fire service support infrastructure

Part B – Careless Disregard for Firefighter Safety ?

Posted by CJ Walsh

2009-05-15:  Firefighters have two functions:

–         fighting fires ;   and

–         rescuing people who are trapped in buildings, or for some reason, cannot independently evacuate a building which is on fire.

 

 

Compare for a moment, therefore, Part B5 in the Irish Building Regulations …

 

B5  Access & Facilities for the Fire Service

 

A building shall be so designed and constructed that there is adequate provision for access for fire appliances and such other facilities as may be reasonably required to assist the fire service in the protection of life and property.

 

 

… with Essential Requirement 2 of the European Union (EU) Construction Products Directive 89/106/EEC …

 

2.  Safety in Case of Fire

 

The construction works must be designed and built in such a way that in the event of an outbreak of fire:

– the load-bearing capacity of the construction can be assumed for a specific period of time ;

– the generation and spread of fire and smoke within the works are limited ;

– the spread of the fire to neighbouring construction works is limited ;

– occupants can leave the works or be rescued by other means ;

– the safety of rescue teams is taken into consideration.

 

 

Can you spot the difference ?   Go to the last indent in Essential Requirement 2.

 

There is a complete and careless disregard for Firefighter Safety in the Irish Building Regulations … it isn’t even mentioned.  And forget about any references to ‘firefighter safety’ in the guidance text of Technical Guidance Document B … there are none.

 

 

In July 2003 … the results of a U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study, examining firefighter fatalities in the years 1979-2001, were released.  This important Study was prepared by Captain William R. Mora of the San Antonio Fire Department in Texas.

 

Firefighter Disorientation – loss of direction due to the lack of vision in a building fire – is one of the oldest, least understood and deadliest hazards of firefighting inside a building.  And according to the U.S. National Institute of Occupational Safety & Health (NIOSH) … disorientation usually precedes firefighter fatality.

 

Capt. Mora’s Study focused on 17 building fires in which disorientation played a major part in 23 firefighter fatalities.

 

In the cases studied, the typical Disorientation Sequence was as follows:

 

A fire in an enclosed building with smoke showing occurs.  The arriving fire services immediately initiate an aggressive interior attack to search for the source of the fire.  During the search, the source cannot be located and conditions deteriorate with the production of heat, smoke and prolonged zero visibility.  As firefighters perform an emergency evacuation due to deteriorating conditions, hoseline separation occurs or tangled hoselines are encountered.  Disorientation then occurs as firefighters exceed their air supply, are caught in flashovers or backdrafts, or are trapped by a collapsing floor or roof.  When a firefighter is not located quickly enough, the outcome is a fatality or serious injury.  The disorientation sequence usually unfolds in a building that does not have a sprinkler system or one that is inoperable.

 

The 17 Buildings displayed a wide range of architectural features … including differences in size, height and type of construction.  In 100% of the fire incidents, however, the buildings had an ‘enclosed’ design with very few windows or doors (necessary for prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation by firefighters) in relation to the size of the building.  They also included basements.

 

This ‘enclosed’ form was the result of Architectural Design or alteration after construction was completed.  When owners altered a building, pre-existing windows or doors were closed up using materials such as plywood sheeting or brickwork.

 

 

 

Another Issue … a Fundamental Principle of Fire Engineering Design … after the WTC 9-11 Incident in New York … is to always ensure the provision of Alternative, Safe & ‘Intuitive’ Evacuation Routes for ALL building users.

 

Fully understanding the different functions of firefighters … and giving proper consideration to their safety … why aren’t Alternative, Safe and ‘Intuitive’ Fire Attack Routes for Firefighters provided, as the norm, in buildings ?

 

 

What is ‘Intuitive and Obvious’ Design for Fire Evacuation, anyway ?

 

 

Are Architects and Fire Engineers given any education or training about …

 

–         Visuo-Spatial Learning ?

–         Proprioception ?

–         Cognitive Psychology ?

 

.

 

.

 

END

Enhanced by Zemanta

‘Areas of Rescue Assistance’ in Buildings – More Bytes ?

Posted by CJ Walsh

2009-03-17:  Pull closer to the screen … we can lower the sound level, and be honest with ourselves for a few minutes …

 

We have enabling legislation spewing out of our ears in the European Union on the subject of ‘fire safety, protection and evacuation for all’ … there is absolutely no shortage whatsoever !

 

The problem is that far too many fire officers (prevention and operations) and building control officers in local authorities, architects, engineers and quantity surveyors do not know and/or do not care about this issue.

 

Rates of compliance with legislation are very low.  Proper compliance is such a rare thing … that you would almost feel like holding a party, in celebration, right there on the spot when it’s discovered !   This applies not only to Ireland and Great Britain … but to the rest of Europe as well.

 

And while many countries have already signed and ratified the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which became an International Legal Instrument on 3rd May 2008 … and many more will do likewise during the course of the next year or two, including the United States of America (according to the Whitehouse WebSite !) … I am sure that few individuals in those countries have any understanding of Article 11 (text quoted in an earlier post).

 

 

Accessible Fire Engineering:

On that fateful morning of 11th September, 2001 … at the World Trade Center Complex in Lower Manhattan, New York City … we witnessed a catastrophic failure in common practices and procedures … at all levels …

–         Architectural / Conventional (‘Ambient’) Engineering / Fire Engineering ;

–         Building Management ;

–         Emergency Responders / Firefighters / Rescue Teams ;

–         Control Organizations Having Authority (AHJ’s) or Jurisdiction ;

–         Fire Safety Objectives in Building Legislation, Codes & Standards.

 

This was a ‘real’ fire incident.  It has been very, very closely examined in the intervening years.  Disability was a major issue at the heart of the tragedy … 6% of WTC building occupants were people with mobility impairments … approximately 8%, in total, were people with disabilities.  The overall number of People with Activity Limitations (2001 WHO ICF), however, was higher.

 

It is for this reason that three vital WTC Components have neatly dovetailed and fused … to realize an essential rational and empirical basis for a transformed fire engineering approach which can deal effectively with ‘fire safety, protection and evacuation for all’ of the people who use buildings … Accessible Fire Engineering … a subset of Sustainable Fire Engineering …

 

1.  2005 NIST(USA) NCSTAR 1 Final Report on 9-11 WTC 1 & 2 Tower Collapses. 

 

2.  2008 NIST NCSTAR 1A Final Report on 9-11 WTC 7 Collapse.

 

3.  Ongoing NYC-ATSDR World Trade Center Health Registry (established 2002).

 

 

Further Information about ‘fire safety, protection and evacuation for all’, the NIST 9-11 Reports and the WTC Health Registry … is available at the FireOx International WebSite …

 

www.fireox-international.eu

 

 

 

Picking up, therefore, where I left off a few days ago …

 

 

An ‘Area of Rescue Assistance’ in a Building should:

–         adjoin every fire evacuation staircase in a building ;

–         be located on every floor (note: fire evacuation routes at ground level should lead directly to the exterior) ;

–         include adequate space for the people in wheelchairs, and their assistants, people using crutches, people with visual impairments, etc., who may be expected to use the area of rescue assistance during a fire emergency ;

–         have good lighting at all times (note: lighting activation/de-activation by motion detection, for reasons of energy efficiency, should not be used in an area of rescue assistance) ;

–         be clearly indicated with good signage ;

–         be fitted with an accessible and reliable communication system placed at a height of 900 – 1 200 mm above finished floor level, facilitating direct contact with a person in the main fire and security control centre for the building ;

–         be of sufficient size for the storage of a sufficient number of (powered) evacuation chairs, portable fire extinguishers, a fire hose reel and a manual fire alarm call point, a fire evacuation supply kit containing, for example, smoke hoods, suitable gloves to protect a person’s hands from debris when pushing his/her manual wheelchair, patch kits to repair flat tyres, and extra batteries for powered wheelchairs, etc.

 

 

The Size of an Area of Rescue Assistance should:

–         relate to expected local usage during a fire emergency.  When the number of people using/occupying/working in/visiting a specific building is considered … calculate how many may have to wait there, if the lifts/elevators cannot be used for evacuation and/or fire safety management procedures fail.

 

For example, if there are only two fire evacuation staircases on a floor in a building (on opposite sides of the building, of course), each area of rescue assistance should be designed to cater for the expected needs of the full floor.

 

Please also see the end of my Post: ‘U.S. Disability Statistics – EU Practical Application ?’, dated 2009-02-25.

 

 

Evacuation Chairs should be capable of:

–         being safely and easily handled ;

–         carrying people of large weight (up to 150 kg) ;

–         going down staircases, which may be narrow and of unusual shape, particularly in existing buildings ;

–         travelling long distances horizontally and externally, perhaps over rough ground, in order to reach a ‘place of safety’.

 

When it is necessary to go up an evacuation staircase to reach ground level … for example, from a basement or underground shopping centre … Powered Fire Evacuation Chairs should always be provided.

 

 

A ‘Reliable’ Buddy System:

In buildings with a reasonably stable user profile, e.g. workplaces, a Buddy System should be introduced throughout the building user population.  For reliability and flexibility, e.g. to accommodate absence or holiday leave, a buddy system should always comprise at least 3 or 4 people.

 

In the case of a person using a wheelchair, his/her Buddy Unit should never be less than 4 people …

 

Black and white photograph showing the correct technique for assisting the evacuation of a person who uses a wheelchair. U.S. Fire Administration 'Orientation Manual for First Responders on the Evacuation of People with Disabilities'. FA-235/August 2002.
Black and white photograph showing the correct technique for assisting the evacuation of a person who uses a wheelchair. U.S. Fire Administration ‘Orientation Manual for First Responders on the Evacuation of People with Disabilities’. FA-235/August 2002.

 

Fire Safety Management Procedures:

Prior to putting any Management Procedures into operation … and certainly before carving any of these procedures in stone … meaningful consultation should take place with building users and local fire authorities … which, particularly in the case of people with activity limitations, will produce the desired outcome of informed consent.

 

Informed Consent …

Consent freely obtained – without threats or improper inducements – after appropriate disclosure to a person of relevant, adequate and easily assimilated information in a form (e.g. oral, written, braille) and language understood by that person.

 

Personal Representative …

A person charged, under European Union or EU Member State national law, with the duty of representing another person’s interests in any specified respect, or of exercising specified rights on that person’s behalf – and including the parent or legal guardian of a child, i.e. a person under the age of 18 years, unless otherwise provided for by European Union or EU Member State national law.

 

 

Without wishing to be obscure, or to avoid the issue … Fire Safety Management Procedures need to be developed to suit each specific building, with its own building user population.

 

.

 

.

 

END

Enhanced by Zemanta

‘112’ – A Single European Emergency Phone Number ??

Posted by CJ Walsh

2009-03-16:  Wherever you are in the European Union (EU) … and whatever you are doing … there is just one phone number that you need to remember for emergency services – ‘112’.

 

Now that Bulgaria has set up its own 112 Hotline, the single EU Emergency Phone Number works in All EU Member States, without exception …

 

Check out your country … here !

 

 

When you call ‘112’, – from a land line, a public pay phone or a mobile/cell/handy phone – a local operator will either deal with your call directly, or redirect you to the emergency service you need – ambulance, police, or the fire services.

 

There is no charge for a ‘112’ Phone Call.

 

The single EU Emergency Phone Number does not replace existing national emergency phone numbers – it works alongside them.

 

Did you know that this number has been around for almost 20 years … and still only 22% of Europeans know about it ?

 

 

However, one small little problem remains … you can only call this number … that is, if you are physically capable of making a call and having a phone conversation !

 

Article 9 of the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (text quoted in an earlier post !), which became an International Legal Instrument on 3rd May 2008, requires that the …

 

EU ‘112’ Emergency Phone Number System SHALL be ACCESSIBLE !

 

Get your fingers out Brussels !!!

 

.

 

.

 

UPDATE 2013-04-06:   In the interim … there has been no dramatic improvement …

 

Flash EuroBarometer 368 – February 2013 – Summary Report

 

The European Emergency Number ‘112’

Click the Link above to read/download PDF File (1.4 MB)

 

.

 

.

 

END

Enhanced by Zemanta

Dublin Stardust Fire Tragedy – The End ?

Posted by CJ Walsh

2009-02-05 (2021-08-04):  ‘In the early hours of the 14th February 1981, a catastrophic fire swept through the Stardust Ballroom in Artane, Dublin, killing forty eight people and causing serious injury to one hundred and twenty eight others.  The overwhelming majority of the victims were in the age group of eighteen to twenty five and came from the neighbouring areas of Artane, Kilmore and Greater Coolock.  The scale and horror of the tragedy was such that it was, and remains, the greatest disaster to have occurred in the history of the State.’

 

Paragraph 1.2, Report of the Independent Examination of the Stardust Victims Committee’s Case for a Reopened Inquiry into the Stardust Fire Disaster.

 

In the middle of January 2009, relatives of Stardust Disco Fire Victims were forced to hold a lengthy sit-in protest at Government Buildings, in Dublin … in order to gain access to this recent Report by Mr. Paul Coffey, Senior Counsel.  See the Photograph of four forlorn relatives, by Mr. Dara Mac Dónaill, on the Front Page of The Irish Times (2009-01-15).

 

 

In Paragraph 5.15(1) of the Report (no reference number, no publication date) … Mr. Coffey recommended:

 

–         that the Government should consider whether it can … place on the public record an acknowledgement of the (Stardust) Tribunal’s findings that there is no evidence that the fire was started deliberately and that its cause is unknown ;

 

Paragraph 5.15(2) continued:

 

–         in the event that this cannot be done, there should be a further inquiry … ;

 

 

On Tuesday evening, 3rd February 2009, in the Dáil (Irish Parliament) … the Irish Government moved, with haste, to formally correct the public record in accordance with Mr. Coffey’s recommendation in Paragraph 5.15(1).  See the Dáil Report on the Stardust Tragedy, by Ms. Marie O’Halloran, in The Irish Times (2009-02-04).

 

Should this be the end of the matter ?   No.

 

From the beginning, have the events surrounding this tragedy been well ‘managed’ ?   Yes.

 

 

 

In Separate Letters, dated 4th April 2006, sent by registered post to the Editors of The Irish Times (Dublin), The Irish Independent (Dublin) and The Irish Examiner (Cork), I wrote the following …

 

Re:  Stardust Fire Re-Examination Now Due !

 

As a young architect in private practice, I saw the Dublin Fire ‘Establishment’ disappear from public view, without trace, after the 1981 Stardust Fire;  it was almost impossible, for at least a year after, to have a meeting with a Fire Prevention Officer.

 

Would it not be reasonable to expect that, in 25 years, our understanding of fire behaviour in buildings, and of the practices and procedures associated with serious fire incidents, has improved ?

 

On 26th October 2005, the  NIST Final Report on the 9-11 WTC 1 & 2 Tower Collapses  was presented to Congress in the United States.  Chapter 9 of that Report contains 30 important Recommendations which must radically alter professional fire engineering practice in the case of all building types, of all sizes … even in Dublin, Ireland !

 

The time is now due for an Independent and Impartial Technical Re-Examination of the Stardust Fire Incident, and any relevant events which occurred during a period of time beginning 6 Months before 14th February 1981 and terminating approximately 18 Months after that day.

 

Such a Re-Examination must exclude any involvement by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DEHLG).

 

Signed:  C. J. Walsh, Chief Technical Officer, FireOx International.

 

 

 

A Similar ‘Management’ Exercise is taking place in relation to the series of Fatal Fire Incidents at the Oldcourt Local Authority Housing Estate in Bray, County Wicklow, Ireland.

 

.

.

END