. The fires burned out of control on six of these ten floors for about seven hours.
The New York City water main had been cut by the collapse of the two WTC Towers (WTC 1 & 2), so the sprinklers in Building 7 did not function for much of the bottom half of the building. Nevertheless, other tall office buildings have burned for as long or longer in similar fires without collapsing – when sprinklers either did not exist or were not functional.”
His main message of the day was …
” World Trade Center Building 7 collapsed because of fires fuelled by common office furnishings. It did not collapse from explosives or from diesel fuel fires.
Building 7 collapsed because fires – similar to those experienced in other tall buildings – burned in the absence of water supply to operate the sprinklers, and burned beyond the ability of firefighters to control fires. It fell because thermal expansion, a phenomenon not considered in current building design practice, caused a fire-induced progressive collapse.”
Unless a Building Design Team has effectively responded (directly, or indirectly through the reference of properly updated national fire regulations and standards), or is responding, to the 2005 NIST Recommendations (NIST NCSTAR 1) – and particularly the more recent 2008 Recommendations (NIST NCSTAR 1A) – in full and in detail – a question mark must be placed over the fire safety in any new High-Rise Building above 7 or 8 storeys, and any new Iconic Building above 2 storeys.
Furthermore … on 31st October 2008, the British Standards Institute published British Standard BS 9999 – Code of Practice for Fire Safety in the Design, Management and Use of Buildings. Unless it can be clearly shown that this Standard has taken adequate account of the 2005 & 2008 NIST Recommendations … a very, very big question mark must also be placed over its value as a practice reference document in Ireland.
Clients and Client Organizations please take note !
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